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We inescapably experience the world through our body. Yet as our embodiment itself is 
the background of all our everyday experience, it appears to be experienced quietly. We tend 
to take for granted that our body is present in and contributing to all experience, as we also 
tend to take for granted the feeling that it belongs to us and it is under our control. However, 
certain neuropsychological disorders that arise after damage to the right hemisphere of the brain 
serve as a reminder that these feelings and intuitions cannot always be taken for granted. What 
is more ‘counter-intuitive’ than someone who is unaware of the fact that they can no longer 
move half their body? Or someone who cannot recognise their own arm or, leg as theirs? These 
disorders have troubled neurology, philosophy and psychology since the time of Charcot, Janet, 
Freud and Babinski and continue to represent frequent, largely unmet and poorly studied 
clinical challenges. The present thesis aims to explore from an interdisciplinary vantage point 
the way in which the body is experienced in people with such neuropsychological disorders 
following a stroke. More specifically, it aims to complement current scientific perspectives on 
these disorders with existential-phenomenological ideas regarding the experience of 
embodiment in these patients, with particular emphasis on the ‘pre-reflected’ dimensions of 
embodiment and their derivatives in mental life as highlighted by the philosopher Merleau-
Ponty.  
The empirical part of the thesis involves behavioural and neuroimaging methodologies 
from the field of neuropsychology, including two case series and one single case study (total 
N = 14). Three hypotheses inspired by the early writings of Merleau-Ponty on embodiment 
were explored in these three studies, respectively: (a) whether patients with motor unawareness 
have a ‘pre-reflective’ awareness of their deficits; (b) whether such forms of pre-reflective 
awareness may paradoxically contribute to their explicit unawareness and (c)  whether insights 
generated by the above two studies could be translated to a psychophysical intervention that 
can help a patient recover her explicit awareness of her paralysis. The results of these studies 
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confirmed all three hypotheses, with some theoretical constraints that are discussed in each 
chapter.  
More generally, the results of these studies are discussed in relation to both scientific 
and philosophical theories of body awareness and most importantly in relation to clinical 
challenges and the scope of existential counselling psychology. I argue that these disorders 
allow a unique insight into how existential, counselling and psychotherapeutic psychology can 
position its practice in relation to some of these paradoxical ways of being-in-the-world that 
are not habitually so ‘visible’, unless revealed by brain damage. These considerations apply 
particularly to the more general paradox of psychotherapeutic clients who frequently come to 
therapy consciously hoping to change their habitual ways of being-in-the-world while 
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1. Chapter 1 Introduction and Literature Review 
 
1.1. An Introductory Overview of the Thesis 
Acquired brain damage1, as may be caused by a stroke, can lead to contralateral 
hemiplegia (i.e. paralysis of the side of the body opposite to the side of the brain damage). This 
may sometimes be accompanied by feelings and beliefs about one’s body that are not shared 
by the people in the patients’ social environment, nor the clinical team responsible for their 
care. Patients may, for instance, falsely believe that they can move their paralysed limbs despite 
being demonstrably unable to do.  They may even attempt to move and injure themselves in 
the process. Other patients may deny the ownership of their own arm or leg and claim that it 
belongs to a spouse, or friend, despite acknowledging that it is attached to their own body. Such 
neuropsychological disorders that entail counterintuitive and relatively long-lasting 
abnormalities in the subjective experience of one’s own body2 have long captured the interest 
of not only neurologists and neuroscientists but also philosophers and psychologists (see 
Literature Review below for details). These disorders will also be the focus of the present 
thesis.  
Specifically, these disorders raise questions regarding the bodily foundations of our self-
consciousness. While this thesis will not undertake a detailed review of the literature dedicated 
to clarify the notion of the self, it follows certain psychologists, philosophers and 
neuroscientists who do not conceive the self as a static internal snapshot of some mysterious 
substance, or structure called “the self” (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991; see Appendix VI 
for a heuristic glossary of terms). Rather they have grounded the notion of the self in its 
embodied foundations (Bermúdez, Marcel & Eilan 1995; Gallagher, 2005; Legrand, 2006) and 
                                                          
1 This excludes spinal cord injury that does not affect the brain per se and hence it is not typically associated 
with such cognitive deficits 
2 Several debates surround the terms ‘experience’ and ‘perception’, as well as ‘awareness’ and 
‘consciousness’ in philosophy that exceed the scope of this thesis (see Glossary for heuristic 
definitions).  
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have opted for employing a variety of first- and third-person approaches to the description of a 
“core” or “minimal” self, as the common denominator of all other facets of self-consciousness 
(Gallagher, 2000; see also Glossary). This minimal self is conceived as an ongoing, emergent 
process of tracking and controlling bodily properties as a whole. Embodiment refers to the fact 
that the experiences I am living through are given to me through my body, an organism situated 
in a particular space-time context. Indeed, the idea that our everyday experiences are 
characterized by a minimal or ‘pre-reflective’ (see below) sense of self has been highlighted 
by a longstanding phenomenological tradition and more recently referred to as the “minimal 
self” by contemporary philosophers such as Zahavi (2005, 2014), Gallagher (2008) and 
Legrand (2006) with direct reference to the phenomenological tradition. According to such 
views, the development of the mind, and particularly cognition, can be viewed as the 
consequence of embodiment within a wider physical and social environment. 
 
Motivated predominately by such contemporary, phenomenological views on 
‘embodied cognition’ and the minimal self, that are seen as attempts to further develop 
Merleau-Ponty’s unique perspective on the role of embodiment for the structuring of all 
experience (see Literature Review), the present thesis aims to explore from an interdisciplinary 
vantage point the way in which the body is experienced in people with ‘unawareness of 
paralysis’ following a stroke. More specifically, it aims to provide an alternative to the one-to-
one aetiological relations between neurological deficits and unawareness put forward by 
current neuroscientific models and complement scientific perspectives with existential-
phenomenological ideas regarding the experience of embodiment in these patients, with 
particular emphasis on the pre-reflected dimensions of embodiment and their derivatives in 
mental life. Three hypotheses inspired by existential-phenomenological views on embodiment 
are explored in the present thesis: (a) whether patients with motor unawareness have a ‘pre-
reflective, or tacit’ (see below for definition of this term in both philosophy and science) 
awareness of their deficits; (b) whether such forms of prereflective awareness may 
paradoxically contribute to their explicit unawareness and (c)  whether insights generated by 
the above two studies could be translated to a psychophysical intervention that can help a 
patient recover her explicit awareness of her paralysis. The results of these studies will be first 
discussed in relation to both scientific and philosophical theories of self-consciousness but 
ultimately they will be considered in relation to clinical challenges and the scope of existential 
counselling psychology. It is hoped that the results of such enquiries will contribute to a better 
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theoretical and clinical understanding of body unawareness from both a neuropsychological 
and a phenomenological-existential perspective, by generating new insights to existential 
theory, as well as to existential counselling and psychotherapeutic psychology. 
 
Methodologically, the thesis attempts to follow Merleau-Ponty’s3 epistemological 
stance in exploring theoretically and empirically the phenomenon of neurological motor 
unawareness from an interdisciplinary perspective (see Chapter 2 for further details and 
justification). Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) argued that one way by which philosophical enquiry 
can discover the modes of pre-reflective experience is by examining breakdowns in bodily 
functions, and particularly brain functions. He argued that we can thus discover the underlying 
patterns of our normal conscious state that hide their influence; that work at leaving no traces 
of their ‘crime’. For Merleau-Ponty, the experience of the body cannot be reducible to the 
consciousness of the body; the role of the body in mental life is to a degree ‘prereflective’ and 
as such impenetrable to phenomenological reflection, it must be worked out conceptually in 
relation to the empirical sciences. Thus, Merleau-Ponty himself indeed examined breakdowns 
in brain functions, to discover the hidden modes of our pre-reflective experience of the body 
and the world more generally. In recent years, this epistemological and methodological stance 
has been revived by certain proponents of the embodied and enactive cognition approach (e.g. 
Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991), who have criticised the phenomenological tradition of 
remaining abstract and dedicated to exploration by reflection only, despite the emphasis of 
many scholars on praxis and action. They have suggested that interdisciplinary efforts, 
including ones that include scientific experimentation, may represent necessary, more 
embodied and active engagements with human nature and particularly the paradoxes of self-
consciousness (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991). The present thesis will follow a similar 
epistemological path (see Chapter 2 for details and justification). Specifically, the thesis will 
make use of quantitative, experimental research methods from neuropsychology to investigate 
the nature of body awareness following a stroke, while at the same time it uses insights from 
phenomenological-existential theories to generate novel hypotheses and insights about the 
embodied experience of such patients. This methodological approach is not free of tensions 
and limitations, and is unlikely to be sufficient to fully engage with the lived experience of 
these patients in ways that perhaps qualitative methods may have. Nevertheless, as I argue in 
                                                          
3 Particularly Merleau-Ponty’s early works, such as the now classic work ‘The Phenomenology of Perception’ 
(1945/1962) and other early writings (e.g. ‘The World of Perception’, 1948/2004).   
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detail below (see Chapter 2), it may be a necessary first step towards an integrative, 
interdisciplinary consideration of such phenomena given (1) the practical restrictions imposed 
by the nature of associated cognitive deficits at acute and subacute stages of post-stroke 
recovery, as well as (2) the epistemological and professional gulf between scholars of the mind 
and brain that has been created over the decades in relation to such disorders, i.e. disorders that 
lie at the crossroads between the psychological and the neurological, the biological and the 
mental (see below and Chapter 2 for details) and lastly (3) the intertwined relation between our 
embodiment and our consciousness that at times leads to some paradoxical ways of being-in-
the-world that are not habitually ‘visible’, unless revealed by brain damage and ensuing 
psychological changes (see Chapters 2 and 4 for details).   
In addition to the theoretical and epistemological importance of examining the 
experience of the body following neurological damage, such a topic is of clinical 
relevanceparticularly to psychotherapeutic and counselling psychology. The handful of 
attempts to provide psychotherapy to these patients has shown that these symptoms are not 
only linked with very powerful emotions, but also that the establishment of a good therapeutic 
rapport reveals a number of psychological struggles with a new personal and social reality (e.g. 
Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000). Moreover, even if the phenomena in question are transient 
and thus of limited interest to neurologists and neuropsychiatrists, their occurrence at this 
critical stage is a major obstacle in acute settings, as it can have long term effects on patients’ 
psychological and physical recovery (Gialanella et al., 2005; Prigatano, 2010; see Literature 
Review for further details). Unfortunately, patients may fail to see why they need to engage 
with the clinical team in addressing a problem they do not believe they have and often 
invitations of cooperation are ineffective. I thus believe that an interdisciplinary inquiry into 
the embodied experience of these patients as seen in a general in-patient stroke ward may 
uniquely contribute to the wider understanding that patients’ needs for psychotherapy may be 
added to their needs for speech therapy, occupational therapy and physiotherapy that are 
routinely offered in such wards, hopefully with important clinical implications.  
 
Unfortunately, there is currently no specialised provision for the psychological treatment 
or management of body unawareness and related disorders in most Western countries. The 
provision of counselling and psychotherapy constitutes an exception and most research on the 
topic has not hitherto been clinically pertinent (Kortte & Hillis, 2011; see Prigatano & 
Morrone-Strupinsky, 2010 and Jenkinson, Preston & Ellis, 2011, for reviews). Specifically, 
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stroke-related symptoms of body awareness are often considered as ‘unintentional’ by 
neurologists, as the direct consequence of brain damage, occurring somehow ‘irrespective of’ 
the subject and his feelings (e.g. Bisiach and Geminiani, 1991). Sometimes clinicians claim 
that  patients’ experience ‘is not real’, or that the denial of their deficits is not ‘psychological’ 
denial, but ‘genuine’ neurological unawareness (e.g. Prigatano, 2014). Such rather dualistic 
perspectives have rendered the need for psychotherapy somehow obsolete in ‘genuinely 
anosognosic’ patients, who are implicitly conceived as broken down machines rather than 
individuals with goals and motivations. Indeed, it seems that one of the reasons for this health 
care neglect may be the association of brain damage with old-fashioned medical traditions in 
neurology, which view psychological factors and changes as unrelated, or at best secondary to 
brain function. In addition, within clinical psychology, psychometric traditions are concerned 
with identifying the critical ‘cognitive’ deficits following brain damage without a necessary 
parallel concern for understanding the emotional state and subjective experience of the patient, 
or their potential relation to the patient’s more general embodiment.  
 
Indeed, in a review of a different yet similar topic of false memory following 
neurological damage, I have argued that research and clinical practice in the field of 
neuropsychology have been dominated by implicit dualism and polarisation between 
neurological and cognitive views on the one hand and psychotherapeutic and particularly 
psychodynamic views on the other (Fotopoulou, 2008). It seems that something similar has 
taken place in the study and clinical treatment of body unawareness, with no communication 
or cross-fertilisation between neurological and cognitive views on the one hand and 
philosophical, or psychotherapeutic views on embodied cognition on the other. As I outline in 
my personal statement below (see Chapter 2), I believe that such polarisation can only harm 
the patients themselves and their families whose experience following a stroke is literally 
‘divided’ between professionals.  This thesis is predominately motivated by the willingness to 
take the risk of considering such phenomena across the fields, even if this entails a necessary 
methodological reductionism (see glossary) and a number of areas of theoretical and 
professional tension between different scholarly traditions, as I outline in Chapter 2 below.  
 
Before reviewing the background of this project more formally however, I wish to 
emphasise that this professional division is not of course limited to body awareness deficits 
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following stroke. The first half of the 20th century brought about a wide divide between mind 
scholars in the sciences and the humanities, with deep divisions between biologists,  geneticists 
and brain scientists on the one side and clinicians, philosophers and social scientists on the 
other. By contrast, in the last 50 years one has seen the gradual emergence of many 
interdisciplinary traditions attempting to reduce this divide, including neuropsychiatry, 
neuropsychology and even neurophilosophy and neuropsychotherapy. Such fields have 
allowed some cross-fertilisation in areas of neurological interest, such as the consideration of 
the relationship between neurological false memories and the philosophical concept of self-
deception (Hirstein, 2005), as well as various other philosophical perspectives on 
psychopathology as seen in either psychiatric or neurological contexts (e.g. Bayne & Pacherie, 
2005; Price, Barrell & Rainville, 2002 Eilan, 2000; see also Chapter 2 for detailed description). 
Nevertheless, it appears that implicitly dualistic perspectives on the mind exist and such 
interdisciplinary endeavours are frequently criticised as betraying the principles and 
epistemological constraints of each discipline (e.g. Fotopoulou, 2012; see Chapter 2 for 
details).  
A characteristic example of the consequences of such dualism and the resulting 
alienation between fields is the neuropsychiatric counterpart of the unawareness phenomena 
that will be considered in this thesis. Specifically, while some stroke survivors may become 
unaware of their paralysis, some individuals without any known history of neurological damage 
may experience paralysis, or other sensorimotor symptoms such as tremor, epileptic-type 
attacks, or sensory disturbances. In this sense, ‘functional’ sensorimotor symptoms are the 
‘inverse’ of anosognosic symptoms. Some patients may be affected by such symptoms for 
years, but clinical assessment shows that normal function is possible in the relevant body parts. 
For example, in some patients with left leg weakness, power of hip extension may be weak 
when tested directly, but the apparently weak muscles may activate normally when the patient 
activates the right hip flexor (Hoover’s sign; Hoover, 1908). Unfortunately, such ‘signs’ are 
not available in many other cases. Historically, and mainly under the influence of 
psychoanalytic theory, psychological, emotional factors, such as trauma, sexual conflict or 
distress, have been suggested as causal factors. These explanations are reflected in the various 
alternative terms used to describe these disorders, such as psychogenic, psychosomatic, 
conversion, or hysteria. Distress and psychological trauma are indeed seen at higher rates in 
these patients than in the healthy population (Hallett, Fahn & Jankovic, 2006), but they have 
not been found to be sensitive markers of functional neurological symptoms (Roelofs & 
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Spinhoven, 2007). Thus, an alternative, perhaps equally problematic terminology focuses on 
what patients do not have (non-organic, medically unexplained symptoms). Indeed, the related 
debates regarding the ‘psychogenic’ or ‘non-organic’ causes of these disorders portray a 
compartmentalised, dualistic brain-mind relation.  
Remarkably, this dualism has not only influenced debates regarding the aetiology of 
functional sensorimotor disorders but also views regarding their very existence, i.e. their 
occurrence and prevalence. Specifically, widespread beliefs among historians emerged in the 
last two decades according to which ‘hysteria’ as described classically by Janet, Freud or 
Charcot has all but disappeared in the 20th century (Shorter, 1992; Micale, 1994; Webster, 
1996). In his book,  From Paralysis to Fatigue (1992), for instance, Edward Shorter argues 
that symptoms like hysterical paralysis that were common in the 19th century are now rarities 
that have given way to more general presentations such as generalised fatigue. According to 
such historians, more classic hysterical presentations should instead be attributed to repressive 
Victorian culture, the poor ‘psychological’ literacy of the time and limited neurological 
understanding that misdiagnosed some ‘genuine’ neurological diseases for functional 
symptoms.  
Yet, ample data demonstrate that both the quantity and the quality of functional 
symptoms remains unaltered in medical practice (Lempert, Dieterich, Huppert & Brandt, 1990; 
Parry, Murray, Hart & Bass, 2006; Perkin, 1989; Ewald, Rogne, Ewald & Fink, 1994; Stone et 
al., 2008), a situation that is curiously not reflected in research activity, historical accounts, 
teaching or public awareness. Indeed, more recently several neurologists and clinicians from 
various countries have started to write papers and reviews precisely to this effect, arguing that 
anyone with clinical experience in neurological wards knows that ‘hysteria’ has not 
disappeared (van Gijn, 2007; Stone et al., 2008). Instead, what seems to have disappeared in a 
willingness to clinically or scientifically consider phenomena that challenge any artificial 
divide between the mental and the bodily. In some neurologists’ own words “we propose that 
when the neurological study of disease and the psychiatric study of neurosis became divergent 
endeavours at the start of the 20th century, hysteria fell into a no-man’s land between these two 
specialities. Neurologists were not interested in seeing the patients and the patients were mostly 
not interested in seeing psychiatrists” (Stone et al., 2008; p. 12). In other terms, functional 
disorders seem to have fallen in the professional gap between interest in the psychological and 
interest in the neurological. Following several years of research and clinical placements in 
stroke wards (see also Chapter 2), I have come to realise that the phenomenon of post-stroke 
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motor unawareness shares such a fate with its counterpart; it has fallen into the professional 
gap between neurological indifference for the mental and a psychotherapeutic mistrust of the 
neurological. This thesis is motivated by the wish to take a first, tiny but firm step into this gap. 
 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
1.2.1. Embodiment and the ‘Minimal Self’ 
The main topic addressed by this thesis relates to the ‘embodied self’. The concept of 
the self, or self-consciousness has always been an elusive and controversial topic in the 
humanities and increasingly the sciences. Indeed, the question of what, if anything, makes the 
“self” a unifying phenomenon has attracted a considerable number of empirical studies and 
theoretical accounts. Philosophers like David Hume famously doubted its existence and one 
can find modern versions of such arguments in both philosophy (Metzinger, 2003; 2009) and 
science (Hood, 2012; Gillihan & Farah, 2005). Undertaking a detailed review of the literature 
dedicated to clarify the notion of self lies beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, for the limited 
purposes here, it is important to notice that to face the challenge of an understanding of self-
consciousness, including the problem of its existence and its definition, some psychologists, 
philosophers and neuroscientists have recently opted for distinguishing between several kinds 
and levels of self-consciousness and for employing a variety of first- and third-person 
approaches to the search of a “core” or “minimal” self, as the common denominator of all other 
facets of self-consciousness (Gallagher, 2000). Importantly, this minimal self is not to be 
conceived as a kind of internal representation of some substance called the “self”. Instead, 
minimal selfhood is conceived as an ongoing, dynamic and emergent processes of tracking and 
controlling bodily properties as a whole and hence the notion of the self needs to be grounded 
in its bodily foundations (Bermúdez et al. 1995; Gallagher 2005; Legrand 2006)4.  
Such views have an intricate philosophical history and they have been recently 
invigorated in psychology and neuroscience; they stand in direct opposition to classic, 
                                                          
4 It should be emphasied that the term ‘self-consciousness’ here, particularly as applied to the ‘minimal self’ 
does not imply a conscious of the ‘self’ as an object of consciousness, as something other than the ‘act of 
consciousness’ (see Glossary). It is instead conceived as the very ‘givenness’ of such experiences as mine, as I 
outline below. 
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Cartesian philosophical views on self-consciousness that portray a unitary and disembodied 
self. This Cartesian perspective has indeed been challenged by recent philosophical positions 
and scientific theories that view the self as primarily embodied and emergent. According to 
these approaches, (e.g. Bermúdez et al., 1995; Clark, 1998; Damasio, 1994; 1999; Gallagher, 
2005; Gallese, 2007; Varela et al., 1991), several facets of cognition are causally or even 
constitutively related to the physical body and its potential for action. Moreover, whenever I 
perceive or feel something, these experiences are given to me as mine. Within the last few 
decades, a growing number of philosophical accounts described this feeling of “mineness” in 
terms of first-person giveness of experience that is subsumed under the notion of “minimal 
self” (Zahavi, 2005).  A number of issues remain controversial within such approaches, such 
as the question of whether and to what extent mental representations are implicated in 
embodied cognition and the minimal self. In either case however, advocates of this approach 
agree on the following premise: if the self is that which perceives and acts and perceiving and 
acting are to be understood in bodily terms, then the self is, first and foremost, an embodied 
self. 
Embodiment refers to the fact that the experiences I am living through are given to me 
through my body, an organism situated in a particular space-time context. Indeed, the idea that 
our everyday experiences are characterized by a minimal or ‘pre-reflective’ (see below) sense 
of self has been highlighted by a longstanding phenomenological tradition (E. Husserl, M. 
Merleau-Ponty) and more recently discussed by contemporary philosophers such as Zahavi 
(2005, 2014), Gallagher (2000, 2008) and Legrand (2006) with direct reference to the 
phenomenological tradition. This approach takes its roots on the idea that rather than viewing 
the body as a mere support system for a “mind that need to be fuelled and transported” (Pecher 
and Zwaan 2005:1), one needs to view the mind as a support system that facilitates the 
functioning and adaptation of the body within a wider physical and social environment. The 
development of the mind therefore, and cognition more specifically, can be viewed as the 
consequence of embodiment within such environment.  
Prior to unpacking this notion from an interdisciplinary perspective, a few brief 
conceptual clarifications are in need. What is understood as ‘pre-reflective awareness’ within 
such context and particularly by contemporary phenomenological philosophers such as Zahavi 
(2005)? Philosophers usually start with the intuitive idea of reflecting upon our inner 
experiences: for example, I can introspect what I am experiencing right now while drinking my 
coffee. I can also recognise myself in reflective surfaces like mirrors and reflect that this image 
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is mine (see also Chapter 5). Hence, one convenient way to define the notion of pre-reflective 
self-awareness is by contrasting it with reflective self-awareness. The latter occurs for instance 
whenever one reflectively introspects one’s ongoing experiences or during explicit self-
recognition of one’s face in the mirror. By contrast, pre-reflective self-awareness does not 
involve any form of high-order self-monitoring. One can get a bearing on this 
phenomenological take on self-awareness by contrasting it with the view on perceptual 
awareness defended by Brentano. According to Brentano (1874/1973), when I perceive a glass, 
I am aware that I am perceiving a glass. Importantly, he acknowledges that I do not have here 
two distinct mental states, but rather one single mental phenomenon: my awareness of the glass 
is one and the same as my awareness of perceiving it. But by means of this unified mental state, 
I have an awareness of two objects: the glass and my perceptual experience. Opposing this 
view, classic phenomenologists such as E. Husserl, existential phenomenologists such as J-P. 
Sartre and contemporary philosophers5 (Legrand, 2006; Zahavi, 2014) insisted upon the idea 
that my awareness of my experience is not an awareness of it as an object, in the sense that I 
cannot endorse the perspective of an external observer or spectator on it. In pre-reflective self-
awareness, experience is given not as an object, but as a fundamentally first-personal subjective 
experience. 
 Indeed, some contemporary phenomenological accounts suggest that in pre-reflective 
self-awareness, experience is a fundamentally first-personal subjective experience (Zahavi, 
2005); it possesses ‘egological’ content, or content that concerns oneself. Thus, whenever I 
perceive a painting, the perception of the painting is somehow given to me as mine, in that I 
have simultaneously a tacit experience of myself as the subject of that perception. While not 
all philosophers would agree with this suggestion (e.g. Janzen, 2007), for some philosophers 
(Zahavi, 2005 and some neuroscientists (Damasio, 1999), this egological content is 
synonymous with the feeling qualities that are intrinsic to phenomenal consciousness, the 
‘what-it-is-like’ qualities of subjectivity. Put crudely, one cannot look at the painting without 
being tacitly, necessarily aware that the feelings and sensations one may have about the 
painting, are one’s own feelings and sensations. Clearly, there is much more to be said about 
perceptual awareness in general and the related debates in contemporary philosophy but for the 
purposes of this thesis, I will restrict my focus to the phenomenological insight according to 
which our experiences always involve a kind of implicit, pre-reflective self-awareness which 
                                                          
5 For a detailed discussion of these points see the volume Pre-reflective Self-Consciousness: Sartre and 
Contemporary Philosophy of Mind edited by Miguens et al. (2015).  
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is a more basic form of self-awareness and other more high-order, reflexive forms of awareness 
are built upon it.  
Crucially, the bodily self is not an awareness of the body in passive isolation from the 
physical and social world. It is the awareness of an active body dynamically exploring the 
environment. Indeed, both classic phenomenologists such as E. Husserl and M. Merleau-Ponty 
(see below) and more recently researchers working within the embodied/enactive cognition 
paradigm (e.g. Varela et al. 1991; Gallagher, 2005) insist on the idea that pre-reflective self-
awareness ought to be understood primarily by taking into account the larger brain-body-
environment dynamics (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007; Menary 2007; Hutto and Myin 2013, 
Colombetti 2014). This emphasis on embodied cognition was recently adopted also in science 
and hence I now turn to some of these considerations in science, with particular reference to 
the present thesis.  
 
1.2.2.  Parallel Empirical and Theoretical Considerations in Science 
The above philosophical perspectives on embodiment are endorsed by many 
contemporary scientists (of course to different degrees and not always in full correspondence 
with the philosophical traditions from which they originate) and hence embodied cognition has 
been the focus of much empirical research in the past two decades. In relation to the present 
thesis, a plethora of investigations in experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience have 
used several experimental ‘tricks’ to systematically manipulate sensorimotor signals, promote 
their integration, or generate conflicts and illusions, and hence study their role in body 
awareness (Blanke et al., 2015 for review). These studies, as well as investigations in 
neuropsychology and neuropsychiatry (see Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2014 for review) suggest 
that primary sensorimotor signals, including both interoceptive (signals originating from within 
the organism, such as proprioception or cardiac variables) and exteroceptive (sensory channels 
linked to classic sensory systems such as vision and audition) signals about the body, are 
integrated and organised at different levels of the neurocognitive hierarchy to form several 
neurocognitively distinct dimensions of minimal, as well as ‘extended’ selfhood. Related 
notions, for example, are the concepts of ‘body ownership’ (the sense, feeling or metacognitive 
judgement that I am the subject of a voluntary or involuntary movement, or that I am 
experiencing a certain sensation like touch) and of ‘body agency’ (the sense, feeling or 
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metacognitive judgement that I am the cause or author of a movement and its consequences in 
the world) (Gallagher, 2003; Legrand, 2006).   
Indeed, questions such as how we come to experience our body as ‘mine’ and as “under 
my control” have received increasing empirical attention in both developmental and adult 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience over the past, few decades. Several researchers within 
such traditions have focused on multisensory integration experiments, and other ‘contingency 
detection’ paradigms (see Gergely & Watson, 1999; Blanke et al., 2015 for reviews). For 
instance, some studies have shown that infants as young as 3-5 months, show sensitivity to 
body-related, proprioceptive-visual synchrony, and as motor control develops, also spatial 
congruency (Rochat & Morgan, 1995). In such paradigms, infants tend to respond differentially 
to experimentally controlled and visually presented feedback of their body parts (e.g. legs) 
moving synchronously and in spatial congruency (e.g. same direction of movement in space) 
to their own movements, rather than manipulated visual feedback that does not have these 
properties (e.g. asynchronous or incongruent movements). A recent study further found that 
new-borns detect visual-tactile synchrony in stimuli directed to their own faces and were able 
to discriminate synchrony from visual-tactile asynchrony (Filippetti et al., 2013), in the sense 
that they showed preferential looking during a synchronous visual-tactile condition in which 
they were observing a video of an upright infant face being touched in synchrony with their 
own face, as compared to an asynchronous, temporally delayed condition. This “sensitivity to 
synchrony” and similar properties are in fact the basis of most multisensory integration 
paradigms in adults: sensitivity to synchrony (the so called ‘glue of the senses’) across sensory 
input allows perceiving subjects to experience unitary multimodal events and to separate 
stimulation originating from the body versus that arising from the environment, including other 
agents. For example, hundreds of studies in the past two decades have demonstrated that it is 
possible to experimentally induce illusory feelings of body ownership in healthy adults. These 
illusions involve self-identification with another person’s face or hand induced by synchronous 
visuo-tactile stimulation between the own and the other’s face or hand. For instance, during the 
rubber hand illusion (RHI; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), observing a rubber hand being stroked 
and at the same time experiencing one’s own unseen hand being stroked in synchrony typically 
elicits the sensation that the rubber hand is one’s own hand. Other multisensory integration 
paradigms have observed changes in the bodily self in relation to isolated body parts such as 
arms (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998), or even the perception of the entire body (Ehrsson, 2007; 
Lenggenhager et al., 2007). Crucially, the effects of these experimental manipulations are not 
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measured only by explicit, introspective judgements of the tested participants. Rather they 
involve so-called ‘implicit’ tasks in which pre-reflective aspects of bodily awareness are 
thought to be captured by behavioural measures. For instance, in the RHI, in addition to 
providing subjective ratings, participants are asked to point with their other hand where in space 
they think their own ‘hidden’ hand is. Unbeknownst to the participants, the findings indicate 
that following synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation they tend to point to a false position, 
biased by position of the rubber hand (the so-called ‘proprioceptive drift’ measurement of the 
illusion). Such studies have concluded that the concurrence of primary tactile and visual input 
strongly influences the incorporation of body parts within the psychological self, i.e. it 
contributes to the feeling that these bodily parts are mine. 
Despite however the success of such experimental investigations, these studies in 
healthy volunteers are by necessity constrained by the duration and setup of the experiment. 
To date, neuropsychological disorders that entail relatively long-lasting and biologically 
induced abnormalities in the subjective experience of body awareness represent an additional, 
indispensable window of insight into the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying such 
subjective feelings. The present thesis will focus on a prototypical disorder of the bodily self, 
namely (a) anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP), i.e. a patient’s apparent unawareness of their 
paralysis or, of other sensorimotor deficits following stroke. This condition can sometimes be 
also associated with disturbances of body ownership (DSO), i.e. a subset of patients with AHP 
also present with disruptions in their sense of body ownership, such as asomatognosia 
(misrecognition or ‘loss’ of one’s own body parts) and somatoparaphrenia (attribution of one’s 
body parts to other individuals or vice versa). The thesis uses clinical observations, behavioural 
and neural data from these specific neurological aberrations of self-awareness to explore the 
pre-reflective and intersubjective nature of the minimal self, as well as the formation of the 
reflective self on this basis. It is envisioned that the study of the pathologically exaggerated 
ways in which we experience our own body can provide insights into everyday self-awareness 
and its relevance in counselling psychology. Before proceeding to introduce such studies in 
greater detail however, it is necessary to take a step back and consider the neurological, 
neuropsychological and clinical background of this interdisciplinary thesis.  
 
1.2.3. The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Anosognosia for Hemiplegia 
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Clinical Presentation 
A little more than one hundred years ago Babinski (1914) coined the term anosognosia 
(from the Greek, α = without, νόσος = disease, γνώσις = knowledge, somewhat breaking the 
tradition that would have expected this phenomenon to be described as ‘noso-a-gnosia’ in a 
similar fashion to colour or form agnosia) in order to describe the reports and behaviours of 
right brain damaged patients with contralesional hemiplegia who denied their paralysis and 
acted accordingly (see Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2014 Cortex for the 100 year anniversary 
special issue). It is now known that anosognosia may occur in various neurological conditions 
such as stroke, traumatic brain injury, multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s 
disease and Alzheimer’s disease (for recent reviews see Heilman, 2014; Starkstein, 2014; 
Nurmi, Laihosalo & Jehkonen, 2014). This thesis will focus primarily on anosognosia for 
hemiplegia (AHP; apparent unawareness of paralysis following stroke), a prototypical case of 
unawareness. AHP occurs more frequently following right hemisphere damage (although left 
hemisphere cases have been noted and it remains debatable whether language problems mask 
the symptom in left hemisphere cases (Cocchini et al., 2009), or it is a matter of function 
reversal (Baier et al., 2014); see also below), usually in the frontoparietal and insular cortices, 
but the role of temporal lobe lesions and the limbic system is increasing recognised (Vocat et 
al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011). AHP has also been reported following predominately subcortical 
(e.g. basal ganglia) and left hemisphere lesions (Pia et al., 2004; Orfei et al., 2007; Cocchini et 
al., 2009).  
In the first decades following the naming of this symptom by Babinski (1914) several 
studies offered rich clinical descriptions of AHP and related symptoms (e.g., Gerstmann, 1942; 
Weinstein & Kahn, 1955). Such clinical descriptions portrayed a complex syndrome, including 
a varied pattern of deficits and manifestations. For example, some patients may admit their 
deficits but minimise their practical or emotional importance, a condition termed 
anosodiaphoria (Critchley, 1953). Others do not acknowledge any disability despite obvious 
evidence to the contrary (Feinberg and Roane, 2003). They may, for example, claim that they 
can walk, run or dress on their own, although they are completely paralysed in half their body 
and unable to even stand on their own. Some patients show a strong hatred towards their 
paralysed limbs (misoplegia; Critchley, 1953) or exasperation with some irrelevant, minor 
disappointment (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Weinstein & Kahn, 1950; Fotopoulou & 
Conway, 2004). Furthermore, some patients claim their limbs have moved even upon 
demonstration of the opposite (illusory movements, Feinberg et al., 2000), while others admit 
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their on-line failure, but fail to update their long-term or, ‘off-line’ body awareness (e.g. Moro 
et al., 2011). In terms of symptom specificity, it seems that some patients deny only their plegia 
(Marcel et al., 2004), while others may show a more generalised unawareness of deficits (Orfei 
et al., 2007).  
 
A subset of patients with AHP show a variety of disturbances of bodily ownership (DSO, 
also described by some as somatoparaphrenias; Gerstmann, 1942), including rejecting the 
ownership of the limb (asomatognosia), or, misattributing it to others, or vice versa, claiming 
they have three or more arms, or legs (supernumerary limb) or, treating the limb as though it 
was a separate person (personification; Critchley, 1953). The issue of whether these later 
disturbances of body ownership should be considered distinct disorders of body representation 
or clinical phenomena caused by the same, underlying deficits and lesions as those that lead to 
AHP remains a debated issue (e.g. compare Invernizzi et al., 2013 with Karnath & Baier, 2010). 
More generally, there is on-going debate in neuropsychology and cognitive neurology as to 
whether the above described anosognosic phenomena are manifestations of independent 
abnormalities, or caused by common aetiological factors (see below; see also Fotopoulou, 2014 
for an extensive review). 
 
Incidence and Assessment 
Approximately 58% of right-hemisphere strokes (in the Western world) lead to some 
form of motor unawareness at acute stages (Cutting, 1978; Bisiach et al., 1986), including 
severe verbal (14% - 26% of all right-hemisphere strokes, Karnath et al., 2005; Spalletta et al., 
2007) and behavioural AHP (e.g. attempting bimanual tasks, 25 - 28% of all right-hemisphere 
strokes, Cocchini et al., 2010; Hartman-Maier et al., 2001). However, the precise prevalence 
of AHP and related disorders depends on the assessments and measures used to diagnose and 
describe such symptoms, the selected patient sample, assessment time and subtypes of 
anosognosia considered (Jehkonen et al., 2006; Nurmi et al., 2014). For example, 41 different 
measures have been identified and used in the past 35 years (Nurmi et al., 2014), with some of 
them leading to different conclusions regarding the occurrence of AHP. For instance, Vocat 
and colleagues (2010) reported that the prevalence of AHP was higher when assessed with a 
verbal scale developed by Bisiach and colleagues (1986) than with the scale developed by 
Feinberg and colleagues (2000). Moreover, while traditional methods showed that AHP 
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occurred in 10% of all patients (as assessed with scales such as the Bisiach et al., 1986 
procedure), using a procedure designed specifically for language impaired patients, AHP could 
be detected in 40% of the same patients (Cocchini et al., 2009). For the above reasons, in the 
present study, I used two different scales for the assessment of AHP and included only patients 
with right hemisphere lesions. Indeed, it has been suggested that AHP should be investigated 
in largely homogenous patient groups since deficits of unawareness can imply different 
processes in different patient populations (Jehkonen et al., 2006, Starkstein et al., 1992; 2014). 
 
1.2.4. The Neuropsychological Aetiology of AHP 
‘Feedback Theories’ and Cognitive Neuropsychology 
AHP typically appears in the context of a number of concomitant sensorimotor and 
cognitive impairments (see Orfei et al. 2007; Starkstein et al., 1992; 2014 for recent reviews). 
During the 1980s and 1990s studies in cognitive neuropsychology attempted to establish 
whether any of these deficits or any given combination of deficits could explain the occurrence 
of one or more of the above anosognosic phenomena. While, however, several primary 
sensorimotor deficits and many higher order deficits such as intellectual impairment, memory 
loss, confusion, reasoning deficits, dysexecutive symptoms, visuospatial or, personal neglect 
(see below for definitions), have all been reported frequently in patients with AHP, double 
dissociations between AHP and most of these deficits have been noted in both acute and 
chronic AHP (e.g. Bisiach et al., 1986; Marcel et al., 2004; see Orfei et al., 2007; Jehkonen et 
al., 2006; Vallar & Ronchi, 2006; for reviews). Moreover, Marcel et al. (2004) found that 
neither sensory loss, nor intellectual impairment, nor their combination provides a complete 
explanation of AHP. Given the logic of modular neuropsychological inference (see 
Fotopoulou, 2014 for critical review), such results mean that these deficits cannot be considered 
necessary for AHP to occur; hence, they have been theoretically de-emphasized in favour of 
top-down motor explanations (Berti et al., 2005; Heilman et al., 1998), or ‘combination’ 
theories (see below). However, based on alterative dynamic conceptualizations of AHP (e.g. 
Fotopoulou, 2014), it may be more accurate to assume that while AHP cannot be explained as 
a secondary consequence of any such deficits, they may be viewed as predisposing or 
aggravating factors and hence they need to be measured and considered carefully in each study. 
Accordingly, formal neuropsychological and neurological assessment of all patients was 
included in the methods of the present thesis.  
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Feedforward Theories and Cognitive Neuroscience 
In the last two decades, theoretical and technological progress within the neurosciences 
allowed topics such as consciousness, agency, and ‘the self’ to enter the mainstream of research 
in cognitive neuroscience. In this context, researchers in cognitive neurology and neuroscience 
quickly realised that the rare and phenomenally rich body awareness aberration seen in AHP 
and related disorders represent a unique source of insight into the neurocognitive processes of 
human motor and body awareness. As a consequence, the study of AHP and related disorders 
got a cognitive neuroscience ‘make over’, which included the application of well-controlled, 
psychophysical experiments (see Jenkinson and Fotopoulou, 2014; Fotopoulou, 2014 for 
reviews) and improvements in structural neuroimaging methods allowing group lesion 
mapping studies to identify brain lesions selectively associated with AHP (Berti et al. 2005; 
Karnath et al., 2005). Perhaps most importantly, new theoretical hypotheses were put forward, 
stemming from philosophical or computational approaches on motor and embodied cognition. 
For example, delusional beliefs such as somatoparaphrenia were now regarded and 
experimentally tested as specific disorders of the multisensory processes that underlie the 
conscious sense of body ownership (see Vallar & Ronchi, 2009 for review). Similarly, AHP 
was regarded as a specific disorder of anticipatory motor awareness rather than a secondary 
consequence of deficits in other domains (e.g. Heilman et al., 1998; Frith et al., 2000; Berti et 
al., 2005; Vallar & Ronchi, 2006).  
This latter view of AHP was based on computational models of motor control (for 
review, see Frith, Blakemore & Wolpert, 2000). . These models propose that the central 
nervous system contains a number of comparators, one of which monitors the congruence 
between intended and actual movement. Normally, an internal predictor, or ‘forward dynamic 
model’, uses an efference copy of motor commands to anticipate the expected sensory 
consequences of an intended movement. Awareness mainly relies on these motor ‘feedforward’ 
predictions, whereas actual sensory feedback may not be necessary to construct motor 
awareness, as long as the overall goal of the movement is achieved (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 
1998). Thus, this model implies that whenever the motor system makes a sensory prediction 
about an intended movement, awareness that this movement has been performed may 
automatically be constructed (Berti et al., 2007). When intended movement is performed as 
planned, these sensory predictions match actual sensory feedback, and this awareness of 
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execution is not challenged by the system. Errors in the execution of intended movements 
produce a mismatch between the expected and actual sensory feedback, and an error signal at 
the comparator, which can be used to inform and update awareness. 
Several authors have utilised these computational models to propose modular 
explanations of AHP. Heilman and colleagues (for review see Heilman, Barrett, & Adair, 1998) 
have proposed that AHP arises from a failure to form motor intentions which thus means that 
the comparator is not primed by the forward model to expect movement and hence patients 
never discover that they have not moved. Frith, Blakemore and Wolpert (2000) propose an 
alternative account of AHP, in which patients are able to compute motor commands and predict 
the expected sensory consequences of intended movements. However, patients with AHP have 
the erroneous experience of having initiated a movement because of their failure to register the 
discrepancy between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Thus, this account aims to account 
not only for the fact that patients are unaware of their motor failures (a negative symptom), but 
also of the observation that they have a non-veridical awareness of having moved (illusory 
awareness), when no such movement has been produced (a positive symptom). Berti and 
colleagues ( Berti et al., 2007) follow Frith and colleagues in proposing that patients are 
unaware of the discrepancy between intended and actual movement, however they take a step 
further and suggest that this failure to detect discrepancies is the result of damage directly to 
the comparator mechanism, and not visuospatial neglect or other sensory deficits (as originally 
suggested by Frith et al., 2000).  
Indeed, the latter explanation by Berti and colleagues has since received much empirical 
support in neuroanatomical and behavioural studies (see Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010 for a 
detailed review). On the basis of an innovative lesion mapping study (Berti et al., 2005), this 
group showed that the brain areas involved in monitoring the correspondence between motor 
commands and sensory feedback (i.e., Brodmann premotor areas 6 and 44; the insula cortex), 
are selectively damaged in patients with AHP, while areas typically responsible for motor 
planning (e.g. supplementary motor cortex) are intact in these patients. This as well as other 
groups also found physiological (Berti et al., 2007; but see Gold et al., 1994) and behavioural 
(Garbarini et al., 2012) evidence for the presence of intact motor intentions in AHP. However, 
to our knowledge the direct relation between motor intention and motor unawareness, i.e. the 
question of whether the phenomenal content of patients’ non-veridical awareness reflects 
feedforward signals about motor intentions, has never been investigated. Inspired by 
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phenomenological theory of body perception (see below), this hypothesis was assessed in the 
present thesis (see Chapter 4). 
More generally, despite the clear value of this hypothesis, it quickly has become apparent 
that a strictly modular, motor explanation is not sufficient to account for all the manifestations 
of AHP within, or across patients. For example, such theories cannot explain why mood 
induction can temporarily improve AHP (Besharati, Forkel, et al., 2014), nor account for the 
extension and partiality of AHP (see above). Indeed, recent experimental studies have shown 
that awareness dissociations between and within patients are linked with different lesion 
patterns, including limbic areas non-associated with motor functions. Specifically, three 
independent, group investigations have found that some AHP patients show behavioural 
awareness into their deficits despite verbal unawareness (Moro et al., 2011), while other 
patients show the opposite pattern (Cocchini et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011). Importantly such 
dissociations are linked with differences in lesion sites. Similarly, in a voxel-based lesion-
symptom mapping study, Vocat and colleagues (2010) demonstrated that the 
neuropsychological and neural profile of AHP patients’ changes in time, and different lesion 
patterns are associated with AHP at different time points. These studies point to a 
heterogeneous and multi-component disorder occurring due to lesions affecting a distributed 
set of brain regions, including the insula, premotor and parietal regions but also subcortical 
areas such as the thalamus, basal ganglia and limbic structures. 
 
More broadly, a number of authors have noted that AHP sometimes has delusional 
features that cannot be explained solely on the basis of sensorimotor deficits (for discussion, 
see Ramachandran, 1995; Solms, 1999; Vuilleumier, 2004; Frith et al., 2000; Fotopoulou, 
2010; Turnbull, Fotopoulou, & Solms, 2014). Feedforward theories are valuable in explaining 
the illusion of moving, but AHP patients do not simply claim that they have the phenomenal 
experience of moving. In fact, typically patients with AHP do not spontaneously complain of 
any related, subjectively perceived symptom, whether negative (e.g. I am not moving) or 
positive (I have the impression that I am moving). On the contrary, AHP is diagnosed on the 
basis of questioning during which patients are typically asked to report on their current 
experiences (confrontation questions) and infer their more general motor abilities (see also 
Marcel et al., 2004). Even patients who report illusory experiences of movement during 
confrontation and hence presumably base their inferences on such impressions (Feinberg et al., 
2000), nevertheless simultaneously ignore the wealth of contrary evidence and medical signs 
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indicating that they are paralysed (e.g. their medical results, disabilities, occasional accidents 
and others’ feedback). This perceptual ‘selectivity’ is not the same as the one observed in other 
symptoms such as hemispatial or personal neglect. Indeed, despite the misleading name of 
‘neglect’, this neuropsychological symptom is defined as a deficit in attention to one side of 
space, so that the person shows an inability to process and perceive stimuli on one side of the 
body (personal neglect) or the environment (visuospatial neglect), where that inability is not 
due to a lack of sensation, or aberrant beliefs, or feelings. If stimuli, or even body parts are 
brought to the non-neglected side then typically their perception improves. Moreover, patients 
with neglect can become aware of the fact that they have neglect after their errors are 
demonstrated to them. They then continue to preform such errors but they are not surprised or 
in denial when these errors are pointed out to them again. In fact, the subset of patients who 
cannot become aware of their neglect would be diagnosed as anosognosic for these deficits (i.e. 
anosognosia for neglect instead of for hemiplegia).  
 Moreover, as aforementioned, there is now also experimental evidence that patients 
with AHP maintain their denial even after they themselves had admitted their paralysis 
momentarily (e.g. Besharati, Forkel, et al., 2014). It can thus be said that they adhere to the 
delusional belief that they have functional limbs. The explanation of the latter belief requires 
the postulation of additional dysfunction that prevents sensorimotor and other failures to be re-
represented at a higher level of cognitive self-representation. Indeed, if one accepts that 
anosognosia has delusional features then theoretical loans from the literature on delusions can 
be allowed (see Fotopoulou, 2010 for review), and particularly the ongoing debate between 
one and two-factor theories. According to the former, rational reasoning on the basis of 
anomalous or unusual experience should be sufficient to ultimately lead to refractory, delusion 
beliefs (e.g. Maher, 1992). By contrast, two-factor theories claim that delusional beliefs cannot 
be explained without the role of additional, cognitive dysfunctions such as reasoning biases, or 
monitoring deficits that are necessary for the generation and maintenance of the false beliefs 
(e.g. Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, & Breen, 2001). Indeed, also in the literature on anosognosia, 
a third set of recent theories emphasise that the explanation of anosognosic beliefs and attitudes 
requires the postulation of additional dysfunctions that prevents sensorimotor and other failures 
to be re-represented at a higher level of cognitive and emotional self-representation, beyond 
the sensorimotor domain. These are reviewed below. 
 
‘Combination’ Theories 
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In the light of the above limitations in both ‘feedback’ and ‘feedforward’ theories, some 
authors proposed multi-factorial theories of AHP, according to which in different patients, the 
combination of different sensory and different higher-order cognitive impairments may cause 
different subtypes of AHP. For example, according to Levine’s discovery hypothesis deficits 
in inferential reasoning superimposed on sensorimotor deficits such as proprioception loss may 
prevent patients from ‘discovering’ their disabilities (Levine, 1990; Levine, Calvanio, & Rinn, 
1991), or their momentary discovery may not be ‘remembered’ (Moro et al., 2011).  
Indeed, given the increasingly recognised heterogeneous and multifaceted nature of 
AHP, several groups (e.g. Vuilleumier, 2004; Davies et al.  2005; Orfei et al., 2006; Cocchini 
et al., 2010; Garbarini et al., 2012; Mograbi et al., 2012) have recently suggested a revival of 
cognitive theories that implicate two or more contributory factors, usually some higher order, 
top-down impairment superimposed on some sensory deficit (cf. the discovery theory of Levine 
et al., 1991). For example, as mentioned in the section above, considering AHP in the more 
general context of delusional beliefs, Davies and colleagues (2005) proposed that anosognosic 
beliefs may be explained by a two-factor account used to explain other delusions; abnormal 
beliefs arise due to a first impairment in perception that prompts the abnormal belief and a 
second impairment that interferes with higher-order, monitoring processes thus allowing the 
abnormal perceptions to become abnormal beliefs. Similarly, Vuilleumier (2004) put forward 
an “ABC model” of awareness, where a combination of processes involving ‘appreciation’, 
‘belief’, and ‘check’ operations might normally support motor awareness and combined 
damage to two or more of these processes can cause the different types of anosognosia observed 
in different patients.  
 
These accounts have been undoubtedly useful in emphasizing the multifaceted nature of 
AHP, and for attempting to link the understanding of anosognosic behaviours and beliefs with 
insights about the cognitive processes that may underlie normal and pathological belief 
formation (see also Fotopoulou, 2010; 2012 for discussion of this point). However, these 
accounts have been criticized for not being falsifiable (Vallar & Ronchi, 2006). Moreover, 
reflecting the modular epistemology of cognitive neuropsychology (Fotopoulou, 2013 for a 
critical review), these models treat the described deficits as simply ‘additive’ and as potentially 
caused by simultaneous damage to functionally independent lesion sites. For example, Vocat 
et al. (2010) suggested that a combination of lesions to two or more brain areas within the 
insular, premotor, parietal and temporal cortex, or the white matter connections that link one 
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or more of these areas with subcortical regions, may lead to different combinations of deficits 
in functions such as proprioception, spatial neglect, and error monitoring, which in turn lead to 
AHP in different patients. While such ‘combinations’ of lesion sites and deficits are consistent 
with the multifaceted nature of AHP, what these accounts lack is a more precise 
neurobiological and neuropsychological description of the relation between the affected areas 
and their integrated functional role in body awareness. More specifically, what these accounts 
lack is a more precise psychological and neurobiological description of the dynamic and 
hierarchical relation between the proposed deficits. This lack of integration is particularly 
evident in the case of emotional and other psychosocial factors that have long being proposed 
in the literature on anosognosia, but to our knowledge have not been integrated with the 
proposed neurocognitive theories, as described below. 
 
1.2.5. Classic Psychodynamic Explanations of Anosognosia 
Although a plethora of studies have been dedicated to the nature of brain damage and 
the cognitive dysfunction accompanying AHP (as outlined above), few studies have considered 
psychosocial dimensions of AHP. Some theorists, influenced by psychodymanic theories, have 
proposed that neurocognitive deficits are less relevant to AHP than suggested by cognitive 
neuropsychologists, and that instead, psychological factors should be considered as its primary 
causes. For example, Weinstein and colleagues have claimed that AHP is a form of 
psychological denial of one’s deficits – a defense mechanism against the overwhelming anxiety 
of being ill and paralysed (Weinstein & Kahn, 1955). According to this theory, one’s 
personality and previous coping strategies are important in causing and colouring the 
anosognosia (see also Gainotti, 1972). These psychological descriptions were however based 
on outdated 19th century psychoanalytic models of the mind and thus not integrated with, or 
checked against current psychological knowledge. More generally, a kind of dualistic, 
polarisation has dominated the field. At the one extreme, psychogenic hypotheses suggest that 
AHP reflects defense mechanisms against anxiety and depression (Weinstein, 1996). At the other 
extreme, neuropsychological explanations have suggested that all features of AHP can be 
explained on the basis of specific neurocognitive deficits (e.g. deficits in forward motor 
planning; Heilman et al., 1998). Some have opted for proposing that a kind of dualism between 
different patients with anosognosia; they suggested that some patients with AHP may actually 
show psychological ‘denial’, while others may instead have a ‘genuine’ unawareness 
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(Prigatano, 2014). From the neurophenomenological perspective of this thesis, these dualistic 
perspectives regarding the aetiology of anosognosia portray fundamental ‘disembodied’ 
perspectives regarding cognition and self-awareness. In other terms, damage to the body, be 
that in the periphery or the central nervous system, is by definition also of consequence to self-
awareness and other psychological abilities, given the embodied nature of the latter. It is 
precisely such perspectives, and their implication for counselling psychology and 
psychotherapy, that motivate the investigations of the present thesis, as outlined below.  
 
1.2.6. Anosognosia in the Clinical Context 
Although AHP is often a transient phenomenon, with patients spontaneously recovering 
within weeks or months from onset, recent reviews suggest that approximately 30% of reported 
anosognosic patients remain unaware of their deficits beyond the acute phase of their illness 
(Pia et al., 2004; Orfei et al., 2007). Importantly, even if AHP is limited to the acute stage of 
post-stroke recovery, its occurrence at this critical stage is a major obstacle in acute 
rehabilitation settings, as it can impede motor rehabilitation (Gialanella et al., 2005) and 
obstruct more general recovery, as follows. The acute stage of recovery is the period in which 
the brain re-organises itself, and at this time, prompt interventions (both motor and 
psychological) are of critical importance. However, patients with AHP may fail to see why 
they should comply with treatment requirements (they cannot see why they should try to 
‘rehabilitate’ a problem they do not believe they have), and often direct feedback, invitations 
of cooperation or efforts at distraction are ineffective as patients adhere more firmly to the 
‘truthfulness’ of their false claims (Prigatano, 2010). Thus, AHP can lead patients to refuse 
acute medical treatments that considerably improve prognosis (Di Legge et al., 2005; Cherney, 
2006), to avoid appropriate safety measures (Hartman-Maier et al., 2001, 2002) and to be 
unrealistic about their rehabilitation, housing, social and financial needs (Orfei et al., 2007; 
Prigatano, 2010). Moreover, patients are typically unaware of their own errors in judgement 
and may be so convinced of the truthfulness of their false claims that they act upon them. This 
poses great risks, as patients may attempt to get out of their beds and they tend to harm 
themselves from falls and other accidents more frequently than other stroke patient groups. As 
a result of all these difficulties, unawareness is linked to longer hospital stays (Maeshima et al., 
1997), less likelihood of independent living (Pedersen et al., 1996), lower scores on measures 
of functional recovery (Gialanella et al., 2005; Maeshima et al., 1997) and activities of daily 
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living (ADL) (Maeshima et al., 1997). In fact, the impact of unawareness on ADL and 
functional outcomes is significant even when controlling for the extent of other cognitive 
deficits (Hartman-Maier et al., 2001). Thus, unawareness in acute stages is a specific, negative 
prognostic sign, compromising the course of recovery and rehabilitation and limiting the 
potential for future independence and well-being.  
 
Notwithstanding these unique clinical challenges that AHP raises, there is currently no 
specialised provision for the psychological treatment or management of AHP and related 
disorders in most Western countries. This is not uncommon for neuropsychological symptoms 
at acute stroke services in the UK. Despite recommendations (National Sentinel Audit of 
Stroke, 2008; BPS Briefing Paper No. 19, 2002) and an increase in whole time equivalent 
(WTE) clinical psychology posts, such that now 54% of hospitals have some clinical 
psychology service, many stroke services have adequate access to specialist psychological 
services and when compared to absolute numbers of staff per stroke unit, clinical psychology 
input remains pitiably small with a median of 0.04 WTE per ten beds (National Sentinel Audit 
of Stroke, 2012). There is also a lack of systematic research into acute, post-stroke 
neuropsychological rehabilitation (Cheeran et al., 2009); a recent systematic review of 
interventions designed to improve functional ability in people who have cognitive impairment 
following stroke could identify only four studies (Hoffman et al., 2010). Patients with cognitive 
difficulties are typically excluded from rehabilitation studies on functional outcomes. This lack 
of provision and research is reflected in what patients themselves report; psychological 
problems and information about stroke are among their most frequently unmet needs in post-
stroke care (McKevitt et al., 2011).  
 
Thus, similarly in the case of AHP and somatoparaphrenia no evidence-based treatment 
exists, the provision of counselling and psychotherapy constitutes an exception (e.g. Kaplan-
Solms & Solms, 2000) and most research on the topic has not hitherto been clinically pertinent 
(Kortte & Hillis, 2011; see Prigatano & Morrone-Strupinsky, 2010 and Jenkinson, Preston & 
Ellis, 2011, for reviews). There have only been a handful of studies on the psychophysical and 
cognitive rehabilitation of acute AHP. Specifically, remission of AHP has been  reported using 
vestibular stimulation but the effects of the stimulation last only a few hours at best (Rubens, 
1985; Cappa, Sterzi, Vallar & Bisiach, 1987). An alternative combination of treatments has 
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also only led to transient improvement of awareness (Beschin, Cocchini, Allen & Della Sala, 
2012). Specifically, three treatment techniques that have traditionally been shown to 
temporarily improve neglect (optokinetic stimulation, prism adaptation and transcutaneous 
electric nerve stimulation) have been applied to the treatment of five patients with both 
anosognosia and neglect, with left and right hemisphere damage between 50 and 70 days post 
onset. The results indicated that patients responded differently to treatments; anosognosia but 
not neglect temporarily improved in one patient, while only neglect improved in two other 
patients and there were no effects in the rest.  
Finally, in a review of the few rehabilitation efforts in AHP in several countries, 
Prigatano and Morrone-Strupinsky (2010) outlined some practical guidelines for the 
management of unaware patients. Firstly, the severity, ‘types’ of AHP and the associated 
neurological and neuropsychological deficits should be clearly determined. Good rapport with 
both the patient and the family should then be established. Lastly, they suggest that a detailed 
and individualized rehabilitation plan should be developed, including counselling and 
psychotherapy where available and appropriate (also see Jenkinson et al., 2011). Unfortunately, 
such recommendations have not been taken up in the U.K., where clinical, or counselling 
psychologists, or even psychotherapists are not typically available to stroke survivors at acute 
and post-acute stages of recovery.  
 
1.3. Relevance to Existential, Counselling and Psychotherapeutic Psychology 
As I have outlined above, the traditional scope of counselling psychology and 
psychotherapy does not involve treating patients with acute brain damage. In the UK, most 
patients with brain damage are not offered psychotherapy at the acute stages and frequently the 
potential risk of psychological consequences of brain damage, both cognitive and emotional, 
are not even properly explained to them. This is highly paradoxical as brain damage has known 
direct and indirect effects on psychological states. For example, brain tissue damage can lead 
to an inability to process specific self-related and important personal memories, or to an 
inability to perceive, experience and/or express emotions. In addition, the devastating medical 
reality and lifestyle change of brain damage may have indirect effects on one’s psychological 
state. Nevertheless, these patients are not offered therapy and if they are there are no special 
provisions regarding their particular symptoms. Indeed, beyond the general recommendations 
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mentioned above, there have been very few studies trying to bridge the gap between basic 
research into the nature of AHP and the clinical, psychotherapeutic needs of patients (see above 
section). As briefly mentioned in the Introduction, one of the reasons for this health care neglect 
may be the association of brain damage with old-fashioned medical traditions in neurology, 
which view psychological factors and changes as unrelated to brain function. In addition, 
within psychology, psychometric traditions are concerned with objectifying cognitive deficits 
following brain damage based on available psychometric batteries (e.g. intelligence and 
memory tests), at times with less concern or ability to explore the emotional state and subjective 
experience of the patient. The latter are harder to quantify in such settings and most stroke 
teams do not ask for such assessments.  
 
In this context, the proposed research aims to make specific contributions to the 
understanding and psychotherapeutic treatment of patients with stroke-induced anosognosia 
for hemiplegia. This condition has been termed as unintentional by neurologists and as 
unrelated to patients’  wishes and emotional struggles (Bisiach and Geminiani, 1991). Also, 
these patients are considered emotionally indifferent and unable to experience negative 
emotions consistent with their paralysis (see Turnbull et al., 2005 for a critical discussion). 
Thus, the need for psychotherapy is not obvious. However, some attempts to provide 
psychotherapy to these patients have shown that these symptoms are not only linked with very 
powerful emotions, but also the apparent emotional indifference in these patients is only 
superficial and the establishment of a good therapeutic rapport reveals a wealth of 
psychological attempts to cope with and make sense of the consequences of brain damage 
(Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000). I thus believe that an interdisciplinary inquiry into the 
embodied experience of these patients as seen in a general in-patient stroke ward may uniquely 
contribute to the wider understanding that patients’ needs for psychotherapy may be added to 
their needs for speech therapy, occupational therapy and physiotherapy that are routinely 
offered in such wards.  
 
There are also two further points of importance for counselling psychology. First, given 
that these disorders directly affect the very fabric of self-awareness and self-reflection (not to 
mention other aspects of cognition, such as emotional communication, see also Chapter 2), and 
arguably also social relating and cognition (see subsequent chapters for details), it is not given 
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that therapists can proceed in understanding and helping patients with a standard 
psychotherapeutic and counselling approach. Instead, a thorough investigation of self and other 
awareness in these disorders could offer insight not only into the nature of self-awareness but 
also on the special challenges that face counselling psychology and psychotherapy in the 
context of right hemisphere stroke and neurological disorders more generally.  
 
Second, given the counterintuitive and in certain respects paradoxical (see Chapter 3) 
nature of anosognosia, I will argue that its examination from both empirical and existential-
phenomenological perspectives holds the potential of elucidating some the paradoxes that are 
implicit in the human condition more generally, and particularly in the intertwined relation 
between our embodiment and our consciousness. As I will discuss in each chapter of this thesis, 
the fact that the consequences of this relation are grotesquely exaggerated in anosognosia, 
allows one to examine them from a unique perspective and thus reflect on how existential, 
counselling and psychotherapeutic psychology can position its practice in relation to some of 
these paradoxical ways of being-in-the-world and the everyday challenges they entail for the 
individual and for therapy.  
1.4. Overview of Aims and each Chapter’s Objectives  
In the above context, I aimed to explore from an interdisciplinary vantage point the way 
in which the body is experienced in people with AHP following a stroke. As aforementioned, 
I am motivated predominately by philosophical views on embodied cognition and the minimal 
self, and Merleau-Ponty’ s (1945/1962) perspective on the role of embodiment for the 
structuring of experience, including the experience of one’s own body as the agent and owner 
of actions. Moreover, it will attempt to follow Merleau-Ponty’s epistemological stance, and 
more recent proposals in the field of ‘neurophenomenology’ (Varela et al., 1991; see Chapter 
2 for details)  in exploring theoretically and empirically the phenomenon of AHP from an 
interdisciplinary perspective, using quantitative research methods from neuropsychology to 
investigate the nature of body awareness following a stroke, while at the same time using 
theoretical insights from phenomenological-existential perspectives to generate novel 
hypotheses about the embodied experience of such patients.  
Specifically, the empirical part of the thesis will begin with an overview of the 
psychometric, neuropsychological and neuroimaging mythologies used across the rest of the 
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chapters of the thesis, including the patient characteristics and recruitment criteria used for the 
study (Chapter 2).  
This will be followed by a group study (N = 14) on AHP (Chapter 3) exploring the novel, 
existentially-informed hypothesis that patients with AHP have a tacit awareness of their 
deficits, despite their conscious unawareness. The aim of this chapter would be to 
experimentally explore the possibility of tacit awareness in these patients, as relating to 
Merleau-Ponty’s insight regarding the two, deeply intertwined aspects of our embodied 
awareness of the world, namely the prereflective, habitual body and its potential for action and 
the reflective, conscious perception of the world, and the body in it, as a thing in itself. The 
findings will be discussed in both the neurocognitive and philosophical literature and their 
implications for existential counselling psychology will be explicitly addressed.  
 
The following chapter, Chapter 4, will build upon the findings of Chapter 3, trying to 
experimentally establish in another, psychophysical group study on a subset of the above 
patients (N = 8) whether such forms of prereflective awareness into one’s paralysis may 
actually influence patient’s explicit unawareness. Indeed, contrary to cognitive theories on such 
phenomena, in Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/1962) understanding, the denial of one’s motor deficits 
does not exist despite of one’s pre-reflective understanding of the same deficits, but rather 
because of it; specifically, it is the patient’s more general commitment to the world as the body 
itself ‘knows’ it tacitly, habitually and practically that drives one to deny one’s paralysis in a 
more abstract, reflective terms. The findings of this chapter will be discussed in both the 
neurocognitive and philosophical literature and their implications for existential counselling 
psychology will be explicitly addressed.  
The following and last empirical chapter consists of a case study aiming to assess 
whether insights generated by the above two studies could be translated to a psychophysical 
intervention that can help a patient with AHP recover her reflective awareness of her paralysis. 
Specifically, a video replay is used to provide ‘off-line’ and ‘third-person’ feedback of the 
patient’s body and action attempts, while the researcher offers opportunities for reflections on 
the observed video. The results of this study are discussed in relation to scientific and 
philosophical theories of self-awareness but most importantly in relation to clinical challenges 
and the scope of existential counselling psychology. Finally, the thesis concludes with a wider 
theoretical discussion of the present findings, their epistemological and ethical challenges and 
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most importantly their implications for the more general paradox in counselling psychology 
and psychotherapy of clients who seek therapy in order to change their habitual ways of being 
in the world while at the same time being very committed to these very ways. 
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2. Epistemology, Methodology and General Methods 
 
2.1.  An Existential-Phenomenological Enquiry with Quantitative Research 
Methodology: A Paradoxical Choice for a Paradoxical Phenomenon  
 
This thesis rests on a fundamental epistemological paradox. It assumes that our first-
person, reflective awareness of our own body hides, by its very nature, the influence of a 
different, habitual, practical, prereflective awareness that is best revealed when one examines 
breakdowns of our reflective ability. Accordingly, the focus of the thesis will be on how our 
reflective awareness of our body is compromised by brain damage. How can one thus use first-
person methods that rely on reflection when working with patients with compromised reflective 
abilities? This section unpacks this paradox. 
Self-awareness, and more generally consciousness, is assumed to be a first-person 
experience (see Chapter 1), irreducible to the third-person accounts and thus requiring a first-
person epistemology (how we come to know the world on the basis of our own experience). 
Such epistemology is advocated by transcendental phenomenology (Husserl, 1929/1977; 
particularly as interpreted by Varela et al., 1991; Gallagher, 1995), existential phenomenology 
(e.g. Heidegger, 1927/1962; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962) and several other philosophical, as 
well as psychological approaches, psychotherapeutic practices and qualitative research 
traditions (e.g. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis; Smith et al., 1999). Indeed, the field 
of counselling psychology is characterised by such epistemological principles, originally 
encountered in humanism, in both practice and research (Woolfe, Dryden & Strawbridge, 
2003); human experience and interaction, the wealth of lived experience and its 
(inter)subjective meaning, cannot be reduced to general, abstract and detached facts generated 
by a positivistic approach to knowledge that assumes the existence of an ‘objective’ truth lying 
somehow ‘behind’ subjectivity and intersubjective encounters (see below for specification of 
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these epistemological points and their relation to counselling psychology). Thus, qualitative 
research methods (mostly relying on second-person methods such as interviews) are optimal 
and frequent choices for the research-practitioner in counselling psychology. Such methods are 
particularly chosen as counselling psychologists may wish to take an integrative stance 
(Hollanders, 2003) between some of the demands of psychological science for systematic study 
of a phenomenon and ‘practice-based values’ (Woolfe et al., 2003, p. 8), such as the need for 
a critical appraisal of science itself, reflexivity, empathic understanding, the recognition of 
one’s own role in the formation of the phenomena under investigation (Woolfe et al., 2003, p. 
8). 
 
Yet at the same time most research on counselling psychology focuses on phenomena 
that can be contained within the mental and social realm, with relatively small explorations of 
the domain of embodiment. This focus is not so easy when one is interested in the role of 
embodiment in mental life per se and particularly the role of brain damage in self-awareness. 
Indeed, if consciousness is best described in first-person terms, how are we to understand its 
relation to its foundational embodiment, when the body is also to be understood in third-person 
terms, i.e. as the physical basis of consciousness? Philosophers refer to this long-standing 
challenge, as the hard problem of consciousness. How can bodily processes, such as for 
example, neural activity, give rise to subjective feelings? Even more so, how can one study and 
understand another person’s world from a first-person (or, at least a second-person) 
perspective, when the very faculty (e.g. language, thought, emotion etc.) that allows that person 
to experience and express themselves appears compromised, if not vanished altogether (see 
below for specification of these practical limitations in the case of the present thesis)? Should 
we, as counselling psychologists, engage with such experiences, or are they best left to 
neurologists and other ‘practitioners of the body’, such as physiotherapists?  
The thesis does not of course attempt to solve the mind-body problem, nor explain 
consciousness. However, as the thesis attempts to study the embodied foundations of self-
awareness, and even more so, it focuses on alterations of self-awareness, following brain 
damage, such questions lie at the heart of my epistemological approach and thus the latter need 
some clarification and justification. We have no direct experience of our brains and more 
generally our bodies ‘generating’ our conscious world. Given this ‘design’, many scholars, and 
popular opinion points to dualism; our experiences are either subjective (i.e. our experience of 
the feeling of pain) or objective (i.e. the neural processes that correlate with this pain). Despite 
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its general, explicit rejection in science, Cartesian (ontological) dualism seems implicitly 
present in science and Western society, as I outlined in the previous chapter. Phrases such as 
‘there is nothing wrong with him, the pain is all in his mind’ are still rather common. Ironically, 
the epistemological foundations of cognitive sciences (i.e. computationalism and the metaphor 
of the mind as the ‘representational’ software of the ‘hardware-like’ brain) and one of its 
subfields, namely cognitive neuroscience, are dualistic in their understanding of the mind and 
consciousness in particular (e.g. Varela et al., 1991 for a critical review). Indeed, many of my 
fellow cognitive neuroscientists and cognitive neuropsychologists portray a dualism in their 
everyday practice and their papers (e.g. see Fotopoulou, 2010 for a critical review in relation 
to false memories).  Some philosophers and scientists have been increasingly in recognition of 
such lingering ontological dualism, and they vary in their proposals of how to mediate the 
divide epistemologically (Searle, 1990; Chalmers, 1995; Varela et al., 1991). Some advocate a 
necessary epistemological dualism (i.e. we should study the mind and the brain in independent 
fields and then form interdisciplinary societies where we can compare notes, e.g. Chalmers, 
1995; see also the field of Neuropsychoanalysis, e.g. Solms, 1995; Solms & Turnbull, 2011), 
while others view this stance as a kind of ‘radical nihilism (according to the definition of 
Nietzsche; see Varela et al., 1991, p. 128) and propose a more ‘active’, epistemological 
integration between fields such as phenomenology, cognitive science, Buddhist approaches to 
mindfulness and neuroscience (Varela et al., 1991). Indeed, the last proposal, known as 
‘Neurophenomenology’ and seen as a continuation of the work of Merleau-Ponty by its 
founders (see Varela et al., 1991), is crucial for the present thesis, and I outline below how I 
intend to follow the epistemological path they have suggested in this thesis.  
 
2.2. Merleau-Ponty, the Embodied Mind and Neurophenomenology with Brain 
Disorders 
The original emphasis of phenomenology, as conceived by Husserl, was in exploring 
experience beyond our natural attitude, i.e. by a systematic attempt to avoid preconceived ideas, 
fixed categories of thought, with the view of shedding light into the essence of a conscious 
experience not only in a subjective, but also in a universal sense. Against this background, 
perhaps more than any of the other classic thinkers Merleau-Ponty emphasised the uniqueness 
of human embodiment. He called for a return to, a rediscovery of the ‘world of perception’; a 
Unawareness of Paralysis Following Stroke            42
restoration of a way of looking at space and the things which inhabit it, both animate and 
inanimate, including man itself, through perception, as experienced bodily and naively, without 
being misled by habitual, cognitive categories (Merleau-Ponty, 1948/2004). Following Husserl 
and other phenomenologists, this rediscovery is put forward as a critique to classical science 
and rationalism, which according to Merleau-Ponty see perception as no more than the 
confused beginning (the appearance) of scientific knowledge, or rationality (the reality beyond 
appearances). Descartes famously believed that even by scrutinising one’s senses, one soon 
discovers that there are no reliable criteria by which to avoid their potential deceit and hence 
one learns to trust only the intellect (rationalism). Merleau-Ponty offers a reversal of the classic 
relationship between appearance/reality and perception/science. By doing so he does not wish 
to return to classical empiricism (nor, scientific logical positivism). Indeed, he defends that 
thought is more than experience and observation, as Kant argued. There are ‘a priori’ concepts 
and structures that ‘organise’ and form experience. However, Merleau-Ponty emphasises ‘the 
phenomenon of the body’ (1945/1962); it is not consciousness (ideas, reflection, cognition, 
knowledge) that constitute the world, but a body which ‘embraces’ it. Our embodiment brings 
to experience an a priori structure. It is our ‘bodily intentionality’ (not a voluntary, cognitive 
act but a notion similar to Husserl’s ‘functioning’ intentionality) that ensures our consciousness 
of space and time, of the world. This is achieved not by the preformed categories of reflection, 
but by endeavouring to express our pre-reflective experience, a primordial, less articulated 
form of lived experience. For example, our perception of a glass on a table is prereflectively 
influenced by our habitual ways of grasping a glass, in parallel to our ability to visually perceive 
the glass and verbally categorise it as such.  
 
Importantly for the present thesis, this pre-reflective experience cannot for Merleau-
Ponty be caught in transcendental reflection, as Husserl proposed.  Merleau-Ponty regards this 
as a kind of Cartesian dualism, which implies that there is a body as a form of matter, which 
the mind needs to transcend. Thus, he argues against phenomenology as inner subjective 
experience or, thought. By contrast, the subject is also body for Merleau-Ponty, which of course 
is also matter, object, part of the world. In his words, ‘man is a mind with a body, not a mind 
and a body’ (1948/2004; p.43). Thus, man can only get to the truth of things because its body 
is, as it were, embedded in these things.  
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Crucially for the present thesis, Merleau-Ponty argues that one way by which 
philosophical enquiry can discover the modes of pre-reflective experience is by examining 
breakdowns in bodily functions, and particularly brain functions. He argued that we can thus 
discover the underlying patterns of our normal conscious state that hide their influence; that 
work at leaving no traces of their ‘crime’. As for him the body cannot be reducible to the 
consciousness of the body, and the role of the body is prenoetic and impenetrable to 
phenomenological reflection, it must be worked out conceptually in relation to the empirical 
sciences. Thus, Merleau-Ponty himself indeed examined breakdowns in brain functions, to 
discover the hidden modes of our pre-reflective experience of the body and the world more 
generally. In his seminal book, the Phenomenology of Perception (1945/1962), Merleau-Ponty 
examines among other neurological disorders, the phenomenon of anosognosia for hemiplegia 
(AHP), i.e. a patient’s apparent unawareness of their paralysis following stroke (see below for 
further details). These enquiries he believed could provide a guide towards restoring the world 
of perception; discovering the underlying patterns of our normal conscious state. In other terms, 
failures to the system of bodily self-consciousness reveal how the system normally works when 
there is no damage.  
 
Of course, it is important to emphasise that Merleau-Ponty is not advocating for a 
scientific reductionism when he considers the results of empirical studies on brain damage. In 
the mainstream of traditional neuroscience, the body is conceived as a whole that can be 
separate in parts for the purposes of scientific scrutiny and analysis, as for example when one 
is studying the effects of serotonin inhibition on certain brain cells. According to Merleau-
Ponty (1945/1962) however the body cannot be understood in such a fragmented manner. 
Instead, it can only be understood in its totality and historicity, as a lived experience of the 
world it inhabits. Thus, studying a particular part of the physical entity we call a human body 
is not equivalent to studying a human body with its history in the whole and corresponding 
memory.  For Merleau-Ponty, natural science has an epistemological value (1948/2004). 
However, he regards it as knowledge by approximation, an insufficient medium of inquiry into 
the world. And at a pragmatic level he argues that the issue at stake is not to deny or limit the 
scope of natural science, but it is a matter of whether it can deny or limit the scope of other, 
non-scientific enquiries into the world, as it sometimes claims. Most importantly for the 
presence thesis, Merleau-Ponty argues that although science itself, at least as it is traditionally 
practiced, is limited in its ability to capture the lived world of the individual, phenomenological 
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and existential enquires can understand and incorporate scientific insights. To my knowledge, 
Merleau-Ponty does not offer a specific, practical proposal (as contemporary philosophers do, 
see below) on how one could actively integrate science and phenomenology, although in his 
own efforts he certainly ‘models’ an active philosophical engagement, i.e. he is interested into 
and studies scientific phenomena carefully, as reported by scientists and clinicians, and in his 
writings he applies phenomenological and existential perspectives to their theoretical 
understanding.  
 
According to recent ‘neurophenomenological’ efforts (e.g. Varela, 1996; Gallagher, 
2003), one could take Merleau-Ponty’s pioneering epistemological stance even further. 
Specifically, Varela has argued that instead of trying to integrate cognitive sciences, 
neuroscience and phenomenology philosophically, i.e. in philosophical reflection, one could 
follow a more ‘active’ and pragmatic methodological path (Varela, 1996). He explains that on 
the one hand, cognitive neuroscientists spent an ever increasing time trying to perfect the third-
person behavioural and neuroscientific methods that would allow them to understand how and 
why experiences arise from neural processes. Although these methods, and particularly 
experimentation are active engagements with the phenomena to be observed, all these methods 
are ultimately attempts to correlate observable behavioural changes with observable brain 
changes, portraying a fundamental mistrust for introspection and reflexivity of either the person 
being studied or the experimenter itself. On the other hand, philosophers seem to engage with 
the phenomena in question with little practical engagement, little actual participation. Even 
many of the modern qualitative research methods used by counselling psychologists portray a 
minimum engagement of the researcher in the phenomena in question in the sense that the 
researcher is the interviewer, the observer or the discussant, ‘after the fact’ or the more 
precisely the event, or experience that is the focus of the research. There is little, pragmatic 
‘pocking’ of the experience itself.  
 
Varela and colleagues (1991) call this an ‘abstract’ attitude, which Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty ascribe to both phenomenology and science, and which non-Western Buddhist 
traditions, and some of the modern ‘mindful’ approaches, argue is actually the habitual attitude 
of everyday life. “This abstract attitude is the spacesuit, the padding of habits and 
preconceptions, the armour with which one habitually distances oneself from one's experience” 
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Varela and colleagues write (1991; p. 25). They instead advocate for a methodological 
integration between the practice of mindfulness, capable of reducing such abstract attitude and 
the active methods of scientific experimentation. Indeed, they considered that the form most 
closely allied to a pragmatic engagement with experience is experimentation (p. 31). Of course, 
the latter has been historically tied to positivistic, disembodied perspectives of knowledge, but 
according to the founders of neurophenomenology, it need not be. Despite inevitable doctrinal 
disputes and conflictual claims, they argue that a ‘mindful’ experimentation, one that tries to 
focus on one’s experience beyond the traps of habitual reflection, is possible.   
 
Indeed, some proponents of ‘neurophenomenology’ have realised this project by trying 
to adapt traditional neuroscientific methods to achieve better phenomenological enquiries. For 
example, developing periodic “experience sampling” during experiments (Christoff et al., 
2009), using hypnotic suggestion to elicit certain states of awareness (Lifshitz et al., 2013), or 
harnessing the experience of experimental participants who are already expert at observing and 
describing their experience, such as Buddhist meditators (Farb et al., 2007; Lutz et al., 2008). 
Other scholars have realised the neurophenomenological vision in different ways. Some follow 
Merleau-Ponty in focusing on the philosophical intricacies of the collaboration between 
phenomenology and cognitive science (Gallagher, 2003), attempting to tackle complex and 
particularly thorny issues such as the nature of the self (Zahavi & Roepstorff, 2011), or 
conducting investigations into experiential realms pertinent to clinicians, including the 
phenomenology of psychopathology, (e.g., Sass et al., 2011), or neuropathology (Mishara, 
Corlett, Fletcher & Schwartz, forthcoming).  
 
This thesis is most closely allied to the latter methodological path, even if I acknowledge 
that the thesis will use third-person, experimental methods to infer conclusions about the nature 
of first-person awareness in patients with brain damage. Specifically, the thesis will attempt to 
study neurological patients with difficulties in self-awareness by traditional third-person 
methods, yet shaping and informing active experimental methods by existential and 
phenomenological insights, and discussing the results from similar interdisciplinary vantage 
points, including the ‘practice-based’ epistemological values of counselling psychology (as 
outlined above). Of course, I acknowledge that such third-person, experimental methods will 
inevitably reduce the lived experience of the studied individuals to simplistic observations 
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regarding their behaviour under very specific conditions, dictated by the details and constraints 
of each of the experiments. This is a form of disengaged research, not taking into account 
properly the subjectivity of its participants, nor the intersubjective realities at play during the 
research sessions.   In addition, contrary to classic phenomenological requirements of 
‘bracketing out’ pre-established knowledge and rediscovering experience of brain-damage 
together with my clients and research participants, all experiments are designed after a specific, 
third-person hypotheses that will to a degree dictate the phenomena to be observed and the 
conclusions to be made, and which in turn is dictated by my own readings and biases regarding 
the nature of awareness.  
 
Yet I believe that given the paradox of embodied awareness outlined above, as well as 
the practical difficulties of interviewing individuals with severe cognitive difficulties due to 
right hemisphere damage and the acute state of their illness (some relating to awareness per se 
but others also influencing a number of physical and psychological domains that may be 
important for taking part in an interview, e.g. fatigue, concentration difficulties, difficulties 
with the pragmatic aspect of communication, sustained attention, memory, hospitalisation, 
ongoing medical complications etc.), I believe third-person methods may be justified and have 
some usefulness in this case. Indeed, I believe it is not an accident that no qualitative studies 
have been conducted in this population. The usefulness of this approach applies particularly if 
one (and particularly myself) does not forget that this thesis will not be able to do justice to the 
subjective perception of the body and one’s self in anosognosia, but is aiming rather to offer 
empirical confirmation to some fundamental existential-phenomenological hypothesis about 
the mind-body relation, such as the existence of pre-reflective awareness, and to a consideration 
of such a perspective for counselling psychology.  
 
More generally, following the above epistemological considerations one could argue that 
notwithstanding their methodological reductionism (see Glossary), such empirical studies 
could offer, existential-phenomenological perspectives some complementary confirmation in 
scientific terms into phenomena of mutual interest, such as the issue of prereflective, embodied 
awareness, considered here.  In his own work (e.g. 1945/1962), Merleau-Ponty indeed draws 
extensively on contemporary empirical studies on the development of children, as well as on 
brain damage, including AHP, as aforementioned (his theories are covered in greater length in 
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the various, empirical chapters below). This is the epistemological remit that this thesis follows. 
It engages in empirical and reductionist methodologies, as traditionally employed by the field 
of neuropsychology but with an added element of ‘experimental ‘poking’ to systematically 
probe and study body awareness in patients with AHP. Moreover, instead of relying exclusively 
on neuropsychological theory for the formation of hypotheses and the interpretation of the 
results, it takes inspiration from phenomenological and existential theories to generate and 
reflect upon the minimal self from an interdisciplinary perspective. Such interdisciplinary 
perspectives are of course not free of epistemological and theoretical tensions, and the 
empirical parts of the study are mere ‘approximations’ of the structures that underlie the 
subjective phenomena in question. However, the thesis follows Merleau-Ponty in arguing that 
such interdisciplinary engagements offer unique potential in elucidating some phenomena that 
lie at the crossroads between the bodily (physiological) and the mental (psychological) 
(1945/1962; p. 92), and may not be as transparent in the ‘healthy brain’.  
 
In the following section, I clarify the difficult choices I had to make in the above 
epistemological background and the practical peculiarities of the phenomenon in question, that 
ultimate led to the chosen methodology, as well as more generally, my own aspired position 
within the field of counselling psychology, as it was progressively moulded by my professional 
background and is constantly shaped by my readings on the theoretical and philosophical 
foundations of psychology in general and counselling psychology in particular. I return to my 
role in the research outcomes, against this initial position and epistemological stance, at the 
Discussion section. 
 
2.3 My Personal and Professional Position in Relation to the Tension between 
Existential-Phenomenological Enquiries and Quantitative, Neuropsychological Methods  
 
The epistemological approach of this thesis, as well as the choice of its subject matter, 
is the accumulate result of various, impersonal and practical considerations (e.g. available 
expertise, facilities, patient access), the values of counselling psychology and the requirements 
of this degree, but also my own personal and professional background that has shaped my 
choices and interests until this day. In this latter respect, I think of myself as an aspiring 
counselling psychologist that is already an established researcher in neuropsychology, albeit 
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an ambivalent one, with a healthy dose of ‘uneasiness’ about neuropsychological and scientific 
methods more generally and a long-standing and ‘acted-upon’ interest in the humanities and in 
psychotherapy. Indeed, since my very first steps in the field of neuropsychology (e.g. 
Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Fotopoulou & Conway, 2004), I have endeavoured to approach the 
complex clinical issues involved in brain damage with a perspective that transcends the narrow 
focus of cognitive neuropsychology, as well as its emphasis on rigid psychometric assessment 
(particularly prioritized by certain sectors of clinical psychology). As I attempt to outline in the 
reminder of this section, my later turn towards counselling psychology, and existential-
phenomenological perspectives in particular (I started my training in 2008), is motivated by 
this need to formalise and reflect upon my experiences and interests in this challenging, clinical 
field, and more generally in the unique human challenges raised by the tension between the 
bodily and the mental.  
 
Specifically, following a few years of academic exploration (BSc in Psychology, MSc 
in Theoretical Psychoanalytic Studies) and gaining experience of providing support in various 
mental health and other NHS settings as a volunteer, I have decided to focus my education and 
later on my research activities in neuropsychology. I was particularly interested in the ways of 
remembering one’s life (autobiographical memory and the so called ‘narrative self’, Gallagher, 
2000) was influenced by stroke and other kinds of acquired brain injury. Part of the fascination 
of these topics was the sheer shock of the effects of amnesia; I will never forget the first time I 
met a severely amnesic individual. A part of me just could not accept that he was unable to 
remember meeting me just five minutes ago. I wondered whether he was ‘pulling my leg’ for 
some reason and I remember distinctively how at the same time I revolted (silently) against his 
relatives’ similar doubtful attitude. Why is it, I wondered, that it is so hard for us not to attribute 
one’s psychological attitude to anything else other than his or her agency or will? Why is our 
intuition telling us that it cannot be ‘just his brain’s fault’? These kind of thoughts was my 
intellectual side speaking. Then, there were the more emotional aspects. 
 I was there to observe a ‘simple’ memory assessment, conducted by an experienced and 
positively predisposed clinical psychologist, yet after a while my whole body wanted to scream 
about all of the complex feelings and paradoxes that were been played right in front of me, 
without a single ‘professional’ word, or gesture. I remember that I had fought back the tears at 
this session, while the patient’s wife and his brother were unable too, the patient himself was 
very angry and seam utterly lost by the end of the session. The psychologist was sympathetic 
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and kind, yet at the same time, it was evident that her job was to describe the nature of the 
memory deficit itself, not deal with any wider psychological or social consequences. I had this 
strong sense of ‘incompleteness’. In hindsight, I know that part of this sense was my own, more 
habitual tendency to struggle with my (at times) inevitable, impotence to solve all sorts of 
hardships in other people. Back then, as an aspiring MSc graduate, I had not figured that bit 
out. It did however become apparent to me, early on, that a more ‘emotional’ 
neuropsychological research could play a more clinically-useful role to play.  
 
For example, my Master’s thesis concerned the careful and systematic description of 
lengthy clinical interviews with an individual (single case study methodology) with 
confabulation, i.e. the unintentional production of false memories following brain damage 
resulting from the surgical removal of a brain tumour (Fotopoulou et al., 2004). Under the 
influence of my supervisor, a psychoanalyst and a neuropsychologist, it quickly became 
evident to me that the individual’s false memories were not mere, random, side-effects of his 
brain lesion but instead were closely related to his perception of himself, others, and related 
feelings, prior to and following his stroke. This had been the focus of my first research-based 
doctorate (PhD, awarded 2005 University of Durham) in which I used experimental 
methodologies and single-case, qualitative approaches to study the role of personal motivation 
and emotion in the striking neuropsychological symptoms of (a) severe amnesia for the 
personal past, (b) confabulation (spontaneous and unintentional production of false memories) 




 I have, since then, not only decided to train as a Counselling Psychologist, but also 
focused my research interests and postdoctoral research efforts on understanding and 
systematically studying how the subjective experience of one’s own body is affected following 
brain damage. Inspired by my studies as part of the Doctorate in Psychotherapeutic and 
Counselling Psychology, I have also actively participated in the psychotherapeutic treatment 
of many of these patients, under the supervision of clinical or, counselling psychologists, as a 
volunteer and later on as part of some of my clinical placements for the course. The counter-
intuitive neuropsychological symptoms I have encountered during such research and clinical 
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placements have traditionally been characterised as ‘mere’ and ‘direct’ consequences of brain 
damage. Yet, my clinical experience and my initial studies suggested that in several 
circumstances, patients’ symptoms were closely related to what they themselves considered 
core aspects of their ‘self, i.e. their everyday, habitual experience of their own body and agency 
in the world, their personal identity, bodily integrity and personality. Patients may say for 
example, ‘but I have always founded difficult to trust others. I am not sure I can believe what 
the doctors are saying, when I feel fine myself’. Or, patients have been calm and seemingly not 
worried for days, may suddenly get profoundly irritated and angry with others about a minor 
inconvenience, such as misplacing their spectacles. For example, a person that has been quiet 
in the ward for days, suddenly screamed at their carers that it is ‘Impossible to live without my 
spectacles. Don’t you understand? I will not be able to do anything, go anywhere. What have 
you done with my spectacles? There goes my independence, gone, gone, gone. Nobody cares, 
nobody understands’.  
These experiences led me to wonder how can we best study and understand such 
behaviours and feelings given the existing polarisation between the fields? What could 
quantitative methods and brain scans tell us about these patients’ personal experience and 
history? Their sense of agency? And is it legitimate to just ignore these aspects of their lived 
experience because they have recently suffered a stroke, which presumably is causing some of 
their cognitive difficulties? Reversely, what could qualitative interviews tell us about these 
patients’ brain and the relation between their stroke and their current feelings or experiences? 
And if not much, is it legitimate to ignore their brain damage?  
 
In trying to answer such questions, I quickly realise one cannot easily avoid confronting 
the rigid epistemological dualism between mind and body, as often is implied in the 
neurocognitive explanations of these symptoms (see previous Chapter) and only recently 
challenged by emerging interdisciplinary fields such as neuropsychiatry and neurophilosophy. 
My formal training in Existential, Phenomenological Counselling and Psychotherapeutic 
Psychology was indeed motivated by precisely such challenges and questions, including not 
only as regards epistemology in relation to disorders but also my effectiveness as a researcher 
and a clinician. Specifically, Woolfe, Dryden, and Strawbridge (2003) in their Handbook of 
Counselling Psychology have emphasised the field’s commitment to balancing the roles of 
clinician and researcher, a professional identity frequently summarised in the UK under the 
term science-practitioner identity (SPI). This marriage of roles is based on a growing realisation 
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within the field that a dialogue between empirical psychology and psychotherapy would be 
beneficial (‘Professional Practice Guidelines’ of the British Psychological Society, 2001).  
 
However, as this marriage entails partners of different epistemological traditions, a 
certain tension is unavoidable. I will refer here particularly to the tension between 
existential/phenomenological approaches to both research and the practice of psychology and 
the positivistic and psychometric methodologies of mainstream, empirical psychology and 
neuroscience.  Existentialism has situated human consciousness in the world, giving rise to 
concepts of embedded and inter-subjective experience and has thus bridged the gap between 
knowing the world and experiencing the world. Contradicting positivistic ideas regarding 
knowledge and truth, existentialism suggests that the acquisition of knowledge is the 
consequence of an active participation with the world and people in it -  not the product of 
disengaged research. Given the grounding of counselling psychology in the traditions of 
humanism, it is not alien to such epistemological proposals. Although the traditions of 
existentialism and humanism are not identical, both allow counselling psychology to seek to 
unite rigorous scientific enquiry and a firm belief in the primacy of the therapeutic relation. 
Furthermore, the rigorous project and method of existential/phenomenological perspectives 
(i.e. the phenomenological method) and its devotion to the notions of intentionality and 
subjective construction of meaning can provide a unique epistemological stance for the 
counselling psychologist, in principle, even in the case of brain damage. Such a stance, which 
relies on description and focus on the exploration of phenomena as they disclose themselves to 
us, is inherent in phenomenological traditions. It can further allow investigators, or science-
practitioners, to both be aware of, and reflect on their own contribution to the phenomena 
encountered in therapy or in research with people with brain damage. This can, in turn, allow 
them to better understand the requirement of ‘bracketing out’ pre-established knowledge and 
rediscovering experience of brain-damage together with their clients and research ‘co-
participants’. 
Yet, as outlined above, part of my training has been in studying psychological 
phenomena that utilise quantitative research methods. These epistemological studies rely on 
empiricism and the logico-positivistic tradition within philosophy leading research in 
psychology, to be primarily influenced by the methodological rigour of natural science, namely 
the establishment of ‘objective’ knowledge on occurring phenomena, stripped of any subjective 
influences or other factors that relate to the context in which phenomena occur. More recently, 
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a strong trend within research psychology dictates that psychological phenomena are not even 
explained in their own right, but instead they are referred to some other level of analysis, 
usually the biological or neural levels, and thus explained away, or reduced to these levels. To 
give an extreme but sadly not rare example, the experience of being in love is not explored in 
the context of a person’s previous and current life circumstances, his or her longings and fears 
but rather it is considered as a direct consequence of an increase of dopamine levels in one’s 
ventral striatum (Aron et al., 2005; Fisher et al., 2005).  
Although given my first doctorate, I do not lack the scientific or technical expertise to 
appreciate the principles and advantages of such epistemological reduction, my philosophical 
reading and my experience as a training counselling psychologist precludes me from 
concluding that this level of analysis is sufficient for a full understanding of the psychological 
experience of being in love. By contrast, as a practitioner, I wish to understand this human 
phenomenon by prioritising the person’s subjective experience of the phenomenon, as well as 
its position within his or her general worldview and life. I wish to explore together with my 
client the consequences of such an experience and its impact on his or her well-being, as well 
as form the basis of our ability to share this experience within our therapeutic relation and to 
use it in our more general attempt to explore the client’s life and concerns. In other words, for 
a counselling psychology practitioner, human experience cannot be reduced to mere indices of 
a concomitant biological function, or any other similar reduction of the wealth of lived 
experience and its inter-subjective sharing. As Deurzen-Smith suggests, “in the realm of living 
exact answers and facts do not have a place: there needs to be room for paradox and 
contradiction, there needs to be room for integration of opposites and co-existence of multiple 
versions of a truth” (1990, p. 11).  
 
However, given my SPI, the above critique of established reductionist practices in 
neuropsychological research raised a number of questions. How then, can the scientist in me 
summarise knowledge and generalise across individual cases? Also, how can I communicate 
with my fellow scientists and reliably and persuasively convey something to them about the 
wealth of human experience even in the face of the most devastating brain injury? Finally, how 
can I actively participate in, and thus influence the generation of knowledge that takes place in 
research and that I use as a practitioner (i.e. be a producer as well as user, of knowledge and 
understanding; Woolfe et al, 2003, p. 6). It is in response to such questions that I believe that 
interdisciplinary perspectives have an important contribution to make to the study of 
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neuropsychological phenomena, even if some epistemological and methodological 
reductionism is accepted and practiced, albeit with critical appraisal (see Discussion Chapter).   
More generally, I progressively came to feel that questions about the mind-body relation, 
the self and consciousness in the context of brain damage, are not easy to answer and certainly 
not in a single research project. Some of the complexity regarding the mind-body relation, 
subjectivity and the changes that brain damage may bring would need to be left aside. Given 
the acute stage of illness, the hospital setting and most importantly the fact that these patients 
own reflective capacities were compromised (indeed even the above instances of partial 
awareness were rare), I felt that experimental methods may be a better choice than long, 
qualitative interviews. In addition, I was conscious of my desire (however deeply rooted in my 
own issues and misguided it may be) for my research outcomes to be heard by the professionals 
who work with such patients. I wanted my research to have ‘impact’ in that world, not just in 
counselling psychology and psychotherapeutic worlds. Somehow I felt I would be preaching 
to the converter, while also ‘neglecting’ the medical system that cares for these patients. I feel 
that quantitative methods and papers published in neuroscientific and medical journals had a 
better chance of being ‘heard’ by the doctors and clinical neuropsychologists. Indeed, I wanted 
this thesis to be able to provide a recognisable and legitimate medium from which to strengthen 
the position of the counselling psychologists within the field of neuropsychology, and thus 
inform the current debate between neurosciences and humanities. Lastly, there is a related 
degree of self-interest that I feel I ought to reveal. The aforementioned impact is beneficial to 
my career and may allow me greater professional recognition, which I desire. Finally, I admit 
that I am more familiar with quantitative research methods and hence I felt greater confidence 
in ‘probing’ such complex phenomena with familiar than unfamiliar ways. By contrast, I feel 
quite insecure about philosophy and its complexities and given all the work and reading that 
has gone into philosophical concepts and their intricacies for the purposes of this thesis and my 
doctorate degree more generally, I did not feel capable, or courageous enough to tackle 
philosophical complexities and new (to me) methodological challenges in one go and in such 
a population with known cognitive difficulties and practical limitations (e.g. limited amount of 
free time and privacy in stroke wards).  
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2.3. General Methods 
The experimental and clinical investigations undertaken in the present thesis will be 
presented in the following chapters, as pertaining to the specific hypotheses each chapter will 
address. However, before proceeding to these experimental methodologies, it is necessary to 
include a separate section that aims to describe the recruitment, classification and testing 
methods and procedures used throughout the thesis to assess the neuropsychological and 
neuroanatomical profile of the recruited participants. Accordingly, this chapter provides an 
overview of the basic methods of the study, common in the subsequent chapters.  
2.3.1. Participants 
Recruitment Criteria 
The study formed part of a wider investigation of action and body awareness following 
stroke. In the current study, consecutive participants (adults, men and women, of all ethnicities 
and between 18 and 80 years) were invited to join the study if they fulfilled the following 
inclusion and exclusion criteria. These inclusion and exclusion criteria are formed based on 
purposive sampling in terms of neurological and medical homogeneity (i.e. pure, acute cases 
of stroke-induced anosognosia with discrete lesions seen in a particular hospital ward, and no 
documented psychiatric history, were recruited; see below for full criteria). However, they are 
based on random, exploratory sampling in terms of demographic variables. This mixed 
recruitment strategy is chosen because the aim of the study is to assess how a specific, bodily, 
medical symptom affects various individuals of possible different backgrounds, personalities 
and concerns, as these are admitted to standard acute hospital wards in the UK. This sampling 
thus reflects the specific reality of stroke-induced unawareness of paralysis as found in UK 
hospitals. 
Inclusion Criteria were (1) a medical diagnosis of a recent stroke (less than 4 months 
post-onset); (2) unilateral right hemisphere lesions (as detected by CT or MRI neuroimaging 
investigations); (3) Berti et al (1996) have suggested that studying cases with denial of 
complete contralateral hemiplegia can generate more reliable findings than investigating 
patients with mild or moderate hemiparesis. Accordingly, a critical criterion of contralateral 
hemiplegia was used and (4) disturbance in action awareness (anosognosia for hemiplegia, 
AHP), or in somatic ownership (DSO), as determined by related questionnaires (see below for 
details). Exclusion criteria were: (1) previous documented neurological or psychiatric history; 
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(2) less than seven years of education or an estimated pre-morbid Full Scale Intelligence 
Quotient (FSIQ) based on the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR, Wechsler, 2001; see 
also below) less than 70; (3) medication with severe cognitive or mood side effects; (5) severe 
language impairment (i.e. insufficient communication). Control participants also fulfilled the 
above inclusion and exclusion criteria with the exception of inclusion criterion (1).  
 
Classification Assessments and Criteria 
Patients were classified as having AHP using two assessment measures: The Berti 
interview (Berti et al., 1996) and the Feinberg Scale (Feinberg, Roane & Ali, 2000) (see 
Appendix I). The Berti interview was the basis of the classification of patients with AHP, and 
the Feinberg analysis used to specific the severity of the anosognosia.  
The Berti interview  
Classification was firstly based on the Berti verbal awareness interview (Berti et al., 
1996). The interview began with general questions (e.g. ‘Why are you in the hospital?’), then 
followed by specific questions regarding motor ability (e.g. ‘Can you move your left arm?’), 
and ‘confrontation’ questions (e.g. ‘Please touch my hand with your left hand. Have you done 
it?’). The structured interview is scored on a three-point scale: 2 = denial of motor impairment 
and failure to reach the examiners hand (severe anosognosia); 1 = denial of motor impairment, 
but admits to failure to reach examiner hand (mild anosognosia); and 0 = full acknowledgment 
of motor deficits (normal). Patients scoring one or two categorised as anosognosic.  
The Feinberg Awareness scale  
The Feinberg et al. (2000) scale was used as a secondary measure of unawareness to rate 
the severity of the anosognosia. The scale consists of 10-items. Questions begin with general 
self-report items (e.g. ‘Do you have any weakness anywhere?’), followed by emotion related 
items (e.g., ‘Are you fearful about losing your ability to use your arm?’) and items from a third- 
person perspective (e.g., ‘The doctors tell me that there is some paralysis in your arm. Do you 
agree?’). The questions conclude with task-related and ‘confrontation’ items (e.g. ‘Please try 
and move your left arm for me. Did you move it?’). Responses were scored by the examiner 
for each item: 0 = complete awareness; 0.5 = partial unawareness; and 1 = complete 
unawareness. The responses are summed to produce a composite ‘Feinberg awareness score’: 
0 = complete awareness, 10 = complete unawareness. 
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Patients were classified as having disturbances of left arm ownership based on adjusted 
versions of the Feinberg (et al., 1990) assessment of verbal asomatognosia and 
somatoparaphrenia, administered as follows: Jewellery, watches and identifiable tags were 
removed from participants’ arms where possible. Following permission, the patient’s left arm 
is lifted gently by the elbow, moved and placed in front of the patient in his right hemispace. 
The examiner’s arm is returned to the patient’s left hemispace. The patient’s attention is 
distracted momentarily, and then the examiner points to the patients left arm and asks ‘is this 
your arm?’ Responses are noted verbatim and scored by the examiner for each item as: 0 = 
normal ownership; and 1 = asomatognosia, or more generally DSO. Two further questions were 
asked in the current study to specifically test the potential arm ownership attribution to other 
people, namely ‘Does it ever feel like your left arm does not belong to you? If the patient 
answered affirmatively then they were asked, ‘Does it feel like it may belong to someone else? 
Who?’ Responses are noted verbatim and scored by the examiner for each item as: 0 = normal 
ownership; and 1 = somatoparaphrenia. A score of one, or above in the first set of questions 
indicated asomatognosia. A score of one, or above in the second set of questions indicated 
somatoparaphrenia.  
Final Sample 
The total number of patients screened was 22. Five patients were excluded because they 
did not meet the above criteria. Three patients were consented and recruited, but were unable 
to participate in study due to medical complications, severe fatigue, hospital transfer or death. 
Thus, in total 14 patients participated in the study. Of these seven patients had AHP, one patient 
had both AHP and DSO, while seven patients were HP control participants, as determined by 
the performance in the measures described below. The number of patients contributing to each 
individual experiment, as well as demographic and clinical characteristics, are detailed in each 
chapter separately. 
 
2.3.2. Ethical Approvals and Considerations 
        This section reviews the general Ethical approvals and considerations involved in 
this research. Wider ethical issues arising during the research and related reflections and 
challenges are discussed in the Discussion section.  Ethical approval for this research has been 
sought of and granted by the local NHS trust, as part of a wider research project on unawareness 
of illness following brain damage pursued by the author and her clinical supervisors at the 
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stroke ward involved. The study has also been ethically considered and approved by Middlesex 
University. The author has also received clear guidance and support regarding ethical 
considerations from clinicians at the Institute of Psychiatry and St. Thomas’s hospital where 
she had been based as a psychological researcher from 2005 to 2013. The author has previously 
been awarded ethical approval for many behavioural, neuroimaging and neuropsychological 
studies, including various studies on stroke patients. Thus, the applicant is fully aware of the 
ethical issues involved in her research and she has gained experience in establishing and 
maintaining high levels of ethical practice in clinical research. This experience has informed 
the ethical considerations of the current project. 
 
All research activities have been performed according to the Helsinki Declaration and 
international Good Research and Clinical Practice guidelines and requirements were fulfilled. 
These included the following considerations: Patients were asked to reveal some personal 
information and audio-recordings were made to document patients’ subjective experience of 
their abilities, and their behaviour in relation to their paralysed limps. Patients’ written 
informed consent and permission was obtained for all research and educational uses of these 
records (see below for procedures). A copy of the Information Sheet and the signed consent 
form was given to all participants and was also be given to the clinician responsible for their 
care. Participants were encouraged to ask questions about the study before consenting. The 
confidentiality and anonymity of the collected data was protected: Participants’ personal 
identification information was removed from all protocols. Access to all research records was 
granted only to the investigator, with the aid of password-protected electronic files, 
anonymization coding and locked file-cabinets. All raw data will be destroyed 3 years after 
completion of the study, following NHS guidelines. Anonymous and quantified data will be 
retained for 5 years following their publication (standard publication practice). The only 
potential risk associated with the research involved participants experiencing mental fatigue or 
distress while tested. Consecutive testing sessions were arranged that were appropriate in 
duration to each patient’s ability. Participants were offered feedback at the end of the study, 
should they wished to receive it, and they were offered to call the examiner should they wish 
to discuss any topics of the interview further. Referral to the psychologists working at the ward 
was be possible, should the participant had requested it, or the examiner felt the participant was 
experiencing severe distress as a result of the study, or irrespective of the study, as a result of 
their post-stroke condition. There are no direct benefits to the participants, although they may 
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have enjoyed participating and several have given such feedback (see individual chapters 
below).  
2.3.3. General Recruitment, Consent and Testing Procedures  
Potentially eligible participants were approached under the guidance of the clinical team. 
After the purpose of the study was explained to each of the participants, they were asked if they 
wished to participate in the study. They were informed that their participation is entirely 
voluntary and that they can withdraw from the study at any time, without consequences and 
without giving a reason. It was emphasized, that the participants did not have to make a decision 
immediately and that they could do so within a 48-hour period. If a potential participant 
expressed an interest to participate, the researcher carefully read through the information sheet 
and consent forms, at the pace appropriate for each of the participants. The participants were 
encouraged to ask questions and discuss the study. If the participant agreed to take part in the 
study, eligibility was confirmed and they were asked to sign and date the consent form. A copy 
of the Information Sheet and Consent form is in Appendix II.  
Stroke patients were all tested by the bedside, in as quiet conditions as possible. The 
number and time of testing sessions varied between patients, depending on their hospital care 
schedule, willingness and medical state. Testing took between three to eight sessions to 
complete, with each session lasting a maximum of one hour. When possible, shorter testing 
sessions were performed on sequential days to minimize fatigue.  
 
2.3.4. Neurological and Neuropsychological Assessment 
All patients underwent formal neurological assessment.  Clinical and demographic 
information were collected from medical notes, patients and their relatives. Their 
neuropsychological profile was assessed using standardized tests, as follows:  
Neurological Assessment: Motor strength of the upper and lower limbs was assessed 
using the Medical Research Council scale (MRC; Guarantors of Brain, 1986). The MRC scale 
grades motor power on an ordinal scale: 0 = no contraction; 1 = flicker or trace of contraction; 
2 = action movement, with gravity eliminated; 3 = active movement against gravity; 4 = active 
movement against gravity and resistance; 5 = normal power. Three subtests of the Rivermead 
Assessment of Somatosensory Performance (RASP; Winward et al., 2002) were used for the 
measurement of sensory functions: ‘Surface Touch’, ‘Tactile Extinction’ and ‘Proprioception’. 
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The customary ‘confrontation’ technique was administered to test visual fields and tactile 
extinction (Bisiach et al., 1986). Left-right disorientation was assessed clinically, by asking 
patients to judge the side of their own and the examiner’s body parts, as well as of objects 
presented in peripersonal and extrapersonal space. 
Premorbid Intelligence: The standardized Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (Wechsler, 
2001) was used to provide an estimate of premorbid intellectual function, taking into account 
norms of education and age. The test consists of a list of 50, phonetically irregular words. 
Participants are asked to read aloud a list of words, which are scored for pronunciation errors 
by the examiner. Correct performance relies on prior knowledge given that the correct 
pronunciation of the words cannot be deduced from their spelling.  
General Cognitive Functioning: Working memory was assessed using the digit span 
task, forwards and backwards, from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (WAIS III; 
Wechsler, 1998) and certain other verbal and visuospatial tests from this battery (Vocabulary, 
Similarities, Arithmetic and Matrix Reasoning) were used when possible to asses more general 
aspects of postmorbid intelligence as needed (see Chapters, 3, 4 and 5 for details).  
Extrapersonal Neglect: The Behavioural Inattention Test (BIT; Wilson, Cockborn & 
Halligan, 1987) is a standardised test used to assess unilateral visual-spatial neglect commonly 
occurring after right-hemisphere damage. Five of the conventional subtests from the BIT were 
administered: line crossing, star cancellation, copy, representational drawing and line bisection. 
Each subtest was scored individually according to the BIT standardized procedures.  
Personal Neglect. Personal neglect was tested by the ‘one item test’ (Bisiach, Vallar, 
Perani, Papani & Berti, 1986), and the ‘comb/razor’ test (McIntoch et al., 2000). In the ‘one 
item test’ the patient is asked to use their right, ipsilateral hand to reach to their left, 
contralateral arm. The patients’ attempts are rated on a three-point scale: 0 = good; 1 = done 
but with small error, uncertainty or latency; 2 = the search is interrupted before the search is 
completed; and 3 = no movement towards the other hand is performed. In the Comb and Razor 
Test the patient is given an object like a pen and is asked to pretend performing certain everyday 
bodily care activities such as using a comb or a razor. The %bias of the total score is calculated 
using the following formula: %bias = (left - right strokes) / (left+right+ambigous strokes). The 
%bias formula yields a score between -1 (total left neglect) and +1 (total right neglect). The 
cut off for left personal neglect is % bias < -0.11.  
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Executive Functions. Reasoning abilities were assessed using the Cognitive Estimates 
Test (Shallice and Evans, 1978) and the Proverbs subtest of the Delis-Kaplan Executive 
Function System (DK-EFS) (Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001). Inhibition of automatic responses 
was assessed with the Hayling Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997; see Chapter 3 for detailed 
description).  
Mood.  The Hospital Depression and Anxiety Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), 
was used to assess depression and anxiety. This is a self-rating scale is designed to be used 
with patients with physical difficulties, so that symptoms such as fatigue do not lead to false 
positive responses. A total raw score of eight to ten is considered borderline and scores above 
ten are indicative of the presence of clinical depression and/or anxiety, based on norms from 
the general population.  
 
In summary, this chapter described the epistemological and methodological context and 
background of the present thesis, with the intrinsic tensions and difficult choices involved in 
the interdisciplinary methodology chosen. Subsequently, it presented the general methods 
applied in this study to recruit, classify and neuropsychologically assess patients with right 
hemisphere stroke, as well as the characteristics of the ethical considerations of the present 
study. In the subsequent chapters, the specific neuropsychological profile of the featured 
participants will be presented in parallel to their performance in experimental tasks and their 
required, separate methodologies.  
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3. Tacit Awareness in Anosognosia for Hemiplegia: 
Interference without Conscious Representation 
 
3.1. Summary 
 Merleau-Ponty argued that anosognosia for hemiplegia is a pathology whose 
characteristics offer a unique nature of insight into the character of two, deeply intertwined 
aspects of our embodied awareness of the world, namely the prereflective, habitual body and 
its potential for action and the reflective, conscious perception of the world, and the body in it, 
as a thing in itself. This chapter reviews the cognitive literature on the matter and offers a novel 
investigation of Merleau-Ponty’s hypothesis that patients with AHP have a tacit awareness of 
their deficits, despite their conscious unawareness. Indeed, patients with anosognosia for 
hemiplegia, i.e. apparent unawareness of hemiplegia, have been clinically observed to show 
‘tacit’ or ‘implicit’ awareness of their deficits since the first descriptions of the symptom, but 
there have been no conclusive, systematic empirical studies. Here, I have experimentally 
examined whether implicit and explicit responses to the same deficit-related material can 
dissociate behaviourally. Fourteen stroke patients with right hemisphere lesions and 
contralesional paralysis were tested for implicit and explicit responses to brief sentences with 
deficit-related themes. These responses were elicited using: (a) a verbal inhibition test in which 
patients had to inhibit completing each sentence with an automatic response (implicit task) and 
(b) a rating procedure in which patients rated the self-relevance of the same sentences (explicit 
task). A group of anosognosic hemiplegic patients was significantly slower than a control group 
of aware hemiplegic patients in performing the inhibition task with deficit-related sentences 
than with other emotionally-negative themes (relative to neutral themes). This occurred despite 
their explicit denial of the self-relevance of the former sentences. Individual patient analysis 
showed that six of the seven anosognosic patients significantly differed from the control group 
in this dissociation. By lesion mapping procedures, I found that the lesions of the anosognosic 
patients differed from those of the ‘aware’ controls mainly by involving the anterior parts of 
the insula, inferior motor areas, basal ganglia structures, limbic structures and deep white 
matter. By contrast the anosognosic patient without implicit awareness had more cortical 
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lesions, mostly in frontal areas, including lateral premotor regions, and also in the parietal and 
occipital lobes. These results provide strong experimental support for tacit awareness in AHP, 
confirming Merleau-Ponty’s intuitions and are thus discussed in this light.  
 
3.2. Introduction 
3.2.1. The Paradox of Tacit Awareness in Merleau-Ponty  
As outlined in the introduction, some patients with central neurological damage are 
apparently unable to acknowledge their contralesional motor deficits. This rare 
neuropsychological symptom, which is the focus of this thesis, has been long termed 
anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) – a term implying lack of knowledge of the deficit 
(Babinski, 1914; see also Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2014). As mentioned in the introduction, 
contrary to the mainstream neurology of his time, Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) argues that such 
clinical phenomena (he considers anosognosia in parallel to the phenomenon of phantom limb 
which I will not focus upon in this thesis) are not to be understood as difficulties in the domain 
of explicit, reflective knowledge. Instead, such phenomena reveal the pre-reflective nature of 
our bodily experience and its structuring influence in all our perception. According to him, 
AHP is best understood from the point of view of “the perspective of being-in-the-world” as 
put forward to in his own, early seminal work on embodiment and consciousness (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 94).  
More specifically, Merleau-Ponty introduces the concept of ‘schéma corporel’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 113), unfortunately translated in English as ‘body image’ (see 
Gallagher, 1995 for an analysis of the relationship between the concepts of ‘body schema’ and 
‘body image’ across and within fields), to argue in favour of a non-representational, pre-
reflective and tacit sense in which the body and its functional laws (rather than its image- or 
language-like content: 1945/1962: 99-101) acts as the perceiver of experience, and not its 
object. Contrary to Husserl’s transcendental analysis, according to which everything of 
importance happens in full transcendental view, lying ahead of the noetic act as it were, 
Merleau-Ponty’s early work emphasises the starting point of the act of perception, rather than 
its ‘objects’. The physical body structures all perception. However, that is not to be understood 
as the ‘object’ of consciousness or perception. The body functions based on a tacit, pragmatic 
knowledge it has of the world and itself in it, prior to any cognitive experience, reflection or, 
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representation. The physical body and its potential for action on the world (the schéma 
corporel) deliver to consciousness meanings already formed by the very encounter between 
body and world.  For example, the world habitually appears only partially to the subject and in 
an egocentric perspective (determined by the shape of the body and the position of our sensory 
organs), while different objects call for different usages (e.g. grasping versus reaching).  Thus, 
the body and the world place conditions upon perception in an automated way and at a 
behavioural, subpersonal level. According to Merleau-Ponty it is precisely because of this 
prereflective nature of the fundamental aspects of bodily awareness that renders the schéma 
corporel a suitable object for interdisciplinary considerations by empirical studies, and 
particularly empirical studies on topics like anosognosia.     
 
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty argues that while anosognosia calls for both psychological and 
physiological explanations, none seems satisfactory. Specifically, he refers to some of the 
clinical descriptions of anosognosic patients, as presented by his contemporaries and argues 
that the experience of patients who systematically ignore their paralysed arm and may even 
refer to it as ‘a long, cold snake’ (1945/1962; p. 88), cannot be explained with pure reference 
to their sensory deficits. As I mentioned in the introduction, the suggestion that the delusional 
features of AHP and DSO cannot be fully explained by pure sensorimotor accounts is a point 
of view commonly held and discussed to date. Merleau-Ponty however also rules out the 
possibility that anosognosia can be explained as a psychological memory, volition, or a belief, 
given that certain biological events may alter the nature of the patient’s experience and 
delusions (e.g. he refers mainly to phantom limb and the fact that the severance of nerves to 
the brain abolishes the experience of phantom limbs). The key to explaining anosognosia (and 
phantom limbs and related phenomena) therefore is also the key to explain how the 
psychological factors in question and the physiological basis of anosognosia “gear into each 
other” (1945/1962; p. 89). How can the neglect of the paralysed limb, Merleau-Ponty asks, if 
dependent on the present neural deficits and therefore a causality independent of the subject, 
arise also out of the personal history of the patient, his memories, emotions and volitions? 
 
The answer Merleau-Ponty claims is in the notions summarized as the schéma corporel 
and his version of the existential notion of ‘being-in-the-world’. To say that one exists in a 
world, that one has a world or that one belongs to a world is not to say that one has an objective 
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consciousness of that world and itself in it. The anchoring of one to the world is instead 
primarily a bodily anchoring with practical significance and an open-endedness of purpose. 
Our bodily reflexes and our capacities for sensory perception are indeed just that, for Merleau-
Ponty, a priori capacities and possibilities. Before the appreciation and categorization of 
experience into stimuli or, concepts, our body carries energy and a practical potential in relation 
to the world that shapes the organization of experience. Our physical embodiment, in contrast 
to our personal and historical trajectory on which we have knowledge, is one of biological 
regularity, such as bodily rhythms and other biological constraints that the person has had little 
choice in or knowledge of.  In Merleau-Ponty’s words, around our personal existence, there 
seems to be “a margin of almost impersonal existence, which can be practically taken for 
granted” (1945/1962; p. 96). 
 
 It is this sub-personal and pre-reflective dimension of the body, a frontiers concept 
between the psychological and the physiological that can explain how the paralysis is both 
present and absent for the patient. Presence and absence, Merleau-Ponty claims are indeed 
categories of the objective world that are unhelpful in this case and we need to surpass them in 
our attempts to understand the experience of the anosognosic patient and by extension the 
‘being-in-the-world’. He writes, “ In reality the anosognosic is not simply ignorant of the 
existence of his paralysed limb: he can evade his deficiency only because he knows where he 
risks encountering it…We do not understand the absence or death of a friend until the time 
comes when we expect a reply from him and when we realize that we shall never again receive 
one; so at first we avoid asking in order not to have to notice this silence; we turn aside from 
those areas of our life in which we might meet this nothingness, but this very fact necessitates 
that we intuit them. In the same way the anosognosic leaves his paralysed arm out of account 
in order not to have to feel his handicap, but this means that he has a preconscious knowledge 
of it” (1945/1962; p. 93).  
 
The above passage should not be understood as though patients with AHP consciously 
decide, or intend to deceive others, or indeed themselves regarding their paralysis (see Hirstein, 
2005 for an analysis of anosognosia in relation to contemporary notions of self-deception). 
There can be no such conscious intention, or decision regarding the denial of paralysis, as their 
conscious appreciation of their body does not include the habitual intuition of the body as one 
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of practical potentiality.  And yet according to Merleau-Ponty, it is precisely this paradox 
between practically evading one’s disability and yet being consciously ignorant of it that best 
reveals the nature of our embodied, impersonal existence in the world. The paradox of 
anosognosia is the paradox of a perceptual world that is shaped by my own embodied and 
active relation to it before it is actually perceived by me as perceptible. Or in other terms, the 
paradox of anosognosia reveals the nature of perception or consciousness itself as a (potentially 
distorting) first-person derivative of my very need to perceive, or be conscious of a world 
beyond the here-and-now of practical, embodied, egocentric experience. As Merleau-Ponty 
powerfully explains the anosognosic patient finds evidence of his ‘intact’ motor abilities in the 
very objects that reveal his disability. A bicycle, a knife or a chair elicit a set of action 
potentialities, in the same time as they reveal that these actions cannot be performed. Utilizable 
objects, precisely in so far as they perceived as utilizable, appeal to the patient’s arm in ways 
that he can no longer utilize. This analysis highlights that the felt body indeed comprises of at 
least two aspects, the conscious, reflective body in the moment and the habitual body (the body 
corporel). The paradox of anosognosia reveals therefore that an object appears as utilizable 
even if it is so in the habitual sense only but not in the here-and-now. But how can we then 
perceive objects that we cannot manipulate as actually manipulatable? The answer argues 
Merleau-Ponty lies in the fact that “The manipulatable must have ceased to be what I am now 
manipulating, and become what one can manipulate; it must have ceased to be a thing 
manipulatable for me and become a thing manipulatable in itself. Correspondingly, my body 
must be apprehended not only in an experience which is instantaneous, peculiar to itself and 
complete in itself, but also in some general aspect and in the light of an impersonal being”. 
(1945/1962; p. 95). 
 
Thus, in everyday life, the objects and stimuli of the world appear to my consciousness 
as separate than my practical intentions and habits on which their existence for me actually 
depends. In other terms they appear to conscious perception as though they exist prior and 
independently of my embodiment. As Merleau-Ponty notes in the above quote, the same of 
course applies to the very body itself; in this sense of consciousness, my own body appears to 
me as a thing in itself, perceived in the fashion of objects, as if it could be perceived in its own 
totality (as a thing in itself), not by the totality of my embodied and practical being but by any 
one body, position or point in time (this point leads on to a wider discussion on ‘otherness’ and 
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intersubjectivity that I cannot do justice to in this thesis but I do briefly refer to in relation to 
some specific findings on anosognosia in Chapters 5, 6 and 7).  
 
In relation to the explanation of AHP per se, Merleau-Ponty argues that the syndrome is 
indeed best explained by his account of the nature of the ‘being-in-the-world that can cut across 
the physical and the mental levels of explanation. Specifically, according to Merleau-Ponty it 
is the patient’s more general commitment to the world as the body itself ‘knows’ it tacitly, 
habitually and practically, rather than in a reflective, conscious manner, that drives one to deny 
one’s paralysis in the here-and-now and the more abstract, reflective consciousness of the body 
as a thing in itself. The later more ‘objective’ dimension of awareness needs to be sacrificed 
due to the natural momentum of being-in-the-world that necessitates us to remain tacitly open 
all our habitual possibilities. Thus, in following Merleau-Ponty’ s thinking, I conclude that 
patients with AHP continue to perceive their body in the totality of their embodied and practical 
being, but no longer perceive it correctly as in the fashion of objects, as it could be perceived 
by any one body, any one spatial position or point in time, or in other terms ‘objectively’. 
Moreover, given this explanation it follows that an investigation of anosognosia at the level of 
the contents of consciousness alone, be this a positivistic or a phenomenological enquiry, may 
always miss the tacit and pre-reflective nature of this commitment to the world. Below I will 
undertake a reductionist investigation in patients with AHP, with the sole of aim of examining 
whether any empirical evidence of the presence of tacit awareness of paralysis can be observed 
in patients with AHP, despite their conscious unawareness. I will then relate the findings to a 
more general theoretical analysis, motivated and constrained by the existential-
phenomenological perspective put forward my Merleau-Ponty as briefly outlined here. 
 
3.2.2. The Paradox of Tacit Awareness in the Neurocognitive Literature 
The above reflections on AHP raise the question of whether any behavioural or other 
studies have been able to provide any indications of the possible role of such tacit, implicit 
body awareness in AHP and related symptoms of body unawareness. Indeed, this facet of AHP 
has been commented upon by clinicians since the time of Babinski (see Jenkinson & 
Fotopoulou, 2014 for historical references) but remains a poorly investigated distinction in the 
cognitive neuropsychology of AHP. Contemporary, anecdotal accounts have continued to note 
that some patients with AHP show indications of ‘tacit’ or ‘implicit’ awareness of their deficits, 
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which in the cognitive literature is defined as “knowledge that is expressed in task performance 
unintentionally and with little or no phenomenal awareness” (Schacter, 1990, p. 157). Thus, 
while patients may explicitly deny their paralysis, they may be unconsciously processing some 
components of their deficits, including the emotional aspects. For example, a severely 
anosognosic patient who persistently denied her paralysis and all associated disabilities, 
spontaneously told junior doctors during a ward round: “Perhaps it would be really useful to 
you to come and see me at a time when I’ll be really ill and unable to move” (see Chapter 5). 
Another AHP patient who was explicitly denying her paralysis, unceasingly complained about 
everyday difficulties with an emotional intensity that better fitted her devastating disability 
than these minor everyday disappointments (Fotopoulou & Conway, 2004). However, beyond 
the level of single cases or case series (e.g. Ramachandran, 1995; Berti et al., 1998; Nardone 
et al., 2007), this issue had not been systematically explored in AHP until recently. By contrast, 
the unconscious processing of cognitive and emotional information has been experimentally 
investigated and confirmed in other neuropsychological syndromes, including hemispatial 
neglect (Marshall & Halligan, 1988), blindsight (Weiskrantz et al., 1974), prosopagnosia 
(Tranel & Damasio, 1985) and amnesia (Johnson et al., 1985).  
In a recent group study, Cocchini and colleagues (2010) showed that patients’ behaviour 
did not always reflect their explicit estimations of their own abilities in a self-report 
questionnaire. Specifically, two patients approached a series of bi-manual tasks as if they could 
use both hands but did not show unawareness in a self-report measure, while another eight 
patients showed the opposite result. The authors interpreted their findings as a double 
dissociation between explicit and implicit awareness for motor deficits. However, this study 
used two different and unrelated tests to measure the two forms of unawareness. This raises the 
possibility that the two tasks were distinct in some components or items (for example their 
attentional or memory demands), posing differing challenges for reasons other than variability 
in response explicitness.  
To conclude reliably that implicit and explicit awareness dissociate within a single 
patient or across groups, implicit versus explicit modes of responding need to be assessed using 
identical, or well-controlled and balanced, material presented in the same modality. In addition, 
the material should be compared with other material of similar emotional value, to control for 
the potential role of negative emotions associated with one’s deficits. Finally, independent 
confirmation of ‘unawareness’ by tests used in previous studies would provide additional 
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validity to the measures used to establish unawareness for hemiplegia. To my knowledge, such 
comparisons have not yet been undertaken in the study of AHP.  
Taking all this into consideration, the current study aimed to compare directly the 
explicit and implicit processing of the same, emotionally ‘controlled’, experimental material. 
To this end, I employed a verbal inhibition test (based on a standardised verbal equivalent of 
the Stroop procedure; see Discussion for a detailed consideration of similarities and 
differences) and examined whether patients with AHP were slower in performing the inhibition 
task when the material of the test included deficit-related information than when it included 
other negative or neutral themes. Typically, selective slowing of responses in emotional 
Stroop-like tests is thought to reflect ‘unconscious’ response competition between the 
processing of emotional self-threatening information and the requirement to complete the task 
(e.g., Wentura et al., 2000). In our study, such selective slowing would suggest that, although 
patients with AHP show poor explicit awareness of their hemiplegia, they may be implicitly 
aware of it and hence behave accordingly when confronted with paralysis-related material. 
Importantly, our task allows the direct comparison of explicit and implicit processing of the 
same verbal experimental material by each patient, and controls for the role of negative 
emotions.  
Furthermore, by lesion mapping procedures, this study aimed to investigate the neural 
correlates of unawareness. As in previous studies of lesion localization in AHP (Ellis & Small, 
1997; Berti et al., 2005; Karnath et al., 2005; Baier & Karnath, 2008; see also Pia et al., 2004 
for an extensive meta-analysis), I performed lesion comparisons between hemiplegic patients 
with and without AHP in order to distinguish between the neural correlates of AHP and the 
parietotemporal network commonly associated with spatial neglect and other common 
symptoms of right-hemisphere damage.  Importantly, previous lesion localisation studies have 
not taken into account the behavioural dissociation between implicit and explicit awareness, 
and thus our study aimed to specify previous findings based on such investigations.   
3.3. Materials and Methods 
3.3.1. Subjects 
Fourteen adult neurological patients were consecutively recruited from an acute 
rehabilitation stroke unit, according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria described in Chapter 
2. Patients were classified as having AHP as explained in Chapter 2. The study included seven 
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right hemisphere damaged patients with complete left arm hemiplegia and AHP (AHP = 
experimental group) and seven right hemisphere damaged patients with complete left arm 
hemiplegia but without AHP (HP= control group). Only one patient (AHP5) showed 
somatoparaphrenia (she believed her left arm was her husband’s). There were no indications 
of disturbed sense of limb ownership (Baier & Karnath, 2008) in any of the other patients. All 
participants gave written informed consent according to the Declaration of Helsinki and the 
study was approved by the local Trust’s Ethical Committee (see Chapter 2).  
3.3.2. Neuropsychological Assessment 
In addition to the anosognosia tests mentioned above, all patients were assessed using 
the standardised tests outlined in Chapter 2, with the addition of the Rosenberg self-esteem 
scale (Rosenberg, 1965), which was used to measure self-esteem (range 0-30; 15-25 = normal 
range; < 15 = low self-esteem). Patients’ demographic characteristics and their performance on 
the aforementioned neuropsychological tests are summarised on Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1. Groups demographic characteristics and neuropsychological profile 
 AHP (N = 7) HP controls (N = 7)  t-test 
Mean SD Mean SD t df p  
Age in yrs 64.00 6.06 56.86 18.52 0.97 7.27 0.36 
Education in yrs 10.57 3.10 12.29 2.50 0.96 12 0.36 
Days from Onset 18.71 19.63 21.29 8.40 0.32 8.13 0.76 
Premorbid IQ– WTAR¶ 102.60 16.59 105.50 6.60 0.37 5.05 0.73 
Berti Awareness¶ LUL 1.43 0.53 0.00 0.00 7.07 6 0.01* 
Berti Awareness¶ LLL 1.86 0.38 0.14 0.38 7.07 6 0.01* 
AHP Questionnaire¶ 5.64 1.38 0.93 0.84 7.74 12 0.01* 
WAIS – III¶ Vocabulary 8.14 3.89 9.00 2.92 0.41 10 0.69 
WAIS – III Similarities 8.17 3.19 9.17 3.19 0.54 10 0.60 
WAIS – III Digit Span 8.86 3.18 10.43 3.55 0.87 12 0.40 
WAIS – III Matrix Reasoning 6.001 2.12 6.751 1.50 0.60 7 0.57 
WAIS – III Arithmetic 7.00 2.55 9.00 2.00 1.28 7 0.24 
Visual Fields¶ R 9.29 0.49 9.86 0.38 2.45 12 0.03* 
Visual Fields L 2.711 2.93 5.711 3.30 1.80 12 0.10 
Visual Fields Both 1.141 1.68 2.431 2.15 1.25 12 0.24 
RASP¶ Surface Touch L - Max 30 6.571 4.80 6.231 3.73 0.13 12 0.90 
RASP Surface Touch/Spam Max 10 4.57 2.51 3.86 1.68 0.63 12 0.54 
RASP Sensory Extinction - Max 12 4.00 5.22 7.5 3.32 1.11 7 0.30 
RASP Proprioception - Max 30 
           Movement  Detection L  
6.571 2.64 6.571 4.43 0.00 12 1.00 
RASP Proprioception - Max 30 
           Direction Detection L  
4.001 2.31 4.571 4.24 0.31 9.28 0.76 
Comb/Razor Test¶ R 27.9 16.0 23.14 3.23 0.77 6.49 0.47 
Comb/Razor Test L 9.90 13.60 16.00 6.73 1.07 12 0.31 
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Comb/Razor Test Ambiguous 7.14 9.35 8.00 5.89 0.21 12 0.84 
Comb/Razor Test Bias 0.491 0.39 0.171 0.14 2.11 7.6 0.07*1 
Bisiach Test¶ 0.70 0.50 0.14 0.38 2.45 12 0.03* 
BIT¶ Total Score 87.831 30.51 84.001 44.78 0.18 11 0.86 
Line Crossing R 18.00 0.00 16.17 3.13 1.44 5 0.21 
Line Crossing L 6.501 6.12 13.501 7.15 1.82 10 0.10 
Letter Cancellation R 16.17 2.40 14.00 3.74 1.22 11 0.25 
Letter Cancellation L 7.671 5.32 10.001 6.73 0.68 11 0.51 
Star Cancellation R 22.17 5.98 22.33 5.05 0.05 10 0.96 
Star Cancellation L 9.671 11.34 17.831 9.39 1.36 10 0.20 
Copy 1.331 1.75 2.711 1.25 1.65 11 0.13 
Representational Drawing 1.25 0.96 2.17 1.17 1.30 8 0.23 
Line Bisection R 2.43 0.98 2.43 0.98 0.00 12 1.00 
Line Bisection Centre 1.571 1.52 2.14 1.46 0.72 12 0.49 
Line Bisection L 0.861 1.21 1.571 1.51 0.97 12 0.35 
Hayling Test RTs 4.14 1.57 4.29 1.89 0.15 12 0.88 
Hayling Test Errors 3.86 1.57 3.00 2.52 0.76 10.07 0.46 
Proverbs¶ 7.80 2.59 12.00 5.10 1.64 8 0.14 
Cognitive Estimates¶ 9.291 2.43 8.331 2.25 0.73 11 0.48 
HADS¶ Depression 4.57 5.29 7.43 4.31 1.11 12 0.29 
HADS¶ Anxiety 8.00 4.43 7.86 5.34 0.05 12 0.96 
Self-Esteem 21.57 5.47 20.71 4.61 0.32 12 0.76 
1 Scores below tests’ cut-off point, or more than 1 SD below the average mean 
*Significant differences between the groups, p < 0.05 
*1Trends towards significance, p < 0.10 
¶ Berti Awareness = Berti et al. 1996 Awareness Interview; AHP Questionnaire = Feinberg et al. 2000 
Awareness Questionnaire.  WTAR = Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (Wechsler, 2001); WAIS-III = 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - 3rd Edition (Wechsler, 1998); Visual-fields = The customary 
‘confrontation’ technique (Bisiach et al., 1986); BIT Total score = sum of scores of the conventional 
sub-tests of the Behavioural Inattention Test; ‘One Item Test’ and ‘Comb/Razor Test’= Tests of 
Personal Neglect. Bias on the latter is calculated according to McIntosh et al., 2000; RASP = The 
Rivermead Assessment of Somatosensory Performance (Winward, Halligan & Wade, 2002); Proverb 
Test = Delis Kaplan – Executive Functions System - Proverbs Subtest (Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001); 
HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983); Self Esteem = Rosenberg 
Self Esteem Scale (1965).   
 
Independent sample t-tests revealed that the groups did not differ in age, education, or 
time since onset at assessment. As expected, the awareness scores of the two groups differed 
significantly in both interviews used. The two groups did not differ in their general premorbid 
or current intelligence scores and there were no significant differences in their reasoning and 
inhibition abilities as measured by three executive tasks. However, both groups performed 
worse than would be expected on the basis of their premorbid IQ on the WAIS-III Matrix 
Reasoning subtest and on the Cognitive Estimates Test, suggesting difficulties in both visual 
and verbal abstract thought and problem-solving. Both groups showed basic left visual and 
sensory deficits. In addition, both groups showed left visuospatial, sensory and personal 
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neglect. Interestingly, the latter appeared significantly more severe in the AHP group. The 
scores of both groups were considered to be within normal limits for a patient population in a 
general hospital on the HADS, but AHP patients showed lower scores (not statistically 
significant) for depression and anxiety compared to HP patients. Finally, both groups scored 
within the normal limits of the general population in the self-esteem measure and there were 
no differences between them.   
3.3.3. Experimental Investigations 
Design and Analysis 
The study used an inhibition task to study implicit processing of deficit-related material 
and a rating task to study explicit processing of the same material. The experiment manipulated 
the effect of Group (AHP patients vs. HP patients) and the effects of Emotional Content 
(Negative, Neutral and Deficit-related sentences) on explicit ratings of self-relevance and 
separately on implicit measures of response latency (reaction times, RTs) and the number of 
suppression errors on a modified inhibition (Stroop-like) task. As in several studies using the 
Stroop procedure with emotional material (e.g. Charash & McKay, 2002; Kampman et al., 
2002), I computed composite measures of interest by subtracting each participant’s mean 
ratings, mean response latencies and mean number of errors for Neutral sentences from their 
mean ratings, mean response latencies, and mean number of errors for Negative and Deficit-
related sentences, respectively. This design allowed for 2 (AHP vs. HP group) x 2 (Negative 
minus Neutral vs. Deficit-related minus Neutral sentences) comparisons.    
In order to explore which and how many of the AHP patients differed significantly from 
controls in their explicit ratings and implicit responses to deficit-related sentences, the Revised 
Standardized Difference Test (RSDT) (Crawford et al., 1998; revised in Crawford & 
Garthwaite, 2005) was used. This is a specialised statistical test developed for comparing the 
difference between a patient's performance on two tasks with the distribution of differences in 
controls. It was developed specifically for use in neuropsychological studies with small control 
samples, and can address the question of whether there is evidence of dissociation between two 
different tasks in an individual patient.   
Materials and Methods 
This study employed a modified version of the Hayling Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), 
a standardised test of ‘automatic response suppression’. The original test had two sections, both 
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consisting of 15 sentences that are missing the last word. The critical Section 2 requires the 
subject to complete the sentence with a word that is completely unconnected to the sentence in 
every way. In other words, this section requires the subject to inhibit an automatic verbal 
response and to generate a different response which must be completely unrelated to the theme 
of the sentence. It yields two measures of the ability of the participant to suppress a response 
(an error score and the time taken to respond). Thus, in summary, this test provides a measure 
of response suppression which has been shown to be impaired in some patients with frontal 
lobe lesions (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). 
The Emotional Hayling Task 
Section 2 of the original Hayling Test was modified to manipulate the emotional theme 
of the sentences (see Appendix 8.3). The Emotional Hayling Task (EHT) used in the present 
investigation consisted of 30 sentences that were missing the last word. They varied in theme 
as follows: (1) 10 sentences related to cars and motoring issues (emotionally neutral sentences 
hereafter referred to as ‘Neutral’); (2) 10 sentences related to violence and physical assault 
(emotionally negative sentences hereafter referred to as ‘Negative’), and (3) 10 sentences 
related to stroke and motor deficit (emotionally negative sentences specifically related to 
patients’ deficits hereafter referred to as ‘Deficit-related’). Other than this emotional theme 
manipulation, the three sets of sentences were matched for syntactic structure, word count and 
semantic content as closely as possible. More specifically, the 10 sentences in each category 
had the exact same syntax and grammatic structure with the corresponding sentences in the 
other 2 categories as shown in Appendix 8.3 and similarly length of each of the three sentences 
varied only minimally (a couple of words at most) in all instances (see Appendix 8.3). Example 
1: (a) Neutral sentence: ‘A tow truck is often used to pull broken-down cars off the…’; (b) 
Negative sentence ‘An ambulance is often used to take assaulted people to the…’; (c) 
Disability-related sentence: ‘A hoist is often used to lift paralysed patients off the…’. Example 
B: (a) Neutral sentence: ‘Some cars can be repaired following motor accidents but others might 
be left with some permanent mechanical...’;  (b) Negative sentence ‘Some people recover 
completely following physical attacks but others might be left with some permanent 
emotional...’; (c) Disability-related sentence: ‘Some people recover completely following brain 
damage but others might be left with some permanent motor...’. 
A pilot study with 23 adults (11 men and 12 women, graduate students with mean age 
22.5 years and SD 3.6 years, range 20-33) was conducted to validate the EHT in relation to the 
original standardised Hayling Test. All subjects completed the original and modified Hayling 
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Test on separate sessions, in counterbalanced order. There were no gender differences in the 
performance of either test. Furthermore, the reaction times and errors in both men and women 
were never greater than two standard deviations from the mean of each subject for each 
category of content (Neutral, Negative, or Deficit-related). Performance on the original 
Hayling test (response inhibition speed and errors) was positively correlated with performance 
on the EHT (r = 0.78, p < 0.01 and r = 0.81, p < 0.001, respectively), indicating that the EHT 
is a valid test of verbal inhibition.  
Procedure and Scoring 
The original Hayling test and the EHT were administered in separate sessions scheduled 
at least two days apart. The original Hayling Test was administrated in the first session in all 
patients to increase their familiarity with the test’s procedure and demands. In the second 
session, the instructions from the original Hayling Test (part 2) were again read out to 
participants. They were informed that a new series of sentences would be read to them. 
Sentences were read out clearly in a neutral manner and at steady pace. Participants were 
informed that they would be timed. Two practice examples were given to each participant, as 
in the original test. The sentences of the EHT were read out to participants in a random order, 
and timing began as soon as the last word of the incomplete sentence was read. Patients’ 
answers were scored for reaction time in milliseconds using a handheld Samsung stopwatch.  
The original Hayling Test’s scoring guidelines and instructions were followed as closely 
as possible. As in the original test, reaction times and the following errors were noted: (a) 
Connected Completions and (b) Somewhat Connected Completions. For example, the answer 
‘hospital’ to the sentence: ‘An ambulance is often used to take assaulted people to the…’ was 
considered a ‘connected completion’ error. The answer ‘floor’ to the sentence ‘A hoist is often 
used to lift paralysed patients off the…’ was considered a ‘somewhat connected completion’ 
error. Finally, the answer ‘classroom’ to the sentence ‘A tow truck is often used to pull broken-
down cars off the…’ was considered a correct (unconnected) response. Unlike the original 
Hayling Test, reaction times were not rounded-up to seconds but were recorded in milliseconds. 
In addition, reaction times which were above or below 3 standard deviations of the participant’s 
mean reaction time per sentence type were excluded from the analysis as outliers (Kampman 
et al., 2002). This occurred only twice and not in the same patient.  
In a final, third session, scheduled at least two days after the EHT session, the 30 
incomplete sentences of the EHT were read out to participants in a random order, and they 
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were asked to rate how much the theme of each completed sentence was relevant to them in 
their current situation on a scale from 1-10 (anchored at ‘1 - Not relevant to my current situation 
at all’ and ‘10 – Extremely relevant to my current situation’). Their responses were not timed.  
To summarise, both the AHP and HP groups completed an implicit awareness test 
consisting of a verbal inhibition task, which included sentences of varying emotional content 
(Neutral, Negative and Deficit-related). Subsequently, both groups were also asked to make 
explicit ratings of the self-relevance of the same sentences (explicit awareness task). It was 
expected that while the AHP patients would rate the Deficit-related sentences as less self-
relevant than controls, they would be significantly slower than controls in completing the 
inhibition task (due to unconscious interference) with these sentences than with sentences of 
other emotionally Negative sentences (both relative to Neutral sentences).  
3.3.4. Lesion Analysis Methods 
Patient lesions were mapped on slices of the T1-weighted MRI scan template 
(ICBM152) from the Montreal Neurological Institute. This template is approximately oriented 
to match Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988). All the lesion plots were drawn on 
the standard MNI space (2 x 2 x 2 mm) by one of us (SP), who was blind to which patient 
group each scan was from. By using the MRIcro software 
(http://www.cabiatl.com/mricro/mricro/index.html; Rorden & Brett, 2000), the template was 
first rotated to match the orientation of the MRI or CT patient scan. The scan images of the 
patient brain were then normalized and aligned (by digital image editing software) to 
superimpose to the rotated template slices. The patients’ lesions were outlined on the rotated 
template, resulting in a map in which each voxel was labelled either 0 (intact) or 1 (lesion). 
Afterwards, the obtained three-dimensional volumes were rotated back to match the stereotaxic 
space of the MNI T1-weighted template by using the interpolation of the nearest-neighbour 
voxels. The derived volumes representing the lesions of each patient were superimposed onto 
the “automated anatomical labelling” (AAL) template 
(http://www.cyceron.fr/web/aal__anatomical_automatic_labeling.html; Tzourio-Mazoyer et 
al., 2002) to determine the lesion voxels of the different cerebral structures as calculated by the 
MRIcron software (http://www.cabiatl.com/mricro/mricron/index.html) (Rorden et al., 2007). 
The lesion involvement of white matter structures and connections was achieved by means of 
the lesion plots’ overlap with the “White matter parcelation map” (WMPM) template (Mori et 
al., 2008). 
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3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Explicit Awareness 
The groups’ explicit ratings of self-relevance to Deficit-related, Neutral and Negative 
sentences are depicted in Table 3.2. As expected, the AHP patients rated the Deficit-related 
sentences as less self-relevant than did the HP patients. This difference was not observed for 
the Neutral and Negative sentences. To verify the statistical significance of these differences 
we conducted a 2 (AHP group vs HP group) x 2 (Negative minus Neutral vs. Deficit-related 
minus Neutral sentences) ANOVA. This revealed that the self-relevance of sentences was rated 
as significantly different depending on their content, F(1, 12) = 204.5, p < .001, and that there 
was an interaction between patient group and the content of the sentences, F(1,12) = 98.8, p < 
.001. Post-hoc Bonferroni corrected t-tests (α = .025) revealed that the two groups differed 
significantly in the difference ‘Deficit-related minus Neutral sentences’ ratings, t (12) = 3.7, p 
< .025. This difference was not significant for the composite measure of Negative sentences 
(Negative minus Neutral sentences ratings), t (12) = 0.4, p = 0.7.  These results confirm that 
the AHP patients rated the Deficit-related sentences as significantly less self-relevant than the 
HP group, relative to both groups’ ratings of Neutral sentences. 
Table 3.2. Groups’ Performance on the Emotional Hayling Test (EHT)  
EHT Scores AHP (N =7) HP (N = 7) 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Explicit (Ratings)   
Negative 1.9 (0.4) 1.8 (0.7) 
Neutral 3.1 (1.7) 3.5 (2.3) 
Deficit* 3 (0.8) 7.9 (0.6) 
Implicit (RTs) 
Correct and Error Responses 
  
Negative 8.4 (7.4) 8.2 (5.5) 
Neutral 7.6 (8.4) 6.4 (2.8) 
Deficit* 17.7 (16.5) 5.7 (2.9) 
Implicit (RTs) 
Correct Responses Only 
  
Negative 5.9 (4.4) 7.2 (3.6) 
Neutral 6.7 (7.4) 4.5 (1.8) 
Deficit* 16.8 (17.2) 3.7 (2.2) 
Implicit (Errors)   
Negative 4.7 (2.6) 5 (2.4) 
Neutral 4.4 (2.6) 5.1 (2.3) 
Deficit 4 (2.7) 6.4 (2.6) 
 
* Significant difference between the groups. 
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It is also noteworthy that all AHP patients rated deficit-related sentences as less self-
relevant than any of the HP controls and their individual scores were significantly different 
from the mean of the HP control group, as determined by Crawford’s test, a specialised test for 
the establishment of single dissociations in single neuropsychological patients (Crawford & 
Garthwaite, 2002; Crawford & Howell, 1998), ts = 4.8 - 7.7, ps < 0.002. These results confirm 
that our anosognosic patients, selected on the basis of two established tests of motor awareness 
(Berti e al., 1996; Feinberg et al., 2000), showed denial of their deficits in our experimental 
task both individually and as a group. This confirmed the validity of our novel explicit 
awareness task.  
3.4.2. Implicit Awareness 
Reaction Times (RTs) 
The groups’ average reaction times (RTs) in each content category for correct and error 
responses, as well as for correct responses only, are presented in Table 3.2. A first analysis 
explored the RTs of the two groups for both correct and incorrect responses (errors). A 2 (AHP 
group vs HP group) x 2 (Negative minus Neutral vs. Deficit-related minus Neutral sentences) 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed that RTs were not overall significantly different 
depending on the sentence content, F(1, 12) = 2.7, p = .12, but there was a significant 
interaction between group and content of sentences, F(1,12) = 8.2, p < .05. Post-hoc Bonferroni 
corrected t-tests (α = .025) revealed that the two groups differed significantly in the difference 
‘Deficit-related minus Neutral sentences’ RTs, t (12) = 3.2, p < .025 but not in the difference 
‘Negative minus Neutral sentences RTs’, t (12) = 0.4, p = .66.  
A second analysis, explored the RTs of the two groups only for correct responses. In this 
analysis two subjects, AHP4 and HP5, who had less than 10 correct responses (22/30 and 24/30 
errors, respectively) were excluded as outliers (see also Kampman et al., 2002). A 2 (AHP 
group vs HP group) x 2 (Negative minus Neutral vs. Deficit-related minus Neutral sentences) 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed that RTs were not overall significantly different 
depending on the sentence content, F(1, 10) = 1.7, p = .22, but there was a significant 
interaction between group and content of sentences, F(1,10) = 6.34, p < .05. Post-hoc, 
Bonferroni corrected t-tests (α = .025) revealed that the two groups differed significantly in the 
difference ‘Deficit-related minus Neutral sentences’ RTs, t (10) = 2.6, p < .025 but not in the 
difference ‘Negative minus Neutral sentences RTs’, t (10) = 1.7, p = .1. 
Error Analysis 
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The groups’ average error rates in each content category are presented in Table 3.2. A 2 
(AHP group vs HP group) x 2 (Negative minus Neutral vs. Deficit-related vs. Neutral 
sentences) repeated measures ANOVA revealed that the number of errors was not significantly 
different depending on the sentence content, F(1, 12) = 0.5, p = .59 and there was no significant 
interaction between group and content of sentences, F(1,12) = 2.7, p = .12. Although this last 
interaction was not significant, an additional analysis was performed to rule out the possibility 
that the above significant differences in total RTs (for both correct responses and errors) were 
a function of different error rates between the groups. A 2 (AHP group vs HP group) x 2 
(Negative minus Neutral vs. Deficit-related minus Neutral sentences) repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted on RTs with the number of errors each patient produced per content 
category used as a covariate. All interactions of sentence content*covariate were not 
significant, while the interaction sentence content*group remained significant, F(1,12) = 6.2, 
p < .05. 
In summary, the study found that AHP patients rated Deficit-related sentences (relative 
to Neutral sentences) as significantly less self-relevant than did HP patients (explicit task). By 
contrast, the two groups did not differ in their self-relevance ratings of Negative sentences 
(relative to Neutral sentences). Crucially, AHP patients were significantly slower than HP 
patients in inhibiting automatic responses to the Deficit-related than the Negative sentences, 
relative to Neutral sentences (implicit task). These results show a clear dissociation in 
performance between the implicit and explicit awareness task in AHP patients.    
3.4.3. Individual Patient Analysis 
The specialised Revised Standardized Difference Test (RSDT; see above) was used to 
explore how many of our AHP patients differed significantly from our control sample in their 
explicit ratings and implicit responses to deficit-related sentences. This method was applied to 
the differences between Deficit-related and Neutral sentences in explicit ratings versus implicit 
RTs, as these were the differential measures that were found to be significantly different 
between the two groups (see above). As above, the RTs for correct responses only and for 
correct and incorrect responses were analysed separately.  
The RSDT test indicated a significant dissociation in all AHP patients except AHP7, 
either when considering correct responses and errors (t6 = 1, p = 0.17), or only the correct 
responses (t6 = 1.3, p = 0.12). These results are presented in Table 3.3. Given this difference, 
the differences between AHP7 and the rest of the AHP patients in all the neuropsychological 
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and psychometric tests administered were also examined. AHP7 scored within the range of the 
rest of the AHP patients on all of the neuropsychological tests, including the original Hayling 
Test. However, he did show a marked difference in self-reported depression, scoring 15 while 
the rest of the patients scored between 1 and 6 (mean 2.84; SD 2.86). He also showed the 
highest score on Anxiety (13; AHP patients mean 7.16; SD 4.25; range 2-12) and the lowest 
score on Self-esteem (15; AHP mean 22.67; SD 5.08; range 19-29). When assessed with the 
Crawford test (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002), only the difference in depression scores was 
significant (t = 3.94; p(two-tailed) < 0.05).  
 






AHP2 AHP3 AHP4 AHP5 AHP6 AHP7 
Explicit Rating 
 
Neutral 3.5 (7.9) 5.1 1.7 4.8 1.5 4.8 2.3 1.4 
Deficit 7.89 (0.7) 2.3 3 2.1 4.3 3.7 3 2.5 
Implicit RTs 
(Correct & Errors) 
 
Neutral 6.4 (2.8) 1.51 6.58 6.23 6.16 4.54 26.15 2.34 




Neutral 4.45(1.9) 1.46 7.21 4.51 Excl 3.74 21.27 2.18 
Deficit 3.73 (2.2) 2.96 14.79 14.05 Excl 15.24 50.00 3.84 
RSDT: Explicit Rating Diff. 
Vs RTs Diff. (Correct & 
Errors) 
t (7)  2.2 1.7 4 3.9 4.2 6.7 1 
p(one-
tailed) 




RSDT: Explicit Rating Diff. 
Vs RTs Diff. (Correct only) 
t (6)  2.1 4 4 Excl 4.1 7.5 1.3 
p(one-
tailed) 




* Significant difference between the patient and the control HP group. 
 
Lesion Analysis 
All the lesions resulted from a single ischaemic or haemorrhagic stroke and were 
confined to the right hemisphere, mainly in the territory of the right Middle Cerebral Artery 
(MCA). In the AHP patients, AHP1, AHP5 and AHP7 suffered from large hemispheric brain 
lesions affecting most of the right MCA territory, involving cortical and subcortical areas. 
Patients AHP2, AHP3 and AHP4 had subcortical damage mainly affecting the basal ganglia, 
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the insula and the surrounding white matter. Patient AHP6 showed a hemispheric lesion, mostly 
subcortical but extending to the medial parts of the frontal and occipital cortex. Figure 3.1A 
illustrates the lesions overlapping in three or more AHP patients. In the control group, HP2, 
HP3 and HP4 patients had lesions which were mostly subcortical, extending from the thalamus 
and the basal ganglia to the insula and the surrounding white matter. HP1 and HP6 had fronto-
temporo-parietal hemispheric lesions; HP7 had a frontotemporal lesion; and HP5’s lesion 
involved mainly dorsomedial cortical areas and the deep white matter. Figure 3.1B illustrates 
the lesions overlapping in more three or more HP patients.  
 
 
FIGURE 3.1. A. Overlays of regional lesion plots of minimum three AHP patients (MNI coordinates 
of the centre of mass: x=39, y=-16, z=16). The number of overlapping lesions is illustrated by different 
colours coded for increasing frequencies, from red (lesion in three patients) to light yellow (lesion in 
seven patients) B. The same colour codes and the same axial sections illustrate the overlapping lesions 
of minimum three HP patients (MNI coordinates of the centre of mass: x=38, y=-9, z=21). C. 
Subtraction lesion plots of AHP patients (positive overlap) with HP patients (negative overlap). The 
result of the subtraction is illustrated in percent numbers, different colours codes for increasing 
percentage, from purple (57% lesion in HP patients) to light yellow (71% lesion in AHP patients). D. 
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The table shows the damaged brain regions ‘surviving’ the subtraction in more than four AHP patients 
(57%); the maximum AHP overlap percentage and the MNI coordinates of the centre of mass are shown 
for each region. E. For each voxel, frequency comparison of lesions in AHP respect to HP patients was 
computed by means of the Liebermeister binomial measure (FDR corrected). In green, yellow and 
orange colours are the regions statistically significant at the 5% level (L = 1.77); in red colour are the 
regions statistically significant at the 1% level (L = 2.57). F. The table shows for each region  the 
number (N) and the percentage (N%) of clustering voxels that ‘survived’ the threshold of p<0.05 (False 
Discovery Rate corrected) along with the maximum Liebermeister (L) statistic obtained in each cluster 
and the MNI coordinates of the centre of mass. 
No significant difference was observed in the total volumes of the lesions in the AHP 
(mean 132 cc, SD = 110) and HP patients (mean 93 cc, SD = 98; t (14) = 0.69, p = 0.68). 
Subtracting HP lesion plots from the AHP lesion plots gave a cluster that remained present in 
at least 5 AHP patients. This cluster mainly involved the anterior part of the insula, and 
extended through the anterior corona radiata and the external capsule to the caudate and 
putamen nuclei (Fig. 3.1C, 3.1D).  
By using the non-parametric mapping (NPM) software available with MRIcron, the 
study compared the frequency of lesion voxels in the two groups by computing a binomial test 
based on the Liebermeister measure (False Discovery Rates corrected), because this binomial 
test appears to be more sensitive than Chi-Squared or Fisher's Exact test. The significant areas 
emerging from the binomial test were in line with the subtraction results, namely revealing a 
superior cluster extending from the rolandic operculum and anterior insula to the caudate and 
putamen nuclei, and an inferior cluster involving the amygdala and the superior temporal pole. 
White matter tissue included the anterior corona radiata, the external capsule, the retro-
lenticular part of internal capsule, and the uncinate fasciculus (Fig. 3.1E, 3.1F). 
In order to explore a possible causal correlation between the lesions of AHP7 and his 
lack of implicit awareness, his lesions were also compared with those of the other AHP patients 
(see Fig. 3.2). The lesions of AHP7 overlapped with several of the common lesion areas of the 
other AHP patients, but showed more lesion voxels in posterior (posterior and medial regions 
of the occipital lobe), anterior (medial regions of the frontal lobe), and dorsolateral cortical 
regions (precentral and postcentral areas). He also showed fewer lesion voxels in limbic regions 
(e.g. amygdala), the basal ganglia and the external capsule.  
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FIGURE 3.2. Regional lesion plot of patient AHP7 (in blue colour, centre of mass: x=41; y=-22; 
z=23). The red and yellow colours represent the lesion voxels of the other six AHP patients. The 
number of overlapping lesions is illustrated by different colours coded for increasing frequencies, 
from dark red (lesion in one AHP patient) to light yellow (lesion voxels overlap in 6 AHP patients). 
The three tables provide a quantitative estimate of the region plots lesioned (a) in AHP7 but not in the 
other AHP patients; (b) in AHP patients excluding AHP7 and (c) finally the common lesions of the 
six AHP patients and AHP7. For each region, the number (N) and the percentage (N%) of lesioned 
voxels are shown. 
 
 
3.5.  Discussion 
3.5.1. Summary and Implications for Neurocognitive Theories 
I this section, I will first discuss the results of this study in the content of the 
neurocognitive literature to which they epistemologically and methodologically relate, before 
I go on to discuss their implications for existential theory and counselling psychology. The 
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present study used an inhibition task to study implicit processing of deficit-related material and 
a rating task to study explicit processing of the same material in left hemiplegic patients with 
and without AHP. The main behavioural finding was that patients with AHP were significantly 
slower than control patients in performing the inhibition task with deficit-related sentences than 
with other emotionally negative sentences, relative to neutral sentences in both cases. The main 
finding of the lesion analysis was that the lesions of the anosognosic patients differed from 
those of the controls by mainly involving the anterior parts of the insula, inferior motor areas, 
basal ganglia structures, limbic structures and deep white matter. The one AHP patient who 
did not show a behavioural dissociation (in the strict neuropsychological sense, see methods 
section) between implicit and explicit awareness of deficit showed more lesions in cortical 
frontal areas, including lateral motor and premotor regions, and also in the parietal and occipital 
lobes.  
The selective slowing of responses to emotional stimuli in Stroop-like tests is considered 
to reflect ‘unconscious’ resource competition between the processing of emotionally 
threatening information and the requirement to complete the inhibition task (Wentura et al., 
2000). Using the same language, our findings in the AHP patients may reflect a similar 
‘unconscious’ response competition between the tacit processing of deficit-related information 
and the requirement to complete the inhibition task. By contrast, AHP patients did not differ 
from controls in their overall ability to perform the inhibition task as assessed by the original, 
standardized test of verbal inhibition (Hayling Test). Secondly, the observed effect of inhibition 
in the AHP patients was based on a differential slowing of response times for deficit-related 
versus neutral words, rather than an absolute measure of response speed (see also Nardone et 
al., 2007). Thus, it is unlikely that this effect relates to the general inhibitory abilities of the 
AHP patients. In addition, our AHP patients showed more lesions than HP patients in right 
limbic and insular cortex areas (see also below) and a corresponding reduction in the 
experience and communication of negative emotions (see Heilman & Harciarek, 2010 for 
review). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that our main experimental effect was driven by these 
emotional processing difficulties, or any general ‘defence’ function against negative emotions 
(see also below), as AHP patients did not show a tendency to process other emotionally 
negative themes differently than HP controls. Finally, it is unlikely that this effect related to 
dissociations between modalities (e.g. it is well known that patients with right hemisphere 
damage have better verbal than visuospatial abilities), as both the implicit and explicit tasks 
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required similar auditory, language, working memory and motor abilities in order to listen and 
respond to the same sentences.    
Furthermore it should be added that while the Colour-Word Test (called the Stroop test 
in this thesis) and Part 2 of the Hayling Sentence Completion Test (called the Hayling in this 
paper) are widely used tests for inhibiton that typically require a verbal response and are 
contigent upon certain semantic abilities, they do not necessarily test the exact same aspect of 
inhibition, or frontal lobe function. Specifically, while some studies have found common lesion 
patterns for these two tests (see Cipolotti et al., 2016 for review) and have found comparable 
impairments in the same population (e.g. patients with Alzheimers disease,  Belleville et al., 
2006), controlling for individual differences in more generic dimension such as fluid 
intelligence has also revealed dissociations between the two tasks. For example, in a recent 
study, Cipolotti and colleagues (2016) found that patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex 
were significantly impaired compared with healthy controls on both the Hayling and the Stroop 
tests. However, when fluid intelligence was partialled out, there was no significant relationship 
between patients’ performance on the two tasks, suggesting that the two tests may involve 
different kinds of inhibition, or other cognitive demands. Both tests require suppressing a 
dominant response, but they differ in other cognitive processes. For example, for the Hayling, 
strategy implementation is needed to generate semantically unrelated alternatives sentences. In 
contrast, for the Stroop, the response set is very constrained and, as such, may require less 
strategy. For the Stroop also, processes involved in response conflict may play a greater role 
compared with the Hayling. The automatic response that needs to be suppressed is presented 
in the test stimuli (i.e. the incongruent colour-word). This may induce more conflict than in the 
case of the Hayling, where the response that needs to be suppressed is not visually or aurally 
presented, but only semantically implied. Thus, any comparison between the two tests in this 
thesis should bear these differences into account. For example, it may nbe that the selective 
slowing of responses to emotional sentences in our Emotional Hayling test is not due to 
‘unconscious’ response competition between the tacit processing of deficit-related information 
and the requirement to complete the inhibition task, but rather between the former demand and 
the need to generate an alternative strategy to resolve conflict. Future studies could adjust the 
Stroop procedure and compare between the two to specify the particular mechanisms involved 
in the implicit awareness seen in AHP patients.    
Taken together, the above considerations suggest that the current study provides 
experimental support for implicit awareness of deficit in some anosognosic patients. In the 
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cognitive literature, implicit awareness has previously been hypothesised based on clinical 
observations (e.g. Ramachandran, 1995; Weinstein & Kahn, 1955) and case studies (Nardone 
et al., 2007).  For example, Ramachandran (1995) reported an AHP patient who was 
retrospectively able to accurately comment on how long she had been paralysed during 
temporary lifting of the AHP following vestibular stimulation.  Despite this temporary insight, 
after the stimulation effect wore off, the patient reverted to denying her paralysis and the 
admission of it during stimulation. Together with the present experimental findings of implicit 
awareness in AHP, these observations suggest that in at least some AHP patients there is a 
continuous, implicit appreciation of one’s disabilities, despite patients’ inability to integrate 
this implicit ‘knowledge’ into an explicit and ‘realistic’ awareness of the body as paralysed.  
The present experimental confirmation of this dissociation is important because the 
combination of our behavioural and neuroimaging results may thus shed some light on the 
deficits leading to explicit unawareness in AHP and the potentially intact mechanisms 
responsible for implicit awareness.  
Recent studies have postulated that explicit unawareness in AHP is caused by a deficit 
in monitoring the discrepancy between intended and actual movement (Frith et al., 2000; Berti 
et al., 2005; 2007). This deficit can lead to the construction of non-veridical motor awareness 
based entirely on unconscious signals of intended movement (Berti et al., 2007; see also 
Desmurget & Sirigu, 2009)6. This hypothesis has been supported by neuroimaging evidence 
(Berti et al., 2005); areas involved in motor preparation and planning (e.g. the supplementary 
motor area, SMA) were found to be spared in AHP patients. By contrast, lateral premotor 
regions, which are typically involved in monitoring discrepancies between intention and action, 
were selectively affected in these patients.  
The neuroimaging results in the present study are consistent with the above proposals, 
in that motor areas around the rolandic operculum were more frequently damaged in AHP than 
HP patients. Moreover, as in the study of Berti et al. (2005) the SMA was spared in all our 
AHP patients. These results confirm the hypothesis that motor planning is intact in AHP 
                                                          
6 The degree to which these unconscious signals are conceived as representational varies between the different 
scientific theorists and we will not be focusing on this debate in this thesis, given that as described in the 
Introduction, according to Merleau-Ponty, preflective awareness of the body is by deficition pre-reflective, pre-
thematic and non-reprsentational. The tension between this view and mainstream cognitive approaches is 
acknowledged but there are exceptions in theoretical neuroscience (Friston 
, 2010) and as discussed elsewhere (Fotopoulou, 2014), one can adhere to such non-representational models 
when considering certain empirical findings in neuroscience that can in principle be explained by both 
representational and non-representational acocunts (see also Chapter 4).   
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patients (Berti et al., 2005; Frith et al., 2000) and may lead some patients to form illusory 
awareness of movements (see also below). However, the dorsal premotor area (e.g. areas BA6) 
was not damaged more frequently in AHP than HP patients in the present study. In Berti et 
al.’s (2005) study, this was the brain region most frequently associated with AHP. In the present 
study, it was only affected in the one anosognosic patient who did not show implicit awareness. 
Only three other AHP patients had damage to this area and this damage was minimal. This 
finding suggests that an intact or almost intact lateral premotor cortex may be one of the neural 
areas that supports tacit, sensorimotor awareness into one’s deficit, a habitual urge to move 
towards objects in the environment, despite the paralysis. Future studies will need to explore 
this finding further and consider the potential role of other brain areas (e.g. parietal areas) in 
residual sensorimotor monitoring processes and tacit, habitual awareness of one’s action 
potentiality.  
 
Whatever the outcome of such studies, however, our current experimental investigations 
further suggest that despite the existence of such implicit awareness of deficit, patients’ 
maintain a more general, explicit belief that they can move. More broadly, the observed 
dissociation between tacit and explicit awareness is consistent with the observation that AHP 
sometimes has delusional features that cannot be explained solely on the basis of sensorimotor 
deficits (for discussion, see Introduction, as well as Ramachandran, 1995; Solms, 1999; 
Vuilleumier, 2004; Frith et al., 2000; Fotopoulou, 2010). The latter can perhaps explain the 
illusion of moving in the here-and-now (Berti et al., 2005), but AHP patients do not simply 
claim that they have illusions of moving. They instead ignore the wealth of evidence indicating 
that they are paralysed (e.g. their disabilities, occasional accidents and others’ feedback) and 
they adhere to the delusional belief that they have functional limbs. The explanation of the 
latter belief therefore requires the postulation of a more general kind of awareness that concerns 
the body beyond the here-and-now of experience; one that extends selfhood in time and space 
(see Gallagher, 2000; Craig, 2009; Damasio, 1999 for more general discussions on such ‘self’ 
distinctions). 
 
While this chapter has not experimentally tested this aspect of AHP directly, I discuss 
previous suggestions in the cognitive and psychoanalytic literature, and their relation with our 
neuroanatomical findings, before I go on to discuss these two facets of the patients’ awareness, 
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tacit awareness and explicit denial, from the point of view of Merleau-Ponty’s existential-
phenomenological perspective.  A number of cognitive theories have suggested that the 
delusional, explicit aspects of AHP can best be explained as an inability to attribute motor 
errors and other failures to oneself and update one’s ‘self-representation’ accordingly (e.g. 
Ramachandran, 1995; Vuilleumier, 2004; Marcel et al., 2004). Interestingly, some of these 
authors have noted that negative emotions may be among the information that these patients 
fail to self-attribute and explicitly experience (see also next chapters). Observations of a sudden 
influx of depressive symptoms (‘catastrophic reactions’, Goldstein, 1939) during episodes of 
transient awareness have been noted in patients who are otherwise unaware of or indifferent 
towards their deficits (Kaplan-Solms & Solms 2000; Turnbull et al. 2005). In addition, it has 
been noted that some AHP patients, who appear emotionally unresponsive towards their 
deficits, tend nevertheless to experience disproportionately intense negative emotions about 
minor unpleasant situations and other people (Kaplan-Solms & Solms 2000; Fotopoulou & 
Conway, 2004). Some authors have argued that this lack of explicit awareness is caused by 
psychogenic ‘defence’ mechanisms directed against anxiety and depression (e.g. Weinstein & 
Kahn, 1955). However, as I mentioned in the Introduction, the relative neuroanatomical and 
behavioural specificity of anosognosic behaviours suggests that such purely psychological 
mechanisms are insufficient to explain AHP (for a recent, critical review, see Heilman & 
Harciarek, 2010).  
Alternatively, other authors within the neurocognitive literature have argued that the fact 
that such ‘denial’ behaviours occur following specific brain lesions can allow us to put forward 
more parsimonious, empirically-informed accounts of brain mechanisms that, when damaged, 
can lead to such delusional behaviours and attitudes (see Fotopoulou, 2010 for discussion of 
this approach, heuristically labelled ‘affective neuropsychology’).  Accordingly, some have 
proposed that such inability to update one’s explicit awareness of one’s body may be the direct 
consequence of right-hemisphere dysfunctions that prevent awareness of motor failures and the 
corresponding negative emotions to be integrated with explicit awareness of the self. Candidate 
brain areas for such dysfunction are the right anterior insula and adjoining frontal areas. A 
plethora of recent neuroimaging studies have suggested that anterior parts of the insula seem 
to be responsible for the re-representation and integration of multisensory, motor and 
interoceptive information that is first processed in other cortical and subcortical areas and 
converge in mid-posterior insula (e.g. Critchley et al., 2004; for reviews see Craig, 2009; 
Tsakiris, 2010). Some authors have therefore proposed that the anterior parts of the right insular 
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cortex are key parts of a neural circuit that supports a stable, coherent and emotionally-
embedded meta-representation of the body as one’s own body (Damasio, 1994; Craig, 2009; 
Tsakiris, 2010). It is thus possible that in AHP patients damage to the right anterior insula and 
adjoining frontal areas contributes to impairment in the re-representation of information 
processed in other sensorimotor and emotional regions. This could render this information 
more likely to be ignored, or attributed to other people and causes (e.g. Kaplan-Solms & Solms 
2000; Fotopoulou & Conway, 2004; Marcel et al., 2004) and less likely to be explicitly self-
attributed.  
This study, consistent with previous studies (Berti et al., 2005; Karnath et al., 2005; 
Baier & Karnath, 2008), found that the anterior parts of the right insula were differentially 
damaged in AHP patients. It should be noted however, that this damage included anterior and 
middle but not posterior parts of the right insula. Karnath and colleagues (Karnath et al., 2005; 
Baier & Karnath, 2008) proposed that the right posterior insula is uniquely associated with 
AHP. Berti et al. found that both anterior and posterior parts of the right insula were among the 
areas specifically associated with AHP. These discrepancies can potentially be explained by 
distinct patient recruitment criteria which are important to note particularly given the observed 
clinical heterogeneity of AHP. In the studies of Karnath et al. there was a high incidence of 
body ownership disturbances. This association has not been reported in other studies (e.g. Berti 
et al., 2005). In our study there was only one patient with indications of somatoparaphrenia 
(AHP5). Interestingly, in this patient, unlike the rest of the AHP patients, both the anterior and 
posterior parts of the insula were affected. Taken together, these findings suggest that the right 
anterior insula may be responsible for an integrated sense of bodily awareness that includes 
motor agency (see also Farrer & Frith, 2002; Craig, 2009), while the posterior insula may be a 
critical part of the network responsible for more basic interoceptive representation and body 
ownership (Craig, 2002; Olausson, et al., 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2007). Finally, our results, as 
well as those of previous neuroimaging studies on AHP (Berti et al., 2005; Karnath et al., 2005; 
Baier & Karnath, 2008), do not directly address the potential role of the left insula in body and 
emotional awareness (see Craig, 2009 for discussion). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that some 
neuroimaging studies of motor and emotional awareness have found bilateral activation of 
insular cortex (e.g. Farrer & Frith, 2002). Interestingly, a recent study of a patient with epilepsy 
following herpes simplex encephalitis who developed Cotard’s syndrome (a severe form of 
unawareness typically including the delusional belief that one is dead, or dying, as well as 
various other self-deprecatory delusions, suicidal ideation, feelings of guilt, and denial of body 
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parts) reported bilateral lesions to the insular cortex (McKay & Cipolotti, 2007). Future lesion 
studies could thus explore the specific roles of the right and left insular cortex in motor and 
emotional awareness and importantly their combined functional role.  
Our results also suggest an association between AHP and subcortical lesions, including 
basal ganglia and amygdala damage. Vuilleumier (2004) has argued that damage to subcortical 
circuits (e.g. basal ganglia) that are involved both in motivation and in detection of “errors” 
might lead to an inability to revise beliefs based on novel perceptual experience and uncertain 
bodily states. It is also of interest that the lesions of the one patient (AHP7) who showed 
increased depression but not implicit awareness of deficit, did not include damage to 
subcortical areas such as the amygdala or the hippocampus and a lesser degree of damage to 
basal ganglia structures. In previous studies, bilateral medial prefrontal cortex and related 
limbic and striato-pallido-thalamic structures lesions have been associated with lower levels of 
depression than dorsal prefrontal areas, or more posterior lesions (for review see Koenigs & 
Grafman, 2009). Interestingly, patients with such lesions in the anterior limbic areas have been 
found to report low levels of “cognitive/affective” symptoms (such as guilt, self-dislike, and 
sadness) but normal levels of “somatic” symptoms (such as fatigue and changes in sleeping or 
appetite) (Koenigs et al., 2008).  
 
Given the small sample and the inherent limitations of lesion analysis, the present 
findings regarding the various observed dissociations and their neural correlates are 
preliminary. Nevertheless, in combination with previous studies, they provide tentative new 
insights into the psychological and neural mechanisms of the multifaceted AHP syndrome. In 
short, our findings suggest that at least some AHP patients may show implicit awareness into 
their deficits, which seems supported by intact parts of the premotor cortex that typically 
support unconscious sensorimotor planning and related feelings such as the ‘urge to move’ (see 
also Desmurget & Sirigu, 2009). The results also appear consistent with cognitive theories that 
have proposed that most AHP patients suffer from a more general, delusion of first-person 
awareness linked with damage to the anterior insular cortex and some possible involvement of 
basal ganglia and limbic circuits. According to such theories, these lesions seem to impair 
patients’ ability to affectively personalise sensorimotor information so that their conscious 
awareness is not updated based on current failures but rather remains linked to previous 
experiences and abstracted knowledge of one’s abilities. 
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3.5.2. Implications for Existential-Phenomenological Theory  
In this section, I explore how the present findings can be understood from the point of 
view of the existential-phenomenological perspective that Merleau-Ponty has put forward in 
his writings on anosognosia and embodiment more generally. In considering this perspective, 
I will also endeavour to discuss points of similarity and disagreement with some of the theories 
put forward to explain AHP in the cognitive literature, as outlined above.  
As I discussed in the introductory section of the present chapter, a central point in 
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of AHP concerns the observation that patients with anosognosia 
show ‘preconscious knowledge’ (1945/1962; p. 93) of their paralysis. This raises the question 
of whether the present findings could be considered as an empirical confirmation of this 
existential-phenomenological observation, even as mere scientific approximations to the 
totality of the individual’s lived body. An initial objection to this idea is the fact that the present 
results derive mainly from two language tasks that perhaps have little to do with patients own 
embodied experience. The patients are asked to listen to certain sentences, understand their 
meaning and respond to them by either inhibiting an automatic semantic association and 
speaking a random word (implicit task), or by explicitly rating their self-relevance (explicit 
task).  At first consideration, a language-based task that involves consciously understanding 
the meaning of a motor-related sentence constructed by someone else sounds irrelevant to 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the ‘habit’ or ‘lived’ body (1945/1962). As I explained above, these 
language tasks were necessitated by patients’ paralysis (one cannot test at the level of motor 
observation how patients experience their motor potentiality towards the world as they cannot 
move their affected side at all), other impaired visuospatial abilities (e.g. neglect)  and the 
reductionist need for tasks that can be comparable in their demand characteristics, i.e. in 
empirical tests of this kind the two domains to be tested need to be somehow ‘balanced’ in their 
difficulty and include the same modalities. Otherwise, differences in performance between 
them could be attributed to such unequal, or different demands in relation to the patients’ more 
general cognitive function.  
However, at closer inspection, there are at least two reasons supporting the idea that 
these findings can be put forward as empirical approximations of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
‘preconscious knowledge’, despite their necessary reductionist nature. The first point to be 
emphasized is that the critical aspects of the implicit task in question are not actually pure 
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semantic aspects. Specifically, what is measured in the task is not patients’ ability to understand 
or verbalise disability-related concepts (these aspects are the mere baseline for the task) but 
rather the speed by which patients respond to them behaviourally (speech is the motor aspect 
of language) and their ability to respond by a word that is unrelated to the semantic content of 
the sentence. Thus, although the test requires subjects to engage with motor-related semantic 
content (versus other categories), the results are determined by their ability to respond 
behaviourally by going beyond such content. The second point to be clarified is even more 
important and it can be traced back to Merleau-Ponty’s own understanding of language7. 
Specifically, Merleau-Ponty sees a certain kind of continuity between his ideas of embodiment 
and the motor aspects of language. When language is used, he claims, the spoken word and its 
meaning are the same thing (1945/1962), in the sense that the natural momentum of the body 
in its relation to the world, includes a conversion to vocal form, includes expressions and 
comprehension. Indeed, to understand the words of others is to also understand their motor 
intentions.  Words seem to evoke meaning to the body directly, prior to any conscious 
elaboration. The word ‘jump’ involves a certain rearrangement of the ‘schema corporel’, 
similar to that of the experience of the body jumping.  
Although a full discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s view on language in relation to the lived 
body extends beyond the constraints of the present thesis, it is argued here that due to the above 
two points, there is at least some plausibility to the idea that the task used in the present study 
could offer empirical confirmation for Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion regarding the preconscious 
knowledge of paralysis in patients with AHP. Moreover, the neuroanatomical findings of the 
study provide further, indirect support for this idea, in the sense that cortical areas liked to 
unconscious aspects of motor planning in other studies, have been found to be spared in these 
patients, as discussed above. Neural facts can never of course be substitutes for 
phenomenological considerations (see Introduction), and hence their relevance here is 
characterized as only indirect. Finally, the present findings reveal that, constistently with 
Merleau-Ponty’s intuition, studying patients with anosognosia offers a rather unique vantage 
point from which to consider the paradox of bodily awareness. All but one of the presently 
tested patients showed signs of implicit awareness into their deficits and yet denied their 
paralysis unequivocally.  
                                                          
7 At least in his early works. His view of language changes somewhat in his later work, as he is more influenced 
by theories on structuralism and semiotics (see Tiemersma,1989 for discussion). 
Unawareness of Paralysis Following Stroke            91
As I mentioned above, in the cognitive literature this paradox is simply, and arguably 
simplistically (see Fotopoulou, 2014), solved by postulating that the mind is made of discrete 
parts (modules) and hence damage to one part may affect one modality of awareness, while 
leaving another intact. Accordingly, as I outlined above, the task of the cognitive 
neuropsychologist is to identify the brain areas selectively associated with the critical symptom 
and hence infer a direct, one-to-one relation between the damaged brain area and the mental 
ability in question. This modular model of the mind and its relation to the brain is nowadays 
rejected in strongest terms by neuroscientists themselves but unfortunately seems to still tacitly 
dominate mainstream cognitive neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience (see Fotopoulou, 
2014 for a critical review). As outlined above, in relation to AHP, this kind of epistemology 
has led to theories that consider explicit anosognosia as the direct consequence of lesions to 
the insular and limbic cortex, with potential involvement of the basal ganglia and other 
subcortical regions. These kind of theories, although increased in their sophistication, seem to 
maintain at the core the explanatory reasoning of older theories that looked for critical ‘sensory’ 
or ‘feedback’ deficits as the cause of AHP (see introduction). The common denominator 
between all these theories is that patients’ conscious awareness is impaired because the 
conscious subject is lacking sufficient information about the body and hence its ‘internal’ 
representation of the body is somehow mistaken.   
Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/1962) perspective on anosognosia and the mind more generally 
differs drastically in this respect. In his view, the explicit unawareness of one’s deficits is in 
direct relation to the implicit awareness of the deficit, despite their paradoxical antithesis. In 
other terms, patients do not show explicit unawareness despite their implicit awareness, but 
rather because of it.  As aforementioned (see Introduction of the present chapter), in his view 
the syndrome is indeed best explained in relation to his account of the ‘being-in-the-world’ that 
cuts across the physical and the mental levels of explanation. Specifically, it is the patient’s 
more general commitment to the world as the body itself ‘knows’ it tacitly, habitually and 
practically that drives one to deny one’s paralysis in more abstract, reflective terms. The human 
natural momentum of being-in-the-world necessitates us to remain tacitly open all our habitual 
possibilities. As Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) reflected, the patient with AHP is not simply 
ignorant of his paralysis, he instead evades his paralysis only in the sense that knows that he 
risks encountering it. Moreover, it is precisely this paradox between practically evading one’s 
disability and yet being consciousnly ignorant of it that best reveals the nature of our embodied, 
impersonal existence in the world. The paradox of anosognosia is the paradox of a perceptual 
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world that is shaped by the primacy of people’s embodied and active relation to the world, a 
world that is only secondarily perceived as perceptible. In other words, the paradox of 
anosognosia reveals the nature of consciousness itself as a (potentially distorting) first-person 
derivative of my very need to perceive, or be conscious of a world beyond the here-and-now 
of practical, embodied, egocentric experience. As Merleau-Ponty argues the anosognosic 
patient finds evidence of his ‘intact’ motor abilities in the very objects that disclose his motor 
deficiencies. Everyday objects elicit action potentialities at the same time as they reveal that 
these actions cannot be performed. Manipulatable objects, precisely in so far as they are 
perceived as manipulatable, appeal to the patient’s arm in ways that he can no longer 
manipulate. Similarly, the body itself is consciously perceived not only in relation to 
experiences that are instantaneous, peculiar to body and complete in themselves, but also in 
some general aspect and in “the light of an impersonal being” (1945/1962; p. 95). Thus, in 
taking both our empirical findings and Merleau-Ponty’ s ideas into account, I can conclude that 
patients with AHP continue to experience the embodied, habitual nature of the body in relation 
to things in their environment, at the expense of their perception of it in the fashion of objects, 
as it could be perceived by any one body, any one spatial position or point in time, or in other 
terms ‘objectively’. The precise relation between this dynamic and the brain lesions observed 
in the patients of the present investigation is currently unclear and will require further 
epistemological considerations and empirical methodologies capable of capturing 
approximations of such dynamic relations at the level of the brain (e.g. what neuroscientists 
call functional and effective connectivity).  
However, the consideration of Merleau-Ponty’s ideas in relation to the present findings 
offer certain additional insights and thus predictions for further study also at the behavioural 
level. If the preconscious awareness of one’s paralysis is indeed present in anosognosia, and if 
it relates among other aspects of embodiment to one’s motor potentiality, and if as Merleau-
Ponty claims it is due to this natural, habitual commitment of the body to such potentialities 
that more abstract forms of body consciousness need to abide to, then patients should be able 
to correctly perceive their non-movement when such action potentialities are not relevant and 
vice versa they should be more adamant in their anosognosic statements when called to action. 
Indeed, this hypothesis will be tested experimentally in the subsequent two chapters (chapters 
4 and 5). In the meanwhile, however, the next section reflects on the implications of the above 
conclusions for counselling psychology.  
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3.5.3. Implications for Existential Counselling Psychology and Psychotherapy 
First, as mentioned in the introduction, the consideration of AHP from this 
interdisciplinary perspective may be of relevance to the psychotherapeutic needs of 
anosognosic patients that are acknowledged by clinical psychology and neuropsychology but 
largely disregarded by the medical and psychotherapeutic professions. More generally, I hope 
that the results and reflections of the present chapter on anosognosia capture and bring to light 
the more general paradox of psychotherapeutic clients who frequently come to therapy 
consciously hoping to change their habitual ways of being-in-the-world while implicitly, yet 
with almost equal force, they may hope not to change their commitment to the world. Second, 
I will argue that this discussion on anosognosia exemplifies how therapists could work with 
the unconscious aspects of therapy from an existential-phenomenological perspective and 
without needing to revert to a kind of Freudian, sexualised and determined unconscious. I 
discuss these two issues in turn below. 
Anosognosia and Existential Psychotherapy. As described in the introduction, AHP in 
the acute stage following stroke is associated with unique clinical challenges and it is 
considered a negative prognostic sign for longterm functional recovery. Yet, there is currently 
no specialised provision for the psychological treatment or management of AHP and related 
disorders in most Western countries (Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2014). Instead, in acute hospital 
words, AHP is frequently regarded as a neuropsychological deficit that needs to be identified 
as such, confronted and ‘trained’ in the same way that other physical symptoms like motor and 
posture difficulties need ‘training’ and ‘exercise’ in the physiotherapist’s gym. Patients are thus 
repeatedly reminded of their ‘correct’ circumstances, their illness and their disabilities in 
frequent and ‘instructive’ ways under an approach called ‘reality orientation’ (Holden & 
Woods, 1995), thought of as important to help patients to achieve a more ‘realistic’ 
appreciation of their deficits. Although this approach has long been criticized for its rigidity 
and insensitivity towards the patient’s emotions (see Spector et al., 2001 for a recent 
discussion), no alternative, psychotherapeutic approaches have been put forward for AHP 
following stroke.  
 
In this context, the existential-phenomenological readings of the empirical findings 
presented above offer a specific perspective to the understanding and psychotherapeutic 
treatment of patients with stroke-induced anosognosia for hemiplegia. This condition has been 
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termed as unintentional by neurologists and as unrelated to personal goals and motivations 
(Bisiach and Geminiani, 1991). Also, these patients are considered emotionally indifferent and 
unable to experience negative emotions consistent with their paralysis (see Turnbull et al., 2005 
for discussion). However, establishing that these patients may simultaneously have tacit 
knowledge into their deficit, and even more that this tacit knowledge is paradoxically 
intertwined with their conscious inability to perceive their deficits, offer psychotherapists and 
counselling psychologists, and more generally all clinicians, a different view of patients with 
AHP. Despite their counterintuitive nature, clinicians need to be mindful of such paradoxes in 
the consciousness and perception of one’s own body and attempt to relate to patients in a 
manner that transcends the strict categories of consciousness, such as the ‘presence’ and the 
‘absence’ of a deficit. A therapist can attempt to relate to patients’ lived experience, including 
exploring their feelings about the body in the context of their lives (see also below), without 
the need to establish a commonly perceived ‘reality’, or ‘world’ in such ‘objective’ terms. For 
example, anosognosic patients who deny their paralysis have been clinically noted to complain 
violently, or express hopelessness for relatively minor events in their lives as perceived by 
others (e.g. their spouses), such as a misplaced fork or comb (Fotopoulou & Conway, 2004). 
Establishing the potentially minor practical impact of such events in their lives is no more 
useful than trying to convince them of the ’reality’ of their deficit, as in ‘reality orientation’ 
approaches. Interpreting such complaints and experiences as related to the deficit, as traditional 
psychoanalytic approaches may propose (Weinstein & Kahn, 1955), may also act in a similar, 
unhelpful manner (see also below). Instead, a therapist informed by existential-
phenomenological insights about patient’s implicit knowledge as outlined above, may try to 
engage with the patient’s own subjective experience about the meaning of the habitual body, 
exploring, describing and even validating their feelings and thoughts in the subjective and 
intersubjective context that they occur, while also progressively opening them up to further 
perspectives.   
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the ‘horizon’ (1945/1962) may be of use here. In 
some similarity to Husserl’s concept of the ‘life-world’8, Merleau-Ponty argued that things are 
given to us against the background of a given world. This world has the structure of a horizon, 
which is constantly in flux as the particular context of our experiences may change. The things 
                                                          
8 For a discussion on the difference between Husserl’s ‘collective horizon’ and Merleau-Ponty’s ‘horizon of all 
horizon’s’ please see Geniusas, 2012.  
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we perceive in the world, including the body in conscious perception, may appear as 
determinate, specific and fixed in their boundaries, hierarchies and categories. However, 
according to Merleau-Ponty, such experiences occur always against a background that acts as 
an indeterminate, prereflective, non-thematic and opaque horizon of understanding. This is the 
horizon of lived, embodied experience that entails a much richer, dynamic repertoire of 
meanings than our conscious, ‘neatly organised’ reflections. Our conscious reflections on the 
world, as we saw even in relation to the conscious perception and appreciation of our own 
body, are not but mere abstract derivatives of that experience. In the case of the anosognosic, 
the perception and description of the physical body as able, familiar and present is therefore 
simultaneously the understanding of the body as disabled, estranged and lost. Patients have 
been noted to claim “of course I can walk”. The cognitive, ‘reality orientation’ therapist may 
pay attention to the apparent disregard of ‘reality’ that the ‘I can walk’ portrays. For the 
existential psychotherapist, the ‘I can walk’ is no more or less important, separate or real than 
the ‘of course’. Thus, such a therapist, may instead pay equal attention to both statements and 
their relation. They may enquire about what the ‘of course’ may mean for the patient. They 
may explore with the patient what such a statement may mean in the context of their lives, their 
relations, their self-regard, thus hopefully in time opening up the patient to further, potentially 
already experienced ways of being in the world (albeit in different contexts) that entail both 
ability and disability (e.g. the experience of being a child, a novice in something, of getting 
lost, of being ill, etc.).  
This principle of ‘horizontalisation’ that warns against imposing any hierarchical 
prioritization of certain meanings, or themes, over others, no matter how intuitive such 
hierarchy and prioritization may sound, is dramatically highlighted by the anosognosic 
phenomena considered here. Stroke patients with anosognosia, when encountered in a 
psychotherapeutic context as clients, call upon us to bracket and horizontalise the very notion 
of the physical reality of the body. The body the patient speaks of is, and simultaneously is not, 
the body that lies paralysed in front of the therapist. The client, as any client, calls upon the 
lived body when interacting with the therapist, even at the very moments that he tries to 
describe his (anosognosic) appreciation of the physical body. It may seem easy and even 
comforting for the therapist to cling to the observable ‘reality’ of the paralysed limbs and try 
to engage the client in such reflections. However, as this chapter has attempted to highlight, 
such efforts would always leave behind the potentially uncomfortable, prereflective experience 
of the lived body as habitually active and currently paralysed and lost.  I argue that 
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intersubjective explorations and sharing of such prereflective experiences and their associated 
meanings during psychotherapy may facilitate clients to arrive at a new subjective 
understanding of the body, in both reflective and prereflective terms, and a consideration of its 
role in their own, wider and changing ‘world-horizon’. 
Anosognosia and an Alternative to the Freudian Unconscious. As aforementioned, 
authors influenced by psychoanalysis have long offered readings of AHP and related clinical 
recommendations for its psychotherapeutic treatment (e.g. Weinstein & Kahn, 1955; for a 
recent review see Prigatano, 2005). Indeed, even Merleau-Ponty himself in his consideration 
of the phenomenon of AHP he explicitly refers to alternative psychoanalytic readings of the 
syndrome and the related notions of the ‘unconscious’ and ‘repression’ as used in classical, 
Freudian metapsychology. Specifically, clarifies that despite any superficial similarities 
between his notion of the pre-thematic, pre-reflective, lived experience and the Freudian 
unconscious, his views on anosognosia offer a drastically different view on such phenomena. 
As discussed above, the lived body is prior to abstract reflection and appreciation of the body 
as a present, ‘thing in itself’. Lived experience more generally, as the alternative to a Freudian, 
drive-based and sexualised unconscious, is our pre-thematic, lived and habitual engagement 
with the world, from which all reflection derives and because of which all reflection is possible. 
For example, when we are trying to approach and grasp an object, we do not necessarily 
consciously reflect on all our prior experiences of reaching and grasping for objects. We instead 
may be conscious of our wish to grasp that object and of its nature as a three dimensional object 
with certain functions (e.g. a glass that you can lift to drink water). Nevertheless, our conscious 
knowledge of the glass is not limited to the perspective and action potentialities afforded by 
our body at the given moment. Instead the glass is perceived as a three-dimensional glass that 
could be seen and used from different (currently unseen and unused) perspectives, exactly 
because of our prior experiences with that and other similar objects and the affordances they 
entail to us and to other people. From this perspective, anosognosia is not the result of 
‘repression’ due to the incompatibility (conflict) of our current perception of the body and our 
inner, unconscious wish to have an active body. Instead, anosognosia is the lived and pre-
reflective experience of our body as habitually able that has not as yet found the motivation 
and maybe not even opportunity, or context, to thematise or reflect on that lived experience in 
conscious terms. The prereflective experience of the active body and the particular individual 
have had a history, intertwined with several meanings and habitual potentialities. One does not 
need the concept of unconscious conflict to assume difficulties in the process of suddenly 
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having to draw new conscious reflections, new abstractions about very body that one could 
take for granted since childhood and experience habitually as able. It is instead proposed that 
existential psychotherapy may have a unique role in engaging patients in reflections on their 
habitual body, opening up their horizon of understanding without the need to directly challenge 
their conscious beliefs and perceptions, nor interpret them as the by-product of other, hidden 
unconscious desires and infantile complexes.   
 
3.6. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter examined whether it is possible to empirically explore a central point in 
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of AHP, namely the observation that patients with anosognosia show 
‘preconscious knowledge’ (1945/1962; p. 93) of their paralysis. Although the conducted 
empirical study necessitated an epistemological reduction of the rich phenomena in question, 
within these constraints, the results of the experiment demonstrated that most patients with 
AHP show implicit (behavioural) indications of knowledge into their paralysis, while at the 
same time ignoring the same paralysis at explicit questioning. These findings were considered 
in relation to existential-phenomenological theory of body awareness. Moreover, points of 
similarity and disagreement with some of the theories put forward to explain AHP in the 
cognitive literature were discussed and finally, implications for counselling psychology and 
existential psychotherapy were considered.   
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4. The Role of Motor Potentialities in Motor Awareness: 
Experimental Evidence in Anosognosia for Hemiplegia 
4.1. Summary 
This chapter addresses the hypothesis of Merleau-Ponty that if the prereflective, habitual 
knowledge of one’s body-in-the-world is what prevents the conscious awareness of one’s 
paralysis, then the more a given environment elicits motor potentialities to a patient, the larger 
should the error be in the conscious perception of the body. However, no study has hitherto 
directly investigated the role of such conditions in the observed non-veridical awareness of 
action in AHP. I developed the following paradigm to investigate the role of motor 
intentionality in awareness in patients with AHP: Four hemiplegic patients with and four 
without anosognosia were provided with false visual feedback of movement in their left 
paralysed arm through a prosthetic rubber hand. I examined whether the ability to detect 
presence or absence of movement based on visual evidence varied according to whether the 
patient had planned to move their limb or not.  Motor intention had a selective effect on patients 
with AHP; they were more likely than controls (U = 16, p < 0.001) to ignore the visual feedback 
of a motionless hand and claim that they moved it when they had the intention to do so (self-
generated movement) than when they expected an experimenter to move their own hand 
(externally-generated movement), or there was no expectation of movement. By contrast, 
patients without AHP were not influenced by these manipulations, and did not claim they 
moved their hand when the hand remained still. This is the first direct demonstration that altered 
awareness of action in AHP reflects the dominance of motor habits and motor expectations 
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4.2. Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on the possibility that, as Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) had 
suggested, patients with Anosognosia for Hemiplegia (AHP) show implicit, pre-reflective 
awareness into their deficit, even though they explicitly deny their paralysis. As I described 
there, contrary to cognitive theories on such phenomena, in Merleau-Ponty’s understanding, 
the denial of one’s motor deficits does not exist despite of one’s pre-reflective, non-thematic 
understanding of the same deficits, but rather because of it. Specifically, it is the patient’s more 
general commitment to the world as the body itself ‘knows’ it tacitly, habitually and practically 
that drives one to deny one’s paralysis in more abstract, reflective terms. The human natural 
momentum of being-in-the-world necessitates us to remain tacitly open to all our habitual 
possibilities and the risk of encountering limitations in such possibilities may not automatically 
translate into conscious reflection. Instead, the latter is a potentially distorting, first-person 
derivative of my very need to perceive, or be conscious of a world beyond the here-and-now 
of practical, embodied, egocentric experience. My conscious body as part of this world, i.e. as 
an object of conscious perception and not as the lived body, is subject to the same principles. 
Thus, we perceived it not only in relation to experiences that are instantaneous, peculiar to 
body and complete in themselves, but also in some general aspect, from the perspective of 
anybody. From this general, abstracted perspective, the body of the anosognosic patient is able 
to move as always. This proposal raises at least two further, related empirical hypotheses: If 
the prereflective knowledge of one’s paralysis is indeed present in anosognosia, and if it relates 
among other aspects of embodiment to one’s motor potentiality, and if the maintenance of such 
potentialities necessitates the body to be perceived as able in conscious, abstract terms, then 
(1) the more such motor potentialities are called for, the larger should the error be in the 
conscious perception of the body and (2) the less such motor potentialities are called for, the 
smaller should the anosognosic error be in conscious perception. I will address the former 
hypothesis in a group study in the current chapter, while I will focus on the potential of reducing 
anosognosia in a single case design in the following chapter.  
 
4.2.1. The Role of Motor Potentialities in the Neurocognitive Literature on Anosognosia 
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As described in the introduction, several authors have recently proposed that AHP may 
be best explained with reference to processes of motor planning, imagery and intentionality, 
rather than sensory feedback. The starting point of such proposals was not the 
phenomenological or existential traditions but were rather derived from recent computational 
models of motor control (e.g. Frith, Blakemore & Wolpert, 2000; but see Berendzen, 2014 for 
a recent example of their compatibility). Thus, I describe them here in their own 
epistemological and theoretical context, before I go on to integrate this literature with Merleau-
Ponty’s views in the discussion of this chapter. In such models, under normal circumstances, 
the formation of an intention to move will be used by brain operations summarised under the 
heading ‘forward models’, which are thought of as neurocognitive, predictive operations 
specialised to generate predictions about the sensory feedback the organism will encounter 
(including limb position sense) if they were to execute the intended action (Frith, Blakemore 
& Wolpert, 2000). If an intended movement is attempted and it is successful, then it is assumed 
that conscious awareness is informed mainly by the predictive, ‘forward models’, largely 
ignoring the actual state of the organism. However, if an action is not performed as planned, 
another set of specialised operations, summarised as ‘comparators’, are thought of as 
responsible for detecting mismatches between the predicted and received sensory feedback and 
informing conscious awareness.  
Berti et al (2007), following Frith et al. (2000) hypothesised that patients with AHP form 
appropriate representations of the desired and predicted positions of the limb, but they are not 
aware of the discrepancy between their prediction and the actual position. On this view, 
patients’ awareness is dominated by intention, and does not take into account the failure of 
sensory evidence to confirm the execution of the intended action. AHP arises because action 
awareness is based on predictions of the effects of motor commands sent to the plegic limb and 
sensory evidence about lack of movement is not processed appropriately by the ‘comparators’.  
Accordingly, AHP may involve damage to the brain areas that underpin the monitoring of the 
correspondence between motor outflow and sensory inflow (e.g. Brodmann’s premotor areas 
6 and 44; Berti et al., 2005), or else contrary sensory information is neglected (Frith et al., 
2000). Consequently, the mismatch between the predicted state (i.e. movement of the limb) 
and the actual state (i.e. no movement) is not registered.  
Notwithstanding the theoretical interest of the above hypothesis, and its potential 
compatibility with some of the principles behind Merleau-Ponty’s views on consciousness of 
the body, to my knowledge, no study has hitherto directly investigated the role of motor 
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intentions, or predictions in the generation of a positive symptom in AHP, namely, their non-
veridical awareness of action. Berti and colleagues (Berti et al., 2005; 2007) have provided 
convincing evidence that motor planning is intact in AHP (against the Heilman et al., 
hypothesis), but to our knowledge no study has been able to demonstrate that motor planning 
dominates awareness of action in AHP. Such a demonstration would require an experimental 
situation in which sensory feedback relevant to the arm that the patient could normally detect 
was nevertheless not detected when patients formed a motor intention to move the arm and 
thus had the relevant motor potentialities ‘in mind’.  This was the aim of the current 
experimental study.  
Specifically, I developed an experimental paradigm to test the hypothesis that awareness 
of a movement is based primarily on motor planning, and that this information dominates over 
sensory feedback.  Because AHP patients typically have somatosensory loss (Cutting, 1978), 
the study focussed on visual feedback from the limb rather than somatosensory feedback.  
Visual feedback of action plays an important role in action awareness, as shown in self-
recognition studies with healthy participants (Tsakiris et al., 2006; van den Bos & Jeannerod, 
2002). The study therefore used a realistic prosthetic hand to generate visual feedback of 
movements that the patient either commanded themselves (self-generated movement; 
maximum motor planning is involved) or were controlled by an experimenter (externally-
generated movement; minimum motor planning is needed). In some conditions, I gave visual 
feedback that was incompatible with the patient’s predictions. In particular, in the critical 
condition, patients were instructed to move their left hand themselves, but the prosthetic hand 
remained still. These conditions essentially mirrored the classic anosognosic scenario within 
an experimentally controlled procedure (cf. Ramachandran, 1995). I hypothesised that if motor 
planning (motor intentions and related potentialities) dominates over sensory feedback in AHP, 
patients would fail to perceive the prosthetic hand’s lack of movement.  Thus, if asked to detect 
movements of their left arm, they would make more errors (false alarms) in this critical 
condition (self-generated movement) than in the externally-generated movement conditions.  
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4.3. Materials and Methods 
4.3.1. Participants 
Eight adult neurological patients were consecutively recruited from an acute stroke unit 
in a first phase of the overall study (see Chapters 2 and 3). Inclusion and exclusion criteria were 
as described in Chapters 2 and 3, and the smaller cohort of patients recruited for this experiment 
were simply the ones available to conduct this experiment for practical purposes (e.g. time 
scheduling issues at the hospital, worsening of medical and cognitive condition). Descriptions 
and analyses of their characteristics and neuropsychological performance are therefore 
summarised here again, as they constitute a smaller sample with presumably differences in 
average performance. Patients were classified as having AHP as described in Chapter 2; there 
were four right hemisphere damaged patients with complete left upper limb hemiplegia and 
AHP (AHP = experimental group) and four right hemisphere damaged patients with complete 
left upper limb hemiplegia but without AHP (HP= control group). All participants gave 
informed consent and the study was approved by the local Trust’s Ethical Committee (see 
Chapter 2).  
All patients had lesions mainly in the territory of the right Middle Cerebral Artery 
(MCA), involving frontal, temporal and parietal lobes, and subcortical involvement of the basal 
ganglia, the insula and the internal capsule. Figure 4.1 illustrates the lesions of the patients as 
documented by clinical CT or MRI scans. The lesions showed variability typical of the 
literature (for an extensive meta-analysis see Pia et al., 2004). In the AHP group patients, A1 
had a frontoparietal lesion extending to subcortical areas, patients A2 and A3 showed large 
lesions affecting most of the right MCA territory, and patient A4 had focal subcortical damage 
mainly affecting the basal ganglia. The lesions of the control HP patients were equally varied. 
Due to the small sample and variation of the neuroradiological findings, precise volumetric 
analysis and detailed lesion mapping analysis and contrasts were not warranted (see previous 
Chapter for a volumetric studies of the larger group; see also Berti et al., 2005; Karnath et al., 
2005 for similar samples).  
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FIGURE 4.1. Individual patients’ lesions in the two groups represented in red. Patients 
A1-A4 formed the AHP group and patient C1-C4 formed the Control HP group. All patients 
had lesions affecting the territory of the right middle cerebral artery.  
4.3.2. Neuropsychological Assessment 
In addition to the anosognosia tests mentioned above, the patients were assessed using 
the standardised neuropsychological tests described in Chapters 2 and 3. Patients’ demographic 
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characteristics and their performance, averaged across the groups of this particular chapter, on 
standardized neuropsychological tests are summarized on Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1. Groups demographic characteristics and neuropsychological profile 
 AHP HP controls Mann-Whitney 
Test 
Mean SD Mean SD Z p  
N 4 - 4 - - - 
Age in yrs 63.75 5.95 61.00 22.79 0.00 1.00 
Education in yrs 12.75 2.87 12.00 2.83 0.73 0.30 
Days from Onset 20.0 13.23 19.75 3.30 0.00 0.40 
Premorbid IQ– WTAR¶ 112.67 13.05 104.75 7.72 0.00 0.40 
WAIS – III¶ Vocabulary 9.75 4.65 8.75 2.99 0.30 0.38 
WAIS – III Similarities 9.50 3.11 10.25 2.50 0.29 0.38 
WAIS – III Digit Span 10.25 3.50 9.25 1.71 0.44 0.36 
WAIS – III Matrix Reasoning 6.331 2.52 8.33 2.52 0.89 0.27 
WAIS – III Arithmetic 7.67 3.21 8.67 2.31 0.70 0.31 
Visual Fields¶ R 9.25 0.50 10.00 0.00 2.05 0.11 
Visual Fields L 3.251 3.40 6.251 2.06 1.48 0.20 
Visual Fields Both 1.001 1.41 2.251 1.71 1.04 0.34 
RASP¶ Surface Touch L - Max 30 6.751 3.86 7.501 3.87 0.29 0.88 
RASP Surface Touch/Spam Max 10 5.001 2.44 4.751 1.70 1.00 1.00 
RASP Extinction - Max 12 3.661 6.35 6.501 2.12 0.59 0.80 
RASP Proprioception - Max 30 
           Movement  Detection L  
6.751 3.30 6.501 4.04 0.15 0.89 
RASP Proprioception - Max 30 
           Direction Detection L  
4.451 2.87 3.501 3.69 0.44 0.69 
Comb/Razor Test¶ R 27.5 16.7 25.50 1.29 1.00 0.34 
Comb/Razor Test L 13.75 17.35 20.00 5.42 1.16 0.34 
Comb/Razor Test Ambiguous 10.75 11.53 8.75 8.18 0.14 0.88 
Comb/Razor Test Bias -0.391 0.32 -0.10 0.11 1.7 0.11 
Bisiach Test¶ 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.53 0.13 
BIT¶ Total Score 84.751 29.54 961 35.31 0.43 0.66 
Line Crossing R 18 0 17.25 0.95 1.50 0.30 
Line Crossing L 6.751 6.16 15.751 3.3 2.00 0.06*1 
Letter Cancellation R 16 2.82 14.75 2.36 0.60 0.20 
Letter Cancellation L 6.251 3.3 12.251 5.5 1.40 0.70 
Star Cancellation R 21.5 7.59 23 4.08 0 1 
Star Cancellation L 8.51 10.63 20.751 4.11 1.60 0.10 
Copy 11 1.41 3 1.15 1.80 0.08*1 
Representational Drawing 1.331 1.15 2.75 0.5 1.90 0.56 
Line Bisection R 3 0 2.5 1 1.00 0.30 
Line Bisection Centre 2 1.41 2.25 1.5 0.50 0.61 
Line Bisection L 0.751 0.95 1.51 1.73 0.60 0.50 
Berti Awareness¶ LUL 1.5 0.6 0.00 0.00 2.50 < .05* 
Berti Awareness¶ LLL 1.75 0.50 0.00 0.00 2.50 < .05* 
AHP Questionnaire¶ 5.1 0.9 0.63 0.48 2.82 < .05* 
Hayling Test RTs 2.001 1.15 3.001 2.31 0.62 0.33 
Unawareness of Paralysis Following Stroke            105
Hayling Test Errors 4.00 1.83 3.50 2.89 0,30 0.40 
Proverbs¶ 8.00 3.61 11.50 5.74 1.08 0.22 
Cognitive Estimates¶ 10.001 2.71 9.331 1.15 1.08 0.22 
HADS¶ Depression 4.00 2.83 7.50 5.97 1.04 0.30 
HADS¶ Anxiety 7.75 5.06 9.00 6.58 0.00 1.00 
1 Scores below tests’ cut-off point, or more than 1 SD below the average mean 
*Significant differences between the groups, p < 0.05 
*1Trends towards significance, p < 0.10 
¶WTAR = Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (Wechsler, 2001); WAIS-III = Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale - 3rd Edition (Wechsler, 1998); Visual-fields = The customary ‘confrontation’ technique (Bisiach 
et al., 1986); BIT Total score = sum of scores of the conventional sub-tests of the Behavioural 
Inattention Test; ‘One Item Test’ and ‘Comb/Razor Test’= Tests of Personal Neglect. Bias on the 
latter is calculated according to McIntosh et al., 2000; RASP = The Rivermead Assessment of 
Somatosensory Performance (Winward, Halligan & Wade, 2002); Proverb Test = Delis Kaplan – 
Executive Functions System - Proverbs Subtest (Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001); HADS = Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale. Awareness Interview = Berti et al. 1996 Awareness Interview and 
Awareness Questionnaire = Feinberg et al. 2000 Awareness Questionnaire.  
 
As shown in Table 4.1, the groups did not differ in age (range in years 38-83), education 
or post-onset assessment time. As expected the two groups differed significantly in the two 
awareness interviews used; the Awareness Interview (Berti et al., 1996) and in AHP 
Questionnaire (Feinberg et al., 2000). Interestingly, three of the four AHP patients claimed they 
did move their paralysed left limbs during the awareness tests, while the HP patients 
immediately acknowledged that the task was impossible for them. Their awareness scores were 
consistent with patients’ spontaneous behaviour; the HP patients acknowledged their paralysis 
spontaneously and never attempted to move without assistance. By contrast, the AHP patients 
tended to deny or minimise their motor deficits in spontaneous behaviour. All four patients 
explicitly stated that they could move their left arm, had attempted to stand on their own at 
least once and repeatedly expressed hostility towards staff and relatives for forbidding them 
from getting up and walking on their own or, performing bimanual tasks. In addition, all four 
patients falsely claimed (confabulated) that they had been moving their left side while in 
hospital (e.g. “Of course, I can use my left arm. How do you think I scratch my right arm when 
it is itchy during the night?”). One patient showed somatoparaphrenia in spontaneous behaviour 
in that she insisted her left arm was her husband’s arm (patient A2 in Fig. 4.1).  
The two groups did not differ in their general premorbid or postmorbid intelligence 
scores and there were no significant differences in their reasoning abilities as measured by two 
frontal tasks. However, it should be noted that both groups performed worse than expected by 
their premorbid IQ on the WAIS-III Performance subtest Matrix Reasoning and on the 
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Cognitive Estimates Test (normal range is 2-6). Both groups showed some degree of 
visuospatial, sensory and personal neglect but this appeared more severe in the AHP group. It 
is of interest that the AHP scored below cut-off levels in the Comb/Razor Test, while the HP 
group did not. The differences between the groups on two visuospatial Neglect Tests (Left side 
Line cancelation and Copy) approximated significant levels (p < 0.10) (see Table 4.1). It thus 
seemed that AHP had overall more severe neglect than HP patients, but variability was noted 
among patients of both groups and given the small samples assessed, differences were non-
significant. Finally, AHP patients showed lower scores for depression and anxiety on the 
HADS comparing to HP patients. However, the scores of the two groups did not significantly 
differ and they were considered to be within normal limits for a patient population in a general 
hospital.  
 
4.3.3. Experimental Investigations 
Design 
The experiment assessed whether the intention to act (i.e. move one’s left hemiplegic 
hand) influenced the perception of movement of the same hand in hemiplegic patients with or 
without AHP. Motor intention was manipulated by instruction at three different levels: self-
generated movement (patients were instructed to raise their left arm), externally-generated 
movement (patients were told that an experimenter will lift their [the patient’s] left arm) and 
no-movement instruction. Visual feedback of movement was manipulated at two levels: 
Movement, no movement. This allowed for a 2 x 2 x 3 design (see Table 4.2 and Appendix V). 
The experimental factors were: (a) group (patients with AHP, patients with HP); (b) the visual 
feedback of hand movement (movement/no movement); and (c) the motor intention (self, 
external, none).  
 
Table 4.2. Table summarizing the experimental design 
 
Instruction Rubber-Hand 
 Movement No Movement 
Self-generated movement 6 trials 6 trials 
Externally-generated movement 6 trials 6 trials 
No movement instruction 6 trials 6 trials 
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Dependent Variables 
Dependent variables included (a) movement detection scores: “Did your left hand 
move?” (YES/NO response); (b) confidence rating on measure a (Likert-type scale 1-7); (c) 
agency scores over the observed movement: “Did you or someone else move your hand?” 
(‘Me/Someone else’ response).  
 
Materials and Procedure  
The aim of the experiment was to assess whether patients’ intention to act influenced 
their awareness of movement of the same hand. As hemiplegic patients cannot move their left 
arm, a life-sized rubber model of a left hand and arm was used to create false visual feedback 
of left hand movement. Prosthetic hands were used because they can be easily manipulated by 
the experimenters, they are quite realistic, and moving them does not elicit somatosensory 
signals. A suitable rubber hand was selected for each patient in order to resemble each patient’s 
own (real) hand in terms of size, shape, skin tone, and freckles. The rubber hand was placed on 
a hospital table in front of the patients (by an assisting experimenter seated at the left of the 
patient and holding the proximal end of the rubber hand), while their vision was temporarily 
blocked. The rubber hand was aligned to the patient’s midline, adopting the canonical position 
that their own left hand would occupy. The rubber hand’s proximal end, held by the assisting 
experimenter, and the patient’s left hand were hidden from the patient’s view under a pillow. 
The ‘ownership’ of the rubber hand was tested as described below, the experimental procedure 
was explained to patients and they were then given two examples of each trial of the experiment 
(see below).  
In 12 trials patients were instructed to slightly raise their left hand (self-generated 
movement condition) following a tap at a predetermined spot on the table in front of them 
(about 20 cm to the right of the rubber hand). In another 12 trials they were told to stay 
motionless and to anticipate that, following the tap, the assisting experimenter (seated at the 
left of the patient and holding the proximal end of the rubber hand under a pillow – see above) 
would passively lift the patient’s left hand upwards for them (externally-generated movement 
condition). In a final set of 12 trials they were told to stay motionless following the tap and that 
the assisting experimenter would not attempt to move their left hand either (no-movement 
instruction condition). Self-generated movement, externally-generated movement and no-
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movement instruction trials were presented in mixed, random order. For each of these levels 
of the variable Intention, the assisting experimenter was manipulating the rubber hand in two 
levels: movement (6 trials for each intention condition), or no movement (6 trials for each 
intention condition) (see Table 4.2). Movement and no-movement trials were presented in 
random order. Patients had to answer in each trial the movement detection, confidence, and 
movement agency questions described above.  
The study’s hypothesis hypothesis was that AHP patients would make more errors in 
their perception of rubber hand movement or non- movement in the self-generated movement 
condition, than in the externally-generated movement or no-movement instruction conditions. 
Control and Ownership Baseline Questions  
Control questions (“Please move your right hand upwards. Did your right hand move?”) 
were asked before the experiment and every 10 trials to ensure patients were paying attention 
to and understanding properly the examiner’s instructions. In addition, questions that verified 
that the patients believed their rubber-hand was their own were asked before, during 
(approximately every 8 trials), and after the experiment. These included the following 
questions: (1) Please point to your left hand using your right hand (while their left hand was 
hidden and the left rubber hand was placed in front of the patient); (2) Is this your hand? 
(pointing to the rubber-hand). Patients performed flawlessly on the right hand control task and 
the ownership control questions (i.e. they did not doubt the rubber hand was theirs), and 
therefore these results are not presented below.  
It should also be noted that at the end of the experiment and while the participants’ own 
left hand was out of sight, I tried placing the rubber-hand in positions incongruent to the 
canonical position of patients’ own left hands. These included positions further to the left, to 
the right, and rotated rubber hand (180 degrees up-side down and back to front) positions. All 
patients (including the patient with a somatoparaphrenic delusion) denied ownership of the 
rubber-hand in all incongruent positions, replicating previous findings in healthy participants 
(Constantini & Haggard, 2007; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). As soon as the rubber hand was 
placed closer to the canonical position of the left hand and in the correct orientation 
(irrespective of where their own left hand was lying) patients stated that they thought the rubber 
hand was their own. In one of the control HP patients, I assessed whether this acquisition of 
ownership of the rubber-hand would apply even after I showed him the rubber-hand and 
explained the use I made of it during the experiment. After this briefing, the patient 
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spontaneously laughed and commented that I had ‘tricked’ him in believing that the rubber-
hand was his own. However, when minutes later I presented the rubber-hand in the canonical 
position of his left arm as in the experiment and asked him if it was the rubber hand or his own, 
he once again stated the rubber hand was his own arm.  
 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Movement Detection 
 
The HP (control) group showed overall high levels of correct responses, i.e. they 
responded ‘yes’ when the prosthetic hand moved and ‘no’ when it did not. The AHP group 
showed also a relatively high level of correct responses with one exception: a dramatic decrease 
in their correct responses in the case where they were told to move their left hand (self-
generated movement) and there was no movement of the rubber hand. These results are 
depicted in Fig. 4.2.  
 
FIGURE. 4.2 Percentage of Correct Responses across groups (means and SEs) for ‘Self-
generated’ (self-generated movement), ‘Externally-generated’ (externally-generated 
movement) and ‘No instruction’ (no movement instruction) Intention Conditions and for 
Rubber Hand Movement and No movement Conditions. Patients with AHP show a selective 
dramatic decrease of correct responses in the ‘Self-generated/No Movement’ condition.  
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Signal detection theory was applied to investigate differences between groups in the 
ability to detect movements of the rubber hand in each condition (Non-parametric analyses of 
total correct responses were also performed and confirmed the results of the analysis based on 
signal detection theory presented below).  For this purpose, a hit was defined as the patient 
reporting a movement of their left hand when the prosthetic hand moved.  A false alarm 
involved reporting movement when the prosthetic hand did not move.  D prime values were 
calculated for each subject and each condition.  Hit rates of 1.0 and false alarm rates of 0.0 
were replaced by 0.99 and 0.01 respectively to allow d prime to be calculated despite floor and 
ceiling performance.  D prime values in each condition were compared between the AHP and 
control groups, using Mann-Whitney tests.  An alpha level of 0.017 was applied to correct for 
three comparisons.  In the own-intention condition, d prime values were significantly lower for 
the AHP than the control group (median d prime 1.24 vs 4.65, U = 16, p < 0.001).  The groups 
did not differ in sensitivity in the externally-applied and no-intention conditions (externally-
applied, median d prime 3.03 vs 4.65, U = 10.5, p = 0.23; no-intention, median d prime 2.96 
vs 2.54, p = 0.39). I conclude that the AHP group were impaired in detecting the movement of 
the rubber hand only in the condition where they had intended to move.  Interestingly, the AHP 
group did not show a general impairment in perceptual sensitivity, since their d prime values 
were in fact higher than the control group in the no-intention condition. 
 
4.4.2. Confidence scores 
All patients showed high levels of confidence in their answers (see Fig. 4.3).  A non-
parametric Mann-Whitney test revealed an overall effect of group (Z = 2.29, p <0.05) with 
AHP patients feeling less confident for their answers than the HP patients. A Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test showed that more confidence was shown overall in response to rubber hand 
movement than to non-movement conditions (Z = 2.46, p < 0.05). The interaction of group x 
movement was analysed by calculating the difference between confidence scores of movement 
and no movement and a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test showed that the group had a 
significant effect on this difference (Z = 0.24, p < 0.05), with AHP patients showing less 
confidence than HP patients in their answers to No-movement than to Movement conditions. 
There were no other observed differences.  
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FIGURE. 4.3. Percentage of Confidence Scores across groups (means and SEs) for 
‘Self-generated’ (self-generated movement), ‘Externally-generated’ (externally-generated 
movement) and ‘No instruction’ (no movement instruction) Intention Conditions and for 
Rubber Hand Movement and No movement Conditions. 
 
4.4.3. Agency Questions 
 
The extent to which patients experienced agency over the movement of the hand was 
assessed by asking them “Did you or someone else move this hand?” in each trial. The 
anosognosic patient who also showed somatoparaphrenia in spontaneous behaviour (see A2 in 
Fig. 4.1) found this question very challenging and either remained quiet when asked or, stated 
she did not know. The question was discontinued after 6-7 trials as she appeared to get 
considerably upset by it. Two of the three remaining AHP patients stated that they had 
performed the movement in all of the ‘self-generated movement’ trials that they had 
‘perceived’ a movement, even if the rubber hand had in fact remained motionless. The fourth 
patient experienced agency in all of the ‘self-generated movement’ trials in which he had 
‘perceived’ a movement, except in one of the four trials in which he had ‘perceived’ a 
movement but the rubber hand had in fact remained motionless. In the ‘externally-generated 
movement’ and ‘no movement’ conditions, these three anosognosic patients denied agency of 
the movement.  
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All control patients denied agency of movement in all the ‘externally-generated 
movement’ and ‘no movement instruction’ trials in which they had perceived a movement. 
However, to our surprise three out of four of the HP control subjects stated that they had 
performed the movement in all of the ‘self-generated movement’ trials that the rubber hand 
moved. Given that these patients were not anosognosic in spontaneous behaviour and in formal 
assessment (see Table 4.1), I asked them the following questions after the completion of the 
experiment: what made them believe they had moved their left hand, whether they had moved 
it at all during their hospitalisation and, if not, and what allowed them to move it now. All three 
patients answered that they had not moved their left hand at all since the stroke, they could not 
explain why they were able to do so during the experiment, and they based their answers mostly 
on what they saw but also to an extent on an ‘internal feeling of having moved it’ during some 
of the trials. Characteristically, one subject also commented: “Sometimes I had the impression 
that even if I had closed my eyes I would feel it move. I mean I felt the movement in my hand. 
I didn’t just see it”. None of the patients had recovered any of their left arm motor power at the 
time of the experiment. Unfortunately, due to practical constraints, such interesting and 
unexpected observations could not be further explored in the present thesis. Their implications 




4.5.1. Summary and Implications for Neurocognitive Theories 
In this section, I will first discuss the results of this study in the content of the 
neurocognitive literature to which they epistemologically and methodologically relate, before 
I go on to discuss their implications for existential theory and counselling psychology. In order 
to investigate the role of motor intention in AHP, this study provided patients with and without 
AHP substituted visual feedback of movement in their left paralysed upper limb.  Thus the 
study was able to assess whether their ability to visually detect this substituted movement 
varied according to whether patients had planned to move their limb or not. The results showed 
that all patients, including patients who were aware of their hemiplegia, believed that they 
generated movements when they were presented with visual feedback of a moving prosthetic 
hand that they thought was their own. Crucially, motor intention had a selective effect on 
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patients with AHP; they systematically disregarded visual information of a motionless rubber 
hand on trials where they had the intention to move, compared to trails where they expected 
the experimenter to move the rubber hand, or when there was no expectation of movement. In 
other terms, patients with AHP were unable to detect absence of movement correctly in the 
self-generated condition, but were able to detect it in the externally-generated condition. By 
contrast, patients without AHP were not influenced by these manipulations and they did not 
claim that they had moved their hand when the rubber hand had remained still.  
These results confirm that AHP is influenced by motor planning, and in particular that 
motor ‘awareness’ in AHP derives from the processing of motor intentions. This finding is 
consistent with the proposals made by Frith et al. (2000; see also Berti et al., 2007) that the 
illusory ‘awareness’ of movement in anosognosic patients is created on the basis of operations 
able to predict the positions of the limbs given certain motor intentions, and not on the basis of 
a comparison between the predicted and actual sensory feedback, which seems to be 
malfunctioning. According to this hypothesis, patients with AHP are able to form appropriate 
representations of the desired and predicted positions of the limb. However, conflicting 
information derived from sensory feedback that would indicate a failure of movement is not 
normally available, because of brain damage to regions that would register the actual state of 
the limbs, or else because this contrary information is neglected. A recent lesion mapping study 
suggested that premotor areas BA6 and 44, which are implicated in action monitoring, are the 
most frequently damaged areas in patients with AHP (Berti et al., 2005; but see previous 
chapter). This finding may explain why these patients fail to register their inability to move, 
but it does not address the functional mechanism that underpins their illusory awareness of 
action per se, as opposed to the prereflective aspects of body knowledge (see previous chapter). 
The current results instead provide direct evidence for the hypothesis that non-veridical 
awareness of action (thinking that an intended movement has taken place when no such 
movement has been performed) is based on the stream of motor commands and not on sensory 
inflow.  
Patients with AHP have diverse somatosensory deficits. Therefore, assessing the exact 
role of sensory feedback on AHP can be challenging. To resolve this problem, this study 
substituted visual feedback from a prosthetic hand which patients believed was their own, for 
somatosensory feedback from the patient’s own hand.  Accordingly, I predicted that the 
detection of the patient’s movement based on this substitute feedback depended on their motor 
intention.  Thus, patients’ errors were unrelated to proprioceptive sensory feedback. Crucially, 
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visual information showing a lack of movement was selectively ignored when the patients were 
instructed to generate themselves the feedforward motor signals to move. To the best of my 
knowledge, this study is the first to test directly the hypothesis of dominant motor intention in 
AHP patients. Interestingly, accumulating evidence suggests that even neurologically healthy 
people demonstrate a remarkably limited awareness of actual movements and their sensory 
feedback (e.g. Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998). In fact, it is only when the discrepancy between 
predicted and actual consequences exceeds a certain threshold that we become aware of an 
error signal from the comparator. On that view, AHP may represent an exaggerated form of 
the normal function of the internal models of the motor system.  
Could this result be explained by alternative accounts of AHP? The selective deficit that 
AHP patients showed in this experiment cannot be accounted for by the proposal that AHP 
results from a lack of motor intention (Heilman et al., 1998). That hypothesis does explain the 
clinical observation that patients cannot ‘discover’ their impairment, but it is not sufficient to 
explain why patients may claim that they have moved when actually they have not (see also 
Frith et al., 2000 and Berti et al. 2007 for discussion).  
Nor can the observed results simply be a confounding effect of contralesional neglect. 
Even though our anosognosic group did show higher neglect scores than non-anosognosic 
patients with similar lesions and motor deficits, patients did perceive the lack of movement in 
the externally-generated movement and no-movement instruction conditions, and they showed 
only a selective difference for self-generated movement. This suggests that neglect cannot be 
the primary cause of the anosognosic errors performed by our AHP patients (see also Bisiach 
et al., 1986; Marcel et al., 2004 for dissociations between AHP and neglect).  
It is also unlikely that the observed results reflect a general deficit in detecting 
abnormalities and contradictions (Ramachandran, 1995), or a greater suggestibility, because 
AHP patients were able to detect the similar discrepancies between instruction and no rubber 
hand movement in the externally-generated movement conditions. In addition, our patient 
groups were well matched in terms of cognitive deficits, such as confusion or intellectual 
impairment ruling out a general cognitive deficit explanation (Levine et al., 1991).  
Interestingly, a number of investigators have suggested that emotional factors may 
influence AHP and explain some of its delusional elements (Marcel et al., 2004; Vuilleumier, 
2004; Turnbull et al., 2005). These emotional factors could be directly linked to the aetiology 
of anosognosia, rather than being secondary (psychogenic) consequences as previously 
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suggested (Weinstein & Kahn, 1955). For example, some have suggested that AHP may result 
from abnormal affective regulation (Nadrone et al., 2008; Turnbull et al., 2005). Alternatively, 
other have claimed that right brain damage may alter emotional and attitudinal processes 
implicated in self-attribution of perceptual experiences (Marcel et al., 2004), or,  cause spatial 
deficits that undermine the representation of self-other separateness (Solms, 1999; Feinberg et 
al., 2005). Sadly, it was not possible to test these possibilities directly in the present thesis, 
although it is of course possible that the emotional relevance of the self-generated movement 
condition (and the relevant noted feelings of agency of movement) was higher than that of the 
externally-generated movement trials. Future studies should explore these possibilities directly.  
               Additional Findings 
Two further findings merit discussion. First, hemiplegic and hemianeasthetic patients, 
with and without AHP, accepted a rubber hand as their own if it was placed at a canonical 
position. The attribution of ownership of the rubber hand points to the fragility of our 
ownership judgements and is relevant to studies of the ‘rubber-hand illusion’ in healthy 
volunteers (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). These experiments have demonstrated that the sense of 
body ownership can be disrupted in normal volunteers by showing them a rubber arm that is 
seen to be stroked exactly in time with tactile stroking of their real arm. Furthermore, 
movements of the real arm may become inaccurate because the volunteers assume the starting 
position of their arm is that of the rubber arm. Given the patients’ severely impaired 
proprioception and tactile sensation, I anticipated that visual feedback of a realistic rubber hand 
in the canonical position could make them unusually ready to attribute the rubber hand to 
themselves. Indeed, the results showed that patients were willing to accept a rubber hand as 
theirs when placed in the canonical position and they did not doubt the ownership of the rubber 
hand throughout the experiment. Furthermore, one of our patients was somatoparaphrenic in 
spontaneous behaviour (patient A2 claimed that her own left hand was her husband’s) but she 
did accept the rubber hand as hers when it was placed in the canonical position of her own left 
hand and her own left hand was out of sight.  
Frith (2005) has speculated that patients with asomatognosia or somatoparaphrenia think 
that the hand they see is not their own hand because it is in a different place from where they 
know and expect their own hand to be. Indeed, this study found that patients only self-attributed 
the rubber hand when it appeared in the position they expected their own left hand to be. 
Previous studies in healthy volunteers have shown that passive visual exposure to artificial 
hands in a congruent posture induces a visual recalibration of proprioception of the 
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participant’s real hand position toward the position of the artificial hand (Holmes et al., 2006). 
However, simply viewing an artificial hand does not create a strong illusion of ownership in 
healthy participants.  For that, synchronized visual and tactile experience is required, as in the 
rubber hand illusion.  Our patients’ tactile and proprioceptive deficit may have made them 
unusually willing to accept merely visual evidence of ownership. 
 
 A second interesting observation concerns our control group. Patients with hemiplegia 
but no AHP believed they had moved their plegic arm in conditions of self-generated 
movement/rubber hand movement. In other words, when they were asked to move their left 
arm and an experimenter was moving the rubber hand congruently with the instructions but 
unbeknownst to them, the majority of our control patients claimed they had moved their arm 
themselves (unlike the AHP patients who believed they had moved even when the rubber hand 
was motionless). Remarkably, these patients were fully and simultaneously aware of their 
paralysis. This misattribution of the agency of rubber hand movement highlights both how 
patients’ beliefs may be altered by experimental manipulations, and the roles of both vision 
and motor intention in these belief formations. The effects of illusory visual feedback on action 
recognition have been similarly explored using mirrors (Ramachandran, 1995) and video 
projections (Daprati et al., 1997; Sirigu et al., 1999). Sirigu and colleagues (1999) showed that 
incongruent visual feedback can lead apraxic patients with left parietal lesions to falsely believe 
they have performed normal instead of inaccurate movements. Interestingly, in the same study, 
when healthy control participants received visual feedback of the examiner’s hand performing 
the same simple action they were instructed to perform (simultaneous and congruent visual 
feedback), their performance in distinguishing between the visual image of their hand and that 
of the examiner’s was not significantly better than that of the parietal patients. This difference 
became significant only when complex actions were tested. These observations suggest that 
the match between intention and visual feedback is important in self-attribution of action.  
 
Finally, the possibility of an effect of suggestibility should be taken into account in both 
of these observations, but it should also be noted that both were selective and thus could not 
fully be accounted for by suggestibility. Patients did not accept the rubber hand as theirs when 
it was placed in non-canonical positions and control patients did not report being able to move 
their paralysed arms when they received contrary visual feedback.  
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4.5.2. Implications for Existential-Phenomenological Theory  
This section will explore how the present findings can be understood from the point of 
view of the existential-phenomenological perspective that Merleau-Ponty has put forward in 
his writings on anosognosia and embodiment more generally. In considering such perspective, 
I will also endeavour to discuss points of similarity and disagreement with some of the theories 
put forward to explain AHP in the cognitive literature, as outlined above.  
As I discussed in the introductory section of the present chapter, a central point in 
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of AHP concerns the observation that the prereflective, nonthematic 
appreciation of a threat or limitation to the body’s habitual motor potentialities, can go hand in 
hand with an abstracted, conscious perception of the body as able and as non-paralysed. This 
observation leads to the empirical prediction that AHP should be paradoxically most 
observable during conditions that call upon such motor potentialities. The empirical study 
undertaken in this chapter, operationalized and tested this hypothesis by creating, 
experimentally controlled conditions in which patient had to detect hand movement following 
self-initiated (active) versus other-initiated (passive) movement expectations. Within such 
specific context, the study confirmed the hypothesis in question, in the sense that errors in 
detecting movement were significantly more frequent when patients were asked to try to 
perform a movement than when they were told that their hands would be moved passively or 
not at all.   
These findings raise the question of whether they could be legitimately considered as an 
empirical confirmation of Merleau-Ponty’s existential-phenomenological reflections, even as 
mere scientific approximations to the totality of the individual’s lived body. As I reviewed 
above, these findings are compatible with contemporary neurocomputation models of motor 
control. These make a number of assumptions that may not be compatible with an existential-
phenomenological perspective on embodiment, such as the concepts of ‘forward models’ and 
‘comparators’. Although such cognitive operations are thought of as operating at the 
unconscious level, they nevertheless are conceived by at least some authors as 
‘representational’ in content and ‘modular’ in structure, i.e. neurochemical processes taking 
place in specific, specialised and proximal areas in the brain that replicate some relations and 
principles at the periphery of the organism (Frith et al., 2000; Berti et al., 2005). Indeed, 
Merleau-Ponty’s perspective is regarded by most scholars as paradigmatically anti- 
representationalist (e.g., Dreyfus, 2002; Gallagher, 2008: 360-64).  
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Of course, even within the traditions that most relate to Merleau-Ponty’s perspective on 
such matters, namely embodied cognition and enactivism, there are ongoing debates on the 
nature and role of the concept of ‘representations’, with some theorists allowing revised 
concepts of representation to be retained (e.g. Clark, 1998) and others arguing for a total 
rejection of the potential usefulness of such concepts (Hutto & Myin, 2013). These debates lie 
beyond the scope of the present thesis. Nevertheless, the emphasis of the above 
neurocomputational models on the idea that unconscious motor potentialities are present in 
perceptual experience and ultimately influence motor awareness (Jeannerod, 2006), on which 
the current study was built on, seem compatible with the perspective that Merleau-Ponty has 
drawn regarding human embodiment and the role of opportunities for action in perceptual 
experience (see also Berendzen, 2014 for an extensive discussion on this similarity). Moreover, 
although some of the language used by cognitive neuroscientists such as ‘motor intentions’ or 
‘motor planning’, as outlined above, may suggest that these models imply a kind of conscious 
and potentially propositional ‘planning’ stage that precedes and determines action. Such a view 
would be in striking contrast with Merleau-Ponty’s views on action that stress the habitual, 
non-reflexive view of action and explicitly reject the idea of conscious action plans (1945/1962; 
p. 159-161).  In his account, humans have integrated sets of skills ready to anticipate and 
incorporate a world prior to the formation of thoughts and the application of any concepts. This 
kind of embodied poise, which Merleau-Ponty calls “habit,” constitutes our nonthematic, 
preconceptual “motor intentionality” (1945/1962; pp. 127). A close reading of the 
aforementioned neurocognitive models however, conveys similarities with this view, at least 
as described by the neuroscientific developers of such models (Blakemore et al., 2000), some 
neurophenomenologists (e.g. Berendzen, 2014) and perhaps less so by the cognitive scientists 
that apply them to psychological phenomena (Frith et al., 2000; Berti et al., 2005). These 
models were not primarily developed to explain conscious motor processes but rather 
unconscious motor control. Thus, words ‘motor intentions’, ‘motor planning’ or ‘forward 
models’ are used to describe unconscious brain processes of motor preparedness and 
potentiality and not cognitive modules, nor contents of awareness. These models put forward 
the idea that prior to any reflective thought, or perceptual content, the body is capable of 
monitoring its own action, based on prior experience and such unconscious, motor control 
processes that are simultaneously the first ingredients of perception, including the perception 
of one’s own body. This view seems compatible with Merleau-Ponty’s idea that “it is the body 
that ‘understands’ in the acquisition of habit” (1945/1962; pp. 167). 
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I believe that in this light, the current study showed not how conscious intentions or 
expectations of movement lead to anosognosic errors, but rather how these experimental 
instructions and the patient’s conscious wish to follow them, elicit the body’s habitual motor 
preparedness and potentiality, which in itself ultimately influences patients’ non-veridical 
awareness.  Specifically, it is the patient’s prior commitment to her own body and the world as 
the body itself ‘knows’ it tacitly, habitually and practically that seems unaffected in these 
patients (see also previous chapter) and may drive them to deny one’s paralysis in abstract, 
propositional, reflective terms, particularly in the context of a lesion that may have affected 
such of the cognitive, conceptual tools that people have to create such perceptual abstractions. 
The patients are thus able to remain tacitly open all their habitual possibilities and their attempt 
to perform a movement as the body expects to be able to do so exposes them to the risk of 
encountering limitations in such possibilities. In order to maintain their habitual commitment 
to the world, the detection of this risk prereflectively is not translated into conscious reflection, 
which in itself may also be directly affected by the brain damage in question and may be harder 
than usual to update. Instead, the conscious appreciation of the body remains ‘safe’ as a more 
general, in this case, illusory abstraction of the here-and-now of practical, embodied 
experience. From this general, abstracted perspective, the body of the anosognosic patient, i.e. 
as an object of conscious perception and not as the subjectively lived body, is able to move in 
the moment, as it is able to move always.  
 
4.5.3. Implications for Existential Counselling Psychology and Psychotherapy 
As mentioned in the introduction and the previous chapter, the consideration of AHP 
from this interdisciplinary perspective may be of relevance to existential, psychotherapeutic 
considerations regarding anosognosic patients, as well as more generally to the kind of 
paradoxes encountered in psychotherapeutic practice regarding self-awareness, and 
particularly the tension between our habitual ways of being-in-the-world and our conscious 
wish to change our habits. I believe the results of the present experiment further highlight the 
challenges faced by the existential counselling psychologist, or psychotherapist in their 
potential attempts to respond to the needs of anosognosic patients, as well as to any client who 
presents with issues regarding the human paradox of self-awareness.  Specifically, the present 
findings highlight how an existential therapist needs to be attuned not only to the conscious 
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content, agency and wishes of their clients but also to their more general, embodied 
commitment to the world and their ‘embodied intentionality’. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, despite their conscious unawareness of their paralysis, these patients may be 
simultaneously and tacitly aware of the threat to their motor potentialities. The present chapter 
confirms that this tacit knowledge of one’s deficit is paradoxically intertwined with their 
conscious inability to perceive their deficits. The more a patient’s body wishes to move, the 
more objects, or spatial configurations in the room call upon the body of the anosognosic for 
habitual models of action, the less aware the patient will be of their inability to execute such 
actions.  
Although this insight, generated by  third-person, philosophical reflection and confirmed 
by tthird-person, scientific experimentation, cannot be taken for granted in every client, and 
needs to be considered as a possibility rather than a certainty in each case, it may be a useful 
reminder of the paradoxical nature of embodied, self-awareness and a platform from which the 
embodied aspects of the setting of psychotherapy can be considered. First, patients request to 
see a psychotherapist, despite their explicit and at times forceful denial of the need for any 
other ‘physical’ or medical therapy, can itself provide a useful topic for reflection, exploration 
and horizontalisation (see previous Chapter). While their conscious denial of any need for 
bodily help is axiomatic in anosognosia, their potential ability to acknowledge their need for 
psychological, intersubjective support during this bewildering and challenging period and their 
explicit request of such support, may open up the door to exploration of their potential, parallel 
acknowledgement that there is a deficit, or challenge of psychological nature that needs to be 
addressed. Moreover, existential psychotherapy, like most psychotherapies, relies mainly on 
verbal exchanges; action is implicated mainly as a means of social communication (e.g. speech, 
gestures, postures, facial expressions), rather than as part of any therapeutic act (e.g. unlike in 
occupational therapy when patients are asked to perform certain practical tasks such as 
cooking). From the perspective of the present findings, this may constitute a rather unique, 
opportunity for the patient not to have her motor potentialities challenged to a high degree. 
Instead, the patient may be able to consciously explore changes in their body in abstract terms 
and in an ‘off-line’ mode. As discussed above, such conscious, reflective terms would also be 
enslaved to the primacy of prereflective experience of the body, yet consistent with the 
hypothesis and findings of the present study, the smaller the calling of the world for action, 
presumably also including the intersubjective world, the less the exposure of the patient to the 
prereflective knowledge of their deficit. It may thus be that within the constraints of the 
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intersubjective, mostly verbal, ‘off-line’ and reflective context of existential psychotherapy, 
these patients may find it relatively easier to reflect on their deficits in abstract terms, before 
they become ready to drastically renegotiate their embodied commitment to the world.  
Of course, the above distinction between the ‘verbal, reflective’ psychotherapeutic 
setting and the ‘prereflective, embodied’ world of on-line action is arbitrary. As I have 
discussed throughout this thesis, the totality of our experience of the body in the world entails 
a deep interdependence between such ‘on-line’ and ‘off-line’ facets of experience. However, 
to the degree that Merleau-Ponty’s hypothesis regarding the role of prereflectively threatened 
motor potentialities in anosognosia is confirmed by the findings of this and the previous 
chapter, one could formulate the reverse empirical prediction of obvious psychotherapeutic 
value. Namely, the less such motor potentialities are called for in an encounter with an 
anosognosic patient, the smaller should the anosognosic errors be in conscious perception. This 
of course raises the challenge of how could an encounter minimise its embodied calling for 
action, while at the same time afford the patient the opportunity to consciously reflect on their 
own action potential. This challenge is precisely what I will endeavour to address in the single 
case study of the following chapter, with the help of simple technology, namely video 
recordings and play-back.  
  
4.5.4. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter tested the hypothesis that AHP involves the dominance of one’s 
prereflective motor habits over sensory feedback in the awareness of action and have produced 
experimental evidence in support of this hypothesis. Specifically, I found that patients with 
AHP are more likely to falsely detect movement of their plegic arm when they have the 
intention to move it, than when movements are externally-generated or when no movement is 
anticipated. I have interpreted these findings according to both a neurocomputational model of 
motor control, as well as the existential-phenomenological perspective of Merleau-Ponty on 
anosognosia and embodiment more generally. Despite their differences, both of these views 
suggest that the non-veridical, conscious awareness of action in AHP is formed on the basis of 
intact unconscious predictions regarding the motor potentiality of the body. In AHP these are 
not appropriately constrained by sensory information about the actual position of the limbs and 
other regulatory cognitive operations. While previous studies have suggested that conflicting 
sensory information may not capable of altering anosognosic beliefs (Berti et al., 2005), they 
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did not demonstrate that sensory feedback about the affected limb was ignored even when it 
was demonstrably available.  Accordingly, this study demonstrated for the first time why 
anosognosic beliefs are formed in the first place: the altered awareness of action in AHP 
depends predominantly on our habitual awareness of the body as able. Other studies have 
shown that actual sensory feedback has a remarkably limited role in the experience of action 
in neurologically healthy individuals (Sarrazin et al., 2008). To this extent, in agreement with 
Merleau-Ponty insights, AHP may be a pathological exaggeration of the dominance of pro-
active signals over conscious reflections on the body. Finally, I discussed the implications of 
these findings for existential, psychotherapeutic considerations and particularly the mostly 
verbal, ‘off-line’ setting of all psychotherapy. The later considerations brought us to the 
hypothesis to be tested in the next chapter, namely, the less such motor potentialities are called 
for in an encounter with an anosognosic patient, the smaller should the anosognosic errors be 
in conscious perception. 
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5. Video-replay Reverses Anosognosia: Off-line, Third-Person 
Awareness 
 
5.1. Summary of Chapter  
This chapter presents a patient with severe anosognosia for hemiplegia, whose 
anosognosia was unaltered when she observed her plegic arm in her ipsilateral visual field (self-
observation from a first-person perspective). However, the patient recovered instantly and 
permanently when viewing herself in a video replay and given the opportunity to discuss her 
self-observation with a non-judgemental researcher. Following up from the findings of the 
previous chapters, it is possible that the observed dramatic reinstatement of awareness relates 
to the observation of oneself ‘offline’, i.e. at the time when one was not intending to move and 
‘from the outside’ (third-person perspective). To the best of my knowledge, the role of off-line, 
third-person self-observation has not been assessed in AHP to date. Thus, this case study 
provides preliminary evidence that when right hemisphere damage impairs the ability to update 
one’s body representation, judgements relying on off-line, self-observation and possibly also 
self-observation from a third-person perspective may be spared in some patients and may 
provide facilitating visual feedback to first-person awareness. This conclusion is consistent 
with Merleau-Ponty’s ideas regarding the dependency of explicit self-awareness on implicit, 
motor potentialities, as well as his views regarding the constitution of the self, based on both 
first- and third-person perspectives.                                                        
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5.2. Introduction 
As reviewed in the Introduction and experimentally shown in the previous two chapters, 
a central point in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of AHP concerns the observation that patients with 
anosognosia show ‘preconscious knowledge’ (1945/1962; p. 93) of their paralysis (see Chapter 
3). Moreover, according to this view and contrary to cognitive theories on such phenomena, 
the denial of one’s motor deficits does not exist despite one’s pre-reflective, non-thematic 
understanding of the same deficits, but rather because of it. Specifically, it is precisely the risk 
of losing one’s habitual motor potentialities and more generally one’s commitment to the world 
as the body itself ‘knows’ it tacitly, habitually and practically that necessitates the denial of 
one’s paralysis in a more abstract, reflective terms. Thus, patients’ non-veridical awareness of 
movement, i.e. their anosognosia and related illusions of movement in the plegic arm, seem to 
stem from the dominance of such habitual motor potentialities over sensory information about 
the actual effects of movement. The previous chapter confirmed the related empirical 
hypothesis that the greater the elicitation of such motor potentialities by the environment (the 
experimental conditions in this case), the larger are the errors in the conscious perception of 
the body as active. These findings suggest that for as long as patients have the intention to 
move, they are likely to build their more abstract, explicit self-awareness based on such 
habitual motor potentialities and thus falsely believe that they have moved in the moment and 
that they can move more generally. However, the reverse hypothesis remains untested. Namely, 
could instances during which the motor potentialities of the body of an anosognosic patient are 
not called upon by the situation, lead them to develop greater explicit awareness regarding their 
paralysis?  
 Importantly if confirmed, the above hypothesis may have implications for the treatment 
of anosognosia at the acute stage of recovery. As reviewed in the Introduction, AHP typically 
remits over time as a result of spontaneous recovery, but sometimes patients remain unaware 
also in the chronic stage (see Pia et al., 2004 for review). Moreover, the presence of AHP in 
the acute stage may significantly obstruct rehabilitation efforts and consequently impede long-
term functional outcomes (Gialanella et al., 2005; Jehkonen et al., 2006). As outlined in the 
introduction, there have been recent advances in the management of AHP by providing specific 
rehabilitation guidelines and strategies (see Prigatano & Morrone-Strupinsky, 2010 and 
Jenkinson et al., 2011 for reviews), with temporary remission of AHP also being recently 
reported using a combination of techniques (see Beschin et al., 2012). Unfortunately, despite 
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these rehabilitation efforts, there is currently no known, efficacious intervention for permanent 
restoration of motor awareness in patients with AHP (Kortte & Hills, 2011; Jenkinson et al., 
2011). 
Can however, the insights generated by the existential perspectives and experimental 
findings of the previous chapters be used to design a specific sensorimotor intervention for the 
treatment of AHP? How can one help patients become aware of their motor failures when 
attempting to move, without allowing their motor intentions to influence their motor 
awareness? One possibility would be to film patients while attempting to move and then at a 
subsequent point in time use such video-clips to provide video-based feedback of motor 
failures. Under these conditions, when patients are observing themselves in the video replay 
trying to move, they are resting and hence not experiencing motor intentions in that particular 
moment in time. Instead, such intentions were formed during the actual filming. This ‘off-line’ 
character of video-based feedback may thus facilitate ‘off-line’ motor awareness. However, to 
my knowledge, off-line self-observation has not been used for the treatment of AHP to date. 
This chapter presents a patient with anosognosia, who recovered instantly and permanently 
from her anosognosia when viewing herself in a video replay.  
 
5.3. Case Report and Methods 
LM was recruited and tested according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria, and 
Ethical principles, specified in Chapter 2. She was the only patient from the group of patients 
recruited in Chapters 2 and 3 that was able to take part in a rehabilitation study, as there had 
been practical difficulties in her transfer and re-housing and she stayed in hospital for a longer 
period. She was a 67-year-old right-handed woman with 15 years of education (Premorbid IQ 
114, as estimated by the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading), at the time a retired publisher. She 
was previously mobile and independent with no relevant medical history, other than untreated 
hypertension. She was single and lived alone, leading a relatively busy social life of many 
philanthropic activities. Fig. 5.1 shows LM’s scans one day and one-year post-onset. The study 
was approved by the local NHS ethical committee and LM gave written informed consent (see 
Chapter 2 for details), including to the unique aspects of this case study such as the filming and 
subsequent video viewing of herself.  
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FIGURE 5.1. Left: Computerised tomography (CT), one-day post-onset. Neuroradiological report:  R 
MCA hyperdense area, R frontoparietal MCA region, effacement of R lateral ventricle. Right 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), one-year post-onset. Neuroradiological report: Extensive area of 
mature damage, involving predominately the right frontotemporal region, with some involvement of 
the adjacent parietal lobe to a lesser degree. There is extensive volume loss of the deep grey matter 
structures also on this side. Appearances are consistent with a mature right MCA infarct. 
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5.3.1. Nature of LM’s Anosognosia for Hemiplegia 
The Berti et al. awareness interview (1996) (see Chapter 2), as well as a set of ten bi-
manual, five bi–pedal and five, control uni-manual questions designed specifically for 
assessing anosognosic patients (Marcel et al., 2004) were used to assess LM’s anosognosia in 
different time points before and after the video intervention. At baseline, LM showed 
unawareness of her general condition and she even claimed she had performed certain of the 
requested tasks with her left plegic arm (see Table 5.1 for full scores; see also Chapter 4 for 
methodological details of this assessment). The diagnosis of anosognosia for hemiplegia was 
confirmed by neurological reports and the wider, interdisciplinary team responsible for her 
care. The diagnosis was also consistent with observations that LM’s relatives and friends made 
when visiting her at the hospital, e.g. “It is as though she cannot understand she had a stroke, 
not really. She thinks she can walk and come out with us as before”.  
During the first 22 days post-onset, LM became gradually aware that she had had a stroke 
and often stated that her left-side was ‘weaker than the right’. Nevertheless, during this time, 
she never showed any acknowledgement of her upper limb paralysis and she repeatedly 
attempted to stand and perform bi-manual tasks. Placing her left arm in her right visual field 
(i.e. overcoming her visuospatial neglect) and asking her to move it had no effect on her 
anosognosic responses. She was evidently frustrated with hospital staff when they did not allow 
her to stand or her own and claimed that she could go to the bathroom, or indeed outside the 
hospital, unaided. She blamed the ‘extreme health and safety’ culture of the hospital for all the 
constraints on her mobility. In addition, she rated herself accordingly in questions that directly 
addressed her ability to perform bi-manual tasks such as clapping hands (Marcel et al., 2004) 
(see Table 5.1). This pattern of behaviour is consistent with previously reported dissociations 
between being generally aware of one’s condition and being unaware of specific motor failures 
and vice versa (Marcel et al., 2004). She was somewhat more aware of her left leg weakness 
and on questioning she was less anosognosic about her abilities to perform bi-pedal tasks such 
as walking (see Table 5.1). Similar variation in awareness between upper and lower limbs has 
been previously reported (e.g. Berti et al., 1996). She also showed spontaneous confabulations 
(false memories) that included claims of performing both bi-manual and bi-pedal tasks during 
her hospitalisation, such as walking around the ward, washing and dressing herself without any 
assistance. She became increasingly frustrated with hospital staff and all the ‘limitations they 
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have imposed on her’ and she was frequently expressing her dissatisfaction. She participated 
in most therapeutic efforts in the ward but staff noted her lack of motivation during sessions. 
Nevertheless, some verbal replies suggested tacit awareness of her deficits; during a ward 
round she consented to junior doctors observing her assessment by the physiotherapist, during 
which she was anosognosic. However, as the junior doctors were about to leave she 
spontaneously told them: “Perhaps it would be really useful to you to come and see me at a 
time that I’ll be really ill and unable to move”.   
5.3.2. Neurological and Neuropsychological Assessment.  
Her neurological and her neuropsychological profile are presented on Table 5.1. She was 
assessed using the standardised neuropsychological tests described in Chapter 2, with the 
following modifications: Postmorbid intelligence was assessed using the following WAIS-III 
(Wechsler, 1998) subtests: Vocabulary, Similarities, Digit Span, Arithmetic, Matrix 
Reasoning). Verbal short- and long-term memory was assessed the Wechsler Memory Scale - 
3rd Edition (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1998). Short-Subtests of the RASP were used for the 
measurement of sensory functions: ‘Surface Touch’, ‘Tactile Extinction’ and ‘Proprioception’. 
Reasoning abilities were assessed using the Cognitive Estimates Test (Shallice and Evans, 
1978) and the DK-EFS Proverbs Test (Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001) and inhibition of 
automatic responses was assessed with the Hayling Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997).  
Table 5.1. LM’s neurological and neuropsychological profile 
 
Pathology Large R distal MCA infarct. Onset: Found collapsed, L hemiplegia 
Carotid dopplers: minor atherosclerosis both internal carotid arteries (30%) 
Awareness 
Testing 
Awareness Interview6  
6 days post-onset: LUL 2 /  LLL1 (anosognosia) ^  
                                   ^1Bi-manual: 6 (SD 1.3);  Bi-pedal: 1.6 (SD 1.3) Uni-manual: 7.4 (SD 1.1) 
15 days post-onset: LUL 2/ LLL1 (anosognosia)   
22 days post-onset: (pre-video): LUL 2 / LLL1 (anosognosia) 
                                   ^1Bi-manual: 5.8 (SD 0.9);  Bi-pedal: 1.3 (SD 0.5) Uni-manual: 6.2 (SD 0.8) 
22 days post-onset: (post-video): LUL 0 / LLL 0 (awareness) 
                                   ^1Bi-manual: 2.4 (SD 0.8);  Bi-pedal: 1 (SD 0) Uni-manual: 6.2 (SD 0.8) 
36 days and 6 months post-onset: LUL 0 / LLL 0 (awareness) 
6 months post-onset: ^1Bi-manual: 1.8 (SD 0.4);  Bi-pedal: 1 (SD 0) Uni-manual: 7.4 (SD 0.6) 




6 days post-onset: GCS = 15.  L side: Hypotonic; Reflexes absent; No sensation; No pain; 0/5 
power; Mild Dysarthria. L lower facial weakness; L neglect; L homonymous hemianopia; R Gaze 
Deviation. Visual Fields¥: R 9/ 10 L 2/10  Both 0/10  
RASP∞ (Impaired): Surface Touch:  L 5/30. Tactile Extinction: 0/12. Proprioception: 9/30. 
 
22 days post-onset (pre-video): Hypertonic. Unaltered:  LUL power, sensation, neglect. Mildly-
improved: Dysarthria and R Gaze deviation, LLL power.  
 RASP (Impaired): Surface Touch: 4/30. Tactile Extinction: 1/12. Proprioception:  7/30 
Neuropsych¤. 
Assessment 
6 days post-onset : Intelligence: Normal in WAIS-III¤1 Verbal Subtests; Some impairment in 
Performance subtests: Verbal IQ: 111 Matrix Reasoning: SS = 4; Block Design: SS= 2; Picture 
Completion: SS = 8. Verbal Reasoning: Proverbs¤2 12 (within 1SD above average). Cognitive 
Estimates¤3 6 (normal range 2-6). New Learning: WMS-III¤4 Logical Memory: Immediate SS = 10. 
Delayed SS = 10 (average scores). Visuospatial Processing: Marked Personal and Extrapersonal 
Neglect: BIT¤5 Total Score: 68/146. Comb/Razor Test¤6: 24 R/4 L/5 Ambiguous. One-item Test¤7 1 
= the left hand is reached with hesitation and search 
22 days post-onset: Unaltered Personal and Extrapersonal Neglect. BIT Total Score: 72/146. 
One-item Test: 1  
*WTAR = Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (Wechsler, 2001);  
^Awareness Interview (Berti et al., 1996). ^1 Actions Awareness Questions (Marcel et al., 2004): Scale not at al = 
0 – 10 As well as before. Scores > 5 represent overestimation in each bi-manual and bi-pedal task. 
∞RASP = The Rivermead Assessment of Somatosensory Performance (Winward, Halligan & Wade, 2002).  
¥Visual-fields were tested with the customary ‘confrontation’ technique (Bisiach et al., 1986).  
¤Neuropsych. = Neuropsychological. ¤1WAIS-III = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale- 3rd Edition (Wechsler, 
1998). ¤2Proverbs =  Delis Kaplan Executive Functions System (Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001); ¤3Cognitive 
Estimates = Cognitive Estimates Test (Shallice and Evans, 1978). ¤4WMS-III = Wechsler Memory Scale- 3rd 
Edition (Wechsler, 1998). ¤5BIT Total score = sum of scores of the conventional sub-tests of the Behavioural 
Inattention Test , including line crossing, letter cancellation, star cancellation, copying, line-bisection and 
representational drawing. ¤6The ‘One Item Test’ (Bisiach et al., 1986) and ¤7 ‘Comb/Razor Test’ (McIntosh et al., 
2000) were used for the assessment of personal neglect.  
 
 
5.3.3. Video Awareness Intervention 
Video awareness intervention was the only neuropsychological intervention the patient 
received. The same neuropsychologist (the author) conducted the neuropsychological and 
awareness assessments (see above), as well as administered the video intervention. At the time 
of the intervention, I felt that I had established a good ‘researcher-participant’ relationship and 
working alliance with the patient during previous assessments. Twenty-two days post-onset, 
LM’s anosognosic statements and behaviour was persisting. Although she was aware of having 
had a stroke, she showed no acknowledgement of her upper limb paralysis and ‘confabulated 
away’ any attempts to convince her otherwise.  Her anosognosia and sensorimotor deficits were 
formally assessed again and found to be unaltered (see Table 5.1). For example, she claimed 
she had moved her arm upon request and continued to claim she could perform a number of 
bimanual tasks relatively well (see Table 5.1). Immediately afterwards she was asked if she 
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was willing to watch a video of a previous assessment, to the filming of which by the bedside 
on a portable digital video camera (Sony Handycam, DCR) she had already consented. The 
film had been edited to a 90 sec clip of herself answering the awareness confrontation questions 
of the Berti interview (see Chapter 2 and above). In the video clip, the examiner was standing 
on the left side of the screen, and the patient was sitting in her wheelchair on the right side of 
the screen (her left side was on the right), with her torso being at a distance of approximately 
1.5m from the camera. There was approximately 1m distance between patient and examiner. 
The patient was seen in front view with her upper body visible, including shoulders, arms, head 
and face.  The video clip was played back to her through a laptop computer (screen size 13) 
placed in front of her (50cm) and about 20cm right of the centre of her visual field. A paused 
frame of the above-described video clip was first shown and the patient was asked to identify 
what she could see in the video, and right-right orientation was tested. Then she was asked 
whether she was willing to view a video of herself trying to perform an action and discuss it 
with the examiner. She was informed of the possibility of the video being upsetting and was 
reminded that she could withdraw from the study at any point, as well as ask questions about 
the procedure and purpose of the assessments. The patient chose to continue. The examiner 
made sure the patient’s vision and attention were focused onto the screen and the 90s edited 
video clip was played back. Following the video the patient was given the opportunity to 
discuss what she observed in her own words, before her awareness was assessed again formally 
with the aforementioned methods, including also the 10 bi-manual, five bi-pedal and five uni-
manual action awareness questions (Marcel et al., 2004). Emotional support and the 
opportunity to reflect upon what she had observed was then offered to LM. Follow-up 
assessments were arranged the following day, 36 days post-onset and 6-months post-onset as 
indicated in Table 5.1 above.  
 
5.4. Post Video Observations and Results  
LM immediately recognized herself in the video clip and spontaneously commented:  “I 
have not been very realistic”. Examiner (AF): “What do you mean?” LM: “I have not been 
realistic about my left-side not being able to move at all”. AF: What do you think now?” “I 
cannot move at all”. AF: “What made you change your mind?” LM: “The video. I did not 
realize I looked like this”. AF: “How do you think you look?”. “Well, like a person who cannot 
move her left side”. Her awareness was again formally assessed with the same interview and it 
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was now consistent with both her upper and lower limb plegia (see Table 5.1), i.e. the patient 
immediately stated she could not move her left arm and did not even try to perform the 
requested actions, stating that she could not do it. The patient was evidently upset and thus she 
was asked how she felt about her answers. LM: “It is very sad. Mostly because you suddenly 
feel you have no control over anything”. It was then suggested to her that she may gain a 
different kind of control by having understood her condition. LM appeared to find this 
comment helpful, “yes, I guess having knowledge is a kind of control. I have always loved 
reading and valued education. I suppose this is a form of late life education” and was able to 
reflect on similar examples from her past that self-awareness had helped her face up to difficult 
situations. Conversation continued until the patient’s mood appeared stable.  
The following day the examiner visited LM to see how she was feeling. LM had full 
awareness of her hemiplegia, remembered the previous day’s observations and her previous 
anosognosia. She said she felt sad but she found the conversation about “having control in a 
different way” very meaningful. She claimed that she remembered how she immediately ‘saw’ 
her paralysis on the video. Given the results of the previous experiment (Chapter 4), the 
examiner asked her if she perceived any movement, or sensation in the past that gave her the 
impression of being able to move but she denied this. Instead, she insisted that she ‘was just 
hoping so’. Her anosognosia did not reappear during her hospitalization (another 4 weeks), nor 
at a 6 month follow-up (see Table 5.1 for formal assessments and results). Staff reported that 
LM’s mood was low, but at the same time she was more motivated to participate in therapy, 
had become engaged in the plans of her re-housing and additional rehabilitation. Moreover, 
she now attributed her motor disabilities to her stroke.  
5.5. Discussion 
AHP is typically ephemeral and progressively remits due to spontaneous recovery. 
However, LM’s sudden and complete transition from severe anosognosia to awareness, her 
largely unaltered sensorimotor deficits, and her subjective perspective on the effects of video 
viewing render spontaneous recovery unlikely. Instead, this study documents that viewing 
one’s self in a video replay, and being given the opportunity to reflect on such observations, 
may reinstate motor awareness in anosognosic patients and speed up recovery.   
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5.5.1. Feedback that By-passes Motor Intentions and Motor Potentialities 
In a previous study on AHP, Ramachandran (1995) has used mirrors to create false visual 
feedback of left hand movement in a patient with AHP. The mirror image of an assisting 
experimenter’s hand was optically superimposed on the patient’s left paralysed hand. The 
patient observed (from a first-person perspective), what she thought was her own left hand, 
moving up and down (see also Zampini, Moro and Aglioti, 2004). Although these studies are 
useful for the understanding of the role of vision in motor awareness, they have only assessed 
the observation of movements in synchrony with patients actual or intended movements. 
Crucially, such synchronous visual feedback had no effect on patients’ impaired awareness, if 
anything it conformed their expectations of being able to move their left limbs as normal (see 
also previous Chapter for similar observations). By contrast, it was observed that observing 
oneself in a later time than an actual action attempt may have different effects on motor 
unawareness than observing oneself from an on-line, first-person perspective (as noted above, 
the patient’s unawareness was not altered when she perceived her paralysed hand failing to 
execute a movement in her right visual hemifield). Thus, the demonstrated effect in the current 
study may relate to differences in observing an action while trying to execute it (on-line) and 
observing oneself at a later time (off-line, as in a video replay).  
As I discussed in the previous chapter, these results are compatible with the account of 
Merleau-Ponty, according to which anosognosia is the result of the risk of losing one’s habitual 
motor potentialities and more generally one’s commitment to the world as the body itself 
‘knows’ it tacitly and habitually that necessitates the denial of one’s paralysis in a more 
abstract, reflective terms. During video observation, the patient had the opportunity to observe 
herself trying to perform an action and failing, while at the same time, her body itself was not 
really called to action. Hence, her embodied ‘habits’ where not challenged by the circumstances 
of the video observation. Instead, her more cognitive, reflective abilities were now faced with 
visual feedback of her paralysis, to a degree free of the prereflective knowledge of risk to her 
habitual motor potentialities.  
As I discussed in the previous chapters, such results are also consistent with the ‘motor’ 
hypothesis of AHP. Namely, video-feedback may facilitate awareness because it by-passes the 
habitual dominance of forward, sensorimotor predictions in these patients.  As I described 
above, such models maintain that motor awareness in healthy individuals relies mainly on 
motor predictions (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998); whenever the motor system makes a sensory 
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prediction about an intended movement, awareness that this movement has been performed is 
automatically constructed (Berti et al., 2007). If no large errors occur, sensory feedback 
matches the predicted one and hence awareness is not challenged. By contrast, large errors 
produce a mismatch and an error signal at the comparator, which can be used to inform and 
update awareness. According to one view (Berti et al., 2005), anosognosia is the failure to 
detect such discrepancies due to damage to the comparator mechanism, so that patients instead 
construct a (non-veridical) motor awareness based entirely on their motor expectations. In 
previous neuroimaging studies with both healthy individuals and patients with AHP, the 
function of such a comparator mechanism have been linked with lateral premotor cortex 
(particularly area BA 46; Berti et al., 2005). This area has been found to be more generally 
damaged in patients with AHP (e.g. Berti et al., 2005), but was only minimally affected in the 
present patient. Moreover, as I pointed out in Chapter 3, this area may be linked with 
unconscious, tacit aspects of motor knowledge (see also clinical observations above and the 
fact that the present patient showed implicit awareness into her deficit in the study reported in 
Chapter 3) and not necessarily non-veridical awareness. Thus, while the current experiment 
provides evidence for the cognitive aspects of this motor theory, it does not support its 
neuroanatomical predictions. Unfortunately, the current experiment does not have the power 
to make string neuroanatomical claims. Future group studies on such interventions could 
explore the role of this area and other brain mechanisms on implicit and explicit forms of motor 
awareness, as well as the precise relation between existential-phenomenological and 
neurocognitive theories on such phenomena.  
 
5.5.2. Feedback from a Third-person Perspective 
 In addition to the above reflections regarding the role of habitual motor potentialities, 
and lack thereof during video replay, it should also be noted that a video replay does not only 
afford an off-line view of the body but also one that is ‘from the outside’ (a third-person 
perspective, as in a mirror but without the left-right inversion of mirrors) and more ‘holistic’ 
than the habitual, first-person perspective of body parts. It may thus be that the observed 
beneficial effects of video self-observation may relate to seeing oneself in such a third-person 
allocentric perspective (see Glosssary). Thus, processing action-related events from the outside 
may have different effects on motor unawareness than observing oneself from an on-line, first-
person perspective (the present patient’s unawareness was not altered when she perceived her 
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paralysed hand from a first-person perspective). Such opportunities for self- observation from 
a third-person perspective have remarkably not been previously applied in AHP, although self-
observation has been shown to facilitate the treatment of other motor and somatosensory 
deficits. For example, mirror viewing relieves pain in amputee subjects (Altschuler et al., 
1999). More specifically, in at least some patients with  neuropsychological disorders of body 
awareness, the third-person perspective seems to have a transformative effect, leading for 
example to remission of autotopagnosia by mirror viewing (Tobita, Hasegawa, Nagatomo, 
Yamaguchi & Kurita, 1995), and increased awareness of choreiform movements following 
video-feedback (Shenker, Wylie, Fuchs, Manning & Heilman, 2004). Video replay has also 
been shown to help improve insight of psychotic patients (Davidoff et al., 1998). Although the 
precise relation between these effects and the present, single-case study will require further 
investigations, it seems that visual feedback from a third-person perspective may influence 
first-person awareness. 
Indeed, similar differences between first- and third-person perspectives on body 
perception have been described even at the purely visual and ‘body-part’ level. For example, a 
neuroimaging study (Saxe, Jamal & Powell, 2006) suggests that viewing one’s isolated body 
parts (hands and feet) from first- or, third-person perspective may be mediated by distinct brain 
areas; the right extrastriate body area (EBA) preferentially responds to images of body parts 
presented from an allocentric perspective, while a region of primary somatosensory cortex 
showed the reverse selectivity: the blood oxygen level-dependent response to body parts 
presented from an allocentric perspective was suppressed. It is thus possible that some of these 
areas are spared in patients with AHP and thus the general, awareness of these patients may 
benefit from body-part, observation from the outside, which seems at least partly independent 
from similar, first-person perspectives on the body. Further studies providing first- versus third-
person visual and possibly also tactile feedback to patients with AHP could disentangle the 
distinct role of these mental and neural processes in motor unawareness.  
However, it is unlikely that the current results are explained by simple, visual 
mechanisms of body-part recognition in the video replay. First, the video replay included a 
view of the whole upper part of the patients’ body, including her face. The face could carry 
particularly rich information linking the body to the self, given its key role in personal identity 
(Tsakiris, 2008). Moreover, recent findings from neuroimaging studies suggest that certain 
posterior cortical areas are specialized for the visual processing of faces (e.g. left fusiform 
gyrus) vs. other body parts (e.g. EBA) (e.g. Downing, Jiang, Shuman & Kanwisher, 2001; 
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Morris, Pelphrey & McCarthy, 2006), allowing greater self-identification with the content of 
the video replay. In addition, viewing the hand and arm in relation to the patients’ torso may 
have further facilitated the recognition of her paralysis, highlighting the link between the 
paralysed arm and the rest of the body. However, as this study did not systematically 
manipulate the spatial extent of the third-person perspective feedback (i.e. the patient was not 
shown feedback of her arm only), these conclusions remain tentative and require examination 
in further studies.  
More generally, an appreciation of the current findings requires a conceptual 
examination that extends beyond simple, visual recognition and takes into account the complex 
psychological mechanisms implicated in self-awareness from first and third-person 
perspectives. I will undertake this below, in relation to both cognitive theories and the 
existential-phenomenological perspective of Merleau-Ponty. 
5.5.3. Specular Images of the Bodily Self in the Cognitive Sciences  
Studies in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, including investigations of 
pathologies of body awareness, such as out-of-body and autoscopic phenomena, have 
suggested that multimodal information about the body is coded in an egocentric frame of 
reference that seems to be critical for the conscious perception for the body as ‘mine’, i.e. 
related to the psychological self (Blanke, Ortigue, Landis & Seeck, 2002; Ehrsson, 2007; 
Petkova et al., 2008; see also Glossary). In fact, some authors have argued that self-
identification is primarily a matter of the first-person visual perspective (Blanke & Metzinger, 
2009; Petkova et al., 2008). This first-person visual perspective on the body depends ultimately 
on two factors: the position of the eyes within the body, and the normal posture of the different 
body parts.  For example, we normally view the dorsum (back) rather than the palm of our 
hands, and we normally view the fingers further from the rest of the hand. Accordingly, most 
experimental studies in healthy controls have sought to examine the psychological and neural 
mechanisms underlying conscious perception of bodily selfhood, such as the sense of body 
ownership, by taking advantage of the malleability of bodily experience in the first person 
perspective, as for example in the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI, Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), in 
which a rubber hand viewed from the first-person perspective becomes treated as part of one’s 
body. These methods have been extended to include out-of-body experiences (Ehrsson, 2007; 
Lenggenhager et al., 2007) and ownership of supernumerary limbs (Ehrsson, 2009).  
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More recently, body ownership has been directly compared between conditions where 
the body is viewed from the first person versus the third person perspective (Bertamini et al., 
2011; Jenkinson et al., 2013; Petkova et al., 2011). The first two studies did not find an effect 
of visual perspective on hand ownership during the rubber hand illusion, while Petkova and 
colleagues investigated the role played by visual perspective in the self-attribution of an entire 
artificial body.  They found that the first person visual perspective is among the critical factors 
for triggering the illusion of full-body ownership. They suggest that the integrative process 
where sensory, motor and other bodily signals are combined to generate the sense of body 
ownership takes place predominately in egocentric rather than allocentric coordinates (but see 
Lenggenhager et al., 2007).  
These findings on the primacy of the first-person perspective for a holistic experience of 
the body as ours leave open the question of what is the role of third-person perspectives on 
bodily self-awareness. In developmental psychology, self-observation from a third-person 
perspective, as in mirrors and other reflective surfaces, is considered as an important element 
in the structuring of one’s body awareness, particularly since most of the time we only have 
some parts of our body in our field of view. For example, studies in developmental psychology, 
including the now classic Rouge Test (Amsterdam, 1972), suggest that children progressively 
form an increasingly complicated “body image” that involves both embodied (first-person) and 
disembodied (third-person, allocentric) perspectives, assisted significantly by mirror reflection. 
This is thought to be constructed between the age of 6-18 months (Bertenthal & Fisher, 1987; 
Rochat, 2003). This acquisition of a mental picture of one’s own body is thought to contribute 
to the development of body awareness in unique ways, as it allows the child to organise its 
experience not only in how it experiences it from habitual, interoceptive and egocentric 
perspectives, but also from ‘other’, external perspectives (Rochat, 2003). Indeed, it has been 
suggested that the resulting body representation, which is visual predominately and typically 
refers to how the body appears from the outside, may differ from other forms of prereflective 
or reflective body appreciations, such as the body schema (Gallagher, 1995; Haggard & 
Wolpert, 2005; see also below). However, to my knowledge, the precise relation between these 
different perspectives on the body and motor awareness has not been further explored in the 
cognitive literature. The results of the present study indeed point to a unique role of third-
person, visual perspectives on motor awareness but as they stand, the influence of third-person 
visual perspective cannot be distinguished from the ‘off-line’ aspects of the video intervention. 
Nevertheless, in the following section I will try to trace the potential implications of the present 
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findings to Merleau-Ponty’s rich observations on the role of third-person visual perspectives 
on the body for self and other awareness.   
 
5.5.4. Specular Images of the Bodily Self in Existential-Phenomenological Perspectives 
As mentioned briefly in the introduction, Merleau-Ponty’s central concept of the 
‘schema corporel’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 113) has unfortunately been translated in 
English as ‘body image’, which stands in opposite to Merleau-Ponty’s clear views regarding 
their non-representational and non-pictorial nature of this concept (1945/1962; 113-115). 
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty has argued in favour of a pre-reflective and tacit sense in which the 
body and its functional laws acts as the perceiver of experience, and not its object. This notion 
is best translated as body schema (Gallagher, 1995). Contrary to earlier, scientific accounts of 
the ‘body schema’ in more mechanisms terms (e.g. Head & Holmes, 1911-12) however, 
Merleau-Ponty stressed the holistic and ‘Gestalt-like’ (Tiemersma, 1989) properties of this 
schema and most importantly the fact that it acts as the background of one’s experience and 
not its object. In other terms, he discussed this concept, as the existential structure of one’s 
experience, determining a being-directed-towards the world and not as the content of one’s 
perception of the body. In this respect, the body schema is always implicit in first-person visual 
experience; to see something is always to see it partially, from an egocentric perspective and 
in relation to the perceiving body, far or close to it, to its left or to its right. The synthesis of 
these features structure the perceptual predispositions and horizons of the individual, helping 
her to organise and structure her perceptual world in an existentially meaningful way. Yet this 
structuring influence of the body remain ‘behind the scenes’, they do not form the explicit 
aspects of my perception, even when this perception is of the body itself. Although Merleau-
Ponty himself does not make this distinction clear in his writings, others have suggested that 
the latter is best described as ‘body image’, a term best reserved for the description of 
perceptions with an intentional status, i.e. either a conscious, perceptual (frequently visual) 
representation or a set of beliefs and attitudes about the body (see Gallagher, 1995 for an 
extensive review).      
 There is however a class of such body images that Merleau-Ponty is particularly 
interested in his writings and relate to the findings of the present chapter. Specifically, Merleau-
Ponty focused on the role of perceived and imagined, specular images of our body, and 
particularly as formed based on mirror encounters, as an important moment in the development 
Unawareness of Paralysis Following Stroke            138
of self-awareness (1960/1964, p. 119). Specifically, in his paper ‘The Child’s Relations with 
Others’ (1960/1964), based on one of his Sorbonne lectures, he puts forward his view on the 
progressive development of self-awareness out of what he describes as a first, infantile state of 
non-complete, psychological differentiation between self and other. Although Merleau-Ponty’s 
views on intersubjectivity and its development, and their rich intellectual context, far exceed 
the scope of this thesis, I briefly outline his views here with special focus on the role he reserves 
for ‘specular images’ of the self.        
Specifically, he argues that the specular image of the baby, and its corresponding 
imagination of the self as seen from the outside, lies at the basis of the objectification of one's 
own body. The realization that one can be seen from the outside, a realization that according 
to Merleau-Ponty was previously unsuspected from the point of view of the baby. Importantly, 
it is this specular body-objectification that allows the establishment of a sense of self and other 
as two separate beings, or what Merleau-Ponty calls a "segregation" between myself and other 
(1960/1964; p. 119). Previously there was a lack of distinction between the infant and other, 
they operated in an anonymous collectivity, an undifferentiated whole, or in a syncretism " the 
indistinction between me and the other, a confusion at the core of a situation that is common 
to us both." (Merleau-Ponty, 1960/1964; p. 120). Thus according to Merleau-Ponty the 
historical development of the self, as a being not only directed towards the world but able to 
reflect upon its existence and individuality, is constitutionally depended about the experience 
of perceiving the self from a third-person visual perspective.  
Most importantly, for Merleau-Ponty this autoscopic objectification is not a mere 
intellectual acquisition as it may be for some of the cognitive studies and theories reviewed 
above. Instead, the recognition of the mirror image of the body as the specular image of the 
self has emotional significance in at least two related ways. First, it marks a separation between 
the embodied, prereflective, felt self and the observing, perceiving and reflective (possibly 
judging) self. Second, as I argued above, it marks a separation between the embodied, 
prereflective, felt self that included others in a confused way and the observing and possibly 
judging other. The child according to Merleau-Ponty realizes for the first time that he can be 
perceived by others in ways that previously could not imagine and cannot control. The 
possibility of such social perceptions allow both the formation of an independent self, as well 
as the understanding that this self is actually granted by the other and hence the self is ultimately 
always dependent on others.  
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More generally, the paradox and duality of intersubjectivity at the heart of human 
existence lies at the idea that the affirmation of our own existence relies on our affirmation by 
the other, so that their presence and image is simultaneously our horizon of being in the world 
and the imprisonment of our embodied existence. According to Sartre for instance, other people 
have a particular affect upon us that inanimate objects do not. Other people, their actions, 
judgements and their own freedom, have a unique handle on our freedom.  In the dimension of 
existence that Sartre calls being-for-others, we come to realise that other people objectify us 
and this realisation, intrinsic in the recognition of ourselves as separate from others, affects us 
emotionally. In a part of Being and Nothingness called ‘The Look’ Sartre (1989/2003) explains 
that when other people gaze at us it is as though this look objectifies us from within, positions 
us in the world in a separate way, so that we exist in the world for others, as they exist for us. 
This introduces unshakable feelings of shame, self-alienation and other similar, social 
emotions. Sartre stressed the related power and dominance desires at the heart of human 
relating and particularly, sadistic dominance, masochistic submission and indifferent 
withdrawal.  
Contrary to Sartre, Merleau-Ponty stresses both the positive and negative aspects of our 
complementarity with others, including for example our ability to feel empathy for others and 
also trusting they love us beyond the need to be constantly objectified by them as ‘loved 
objects’. In consistent, contemporary phenomenological writings, both physical and more 
general instances of social mirroring have been described as serving the crucial function of 
unifying one’s interoceptive and sensorimotor experience with an external image of oneself 
that is simultaneously understood as being also accessible to others (see Rochat & Zahavi, 
2011 for review), allowing for both positive (empathy) and negative (social objectification) 
aspects of our emotional relation with others.   
 Most importantly for the present study, the developmental perspective that Merleau-
Ponty adopts on self-objectification and the formation of explicit, reflective self-awareness, 
allows us to see the role of third-person visual experiences in the constitution of self-awareness 
and in a more stable separation of the self and the other. These reflections suggest that the 
improvement in awareness observed in the present study may relate to the patient’s observation 
of the paralysed body, which allowed her to gain awareness into her paralysis despite its denial 
from a first-person perspective. Interestingly, given that most (but not all, Ramachandran, 
1995; Moro et al., 2011) patients with AHP seem able to recognize similar motor deficits in 
other people, it is possible that these same patients may also be able to recognize their own 
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impairments in a mirror (on-line, third-person perspective on the body). More generally, testing 
the motor awareness of patients with AHP in front of a mirror in future studies would also be 
useful to disentangle the ‘off-line’ (as in video-replays) from the third-person perspective 
elements of the current findings, which is not possible with video replays. 
 Indeed, in order to understand the fact that the present intervention led to a permanent 
rather than a temporary reinstatement of awareness in the patient one needs to consider the 
subtle diffences between perspective taking (the third-person online feedback on the self one 
can receive from mirror self-observation) and more general allocentric and off-line reflective 
thinking afforded by video-replays and proposed by Merleau-Ponty (see also Glossary). 
Specifically, there is a recognised distinction in spatial cognition, as studied in psychology, in 
philosophy, as well as in social cognitive neuroscience between egocentric and allocentric 
processing and first-person and third-person perspective-taking (for review see Frith & De 
Vignemont, 2005). The third-person perspective may involve a translocation of the egocentric 
viewpoint (Vogeley et al., 2004). For example, when I think of what a friend may think about 
my new dress, I can mentally take their perspective and as it were ‘look back at me’. Although 
this would be a third-person perspective on the self, it can remain egocentric if the subjective 
sense of myself is one of looking back at me. Thus, the cognition required can still be 
considered egocentric, i.e. centred on my own body, even if translocated to another person’s 
point of view. By contrast, when I am asked to reflect on what my friend John thinks of my 
friend’s Mary’s dress, I consider the perspective of John in relation to Mary, irrespective of my 
own perspective. In this sense, the latter is an allocentric inference. In allocentric 
representations of others or the self, the target is represented irrespective of the agent’s 
standpoint. Thus the self can be considered as a person among others. It is not me looking back 
at myself but rather my identity exists in the mind of other people irrespective of my own 
perspective on it. A similar distinction can be drawn in relation to time. I can think of my self 
in childhood from the perspective of a given time in my adult life, or I can think of myself from 
anyone’s perspective in time. In my understanding of Merleau-Ponty writings on the social self 
it is the latter meaning of the self beyond the ‘here-and-now’ of experience that he sees as 
central to self-reflection. The permanent effects of the video-observation can indeed be linked 
to such ideas. When observing oneself in a video reply, the third-person and off-line 
perspective afforded by the video is not one that a person experiences egocentrically, from the 
point of view of the video-observing body. Rather the self in the video is a more permanent 
record of the self that can be seen from many perspectives and in different times. In that sense 
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the video may have long-term effects on awareness because it facilitates reflection in third-
person, allocentric terms. Of course, these are assumptions that have not been tested in this 
thesis. Future research should examine patients egocentric and allocentric cognitive and 
emotional abilities in dedicated experimental tasks.   
     
5.5.5. The Role of Emotion in Body Awareness and Implications for Existential Counselling 
Psychology 
Furthermore, it should be noted that awareness improvement in the current study was 
not accompanied by any changes in performance on neuropsychological tests of cognitive 
function, or sensorimotor abilities, but rather with a large increase in depressive feelings as 
captured by a self-report measure, and were evident during testing and were also noted by 
hospital staff. As described in the introduction, the possible role of emotion in AHP has long 
been debated in the field. Indeed, there is long history of related clinical observations and 
theoretical debates (Weinstein & Kahn, 1955; Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991). Patients are 
typically described as manifesting some degree of blunted affect or ‘indifference’ for their 
disabilities. This indifference (anosodiaphoria, Babinski, 1914) can co-exist with AHP or it can 
occur without a concomitant explicit denial of deficits.  On the contrary, depressive symptoms 
and ‘catastrophic reactions’ (sudden influx of strong, negative feelings and related behaviours; 
Goldstein, 1939) are encountered rarely following right-hemisphere damage. Nevertheless, 
some clinicians have long argued that there is a link between awareness and depression in the 
sense that as unawareness decreases over time, depressive symptoms begin to emerge in 
patients who were previously emotionally unresponsive towards their paralysis (e.g. Kaplan-
Solms & Solms, 2000). Some patients even show a disproportionate exasperation with 
irrelevant, minor disappointments, despite their apparent indifference for their paralysis 
(Weinstein & Kahn, 1950; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Fotopoulou & Conway, 2004). These 
observations are consistent with the results of the present study, which further suggest that the 
role of negative emotions needs to be taken into account in future protocols and perhaps more 
formal and longer counselling or, psychotherapeutic sessions need to be provided to patients. 
More generally, consistent with the most general principles of counselling psychology, this 
case study suggests that taking patients emotions into account may be an important component 
of any successful intervention for AHP (see also Prigatano, 2005), as also shown in other 
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neurological syndromes that entail memory unawareness, such as confabulation following 
acute, frontal lobe damage (see Fotopoulou, 2008).  
While the primary focus of the present study was not the role of emotion in body 
awareness, long debates have surrounded this question. As described in the introduction, some 
authors have argued that the above clinical observations on the emotional tendencies of patients 
with AHP are caused by purely psychogenic ‘defence’ mechanisms. According to the theory 
of Weinstein and colleagues (e.g. Weinstein & Kahn, 1955), avoidance, denial and other 
unconscious coping mechanisms prevent patients from explicitly acknowledging their 
paralysis and the related negative emotions. Other authors have however proposed that this 
lack of emotional reactivity is the direct consequence of damage to the (frontal) right 
hemisphere, a brain area specialised for the processing of negative, withdrawal-related 
emotions (see Gainotti, 2012 for review). However, neither of these two approaches has been 
fully supported by empirical evidence. The psychodynamic account cannot explain the relative 
neuroanatomical and behavioural specificity of AHP (Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991; Heilman & 
Harciarek, 2010; see also Turnbull et al., 2014). The ‘valence’ hypothesis has similarly not 
been supported in the literature; although patients with AHP do typically score lower than 
control patients in self-report measures of depression and anxiety (e.g. see Chapter 3), more 
sensitive investigations have shown that they do not differ from controls groups in their ability 
to experience such emotions (Turnbull, Evans & Owen, 2005; Vocat et al., 2010). They also 
show appropriate, negative emotional reactions to their deficits when the latter are evoked 
implicitly (Nadrone, Ward, Fotopoulou & Turnbull, 2007; see also Chapter 3). Thus, it appears 
that the relation between AHP and emotion is more complex than suggested by either the 
psychodynamic or the valence hypothesis.  
From the point of view of the perspective put forward by Merleau-Ponty, one could 
hypothesise that negative emotions are absent in the patient with anosognosia to the degree that 
he is unwilling to withdraw from his habitual, tacit commitment to the world, even at the 
expense of the ‘erasure of reality’ (1945/1962, p. 99). Yet at the same time, as I discussed in 
Chapter 3, the denial of one’s paralysis is constituted precisely upon the prereflective 
awareness of a threat to one’s habitual possibilities of embodied being. Thus, the reinstatement 
of a self-reflective stance following the video-replay, due to either the ‘off-line’, or the third-
person aspects of the video-replay, may also allow the subject to experience the hitherto 
unsuspected emotions that are associated with the threat to one’s bodily integrity and action 
possibilities in the world. More generally, this ability to perceive the body ‘objectively’ in both 
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space and time, i.e. from the viewpoint of any other person, as well as independently of one’s 
current intentions, may also be developmentally linked with one’s ability to face some of the 
challenges of our existence (such as the separation of our self-reflective abilities from our 
prereflective self, and the similar separation between self and other), and the related negative 
emotions. This discussion leads to long and complex discussions on the nature of 
intersubjectivity that lie beyond the scope of the present thesis. Moreover, whether the ability 
to experience such negative emotions is primary or secondary to AHP (i.e. it is not clear 
whether this inability is the cause or the consequence of unawareness) is currently an open, 
empirical question (see also Mograbi et al., 2012; Besharati et al., 2014). However, the present 
study provides some preliminary indications that simply providing off-line and third-person 
visual feedback to such patients may facilitate their awareness and bring about negative 
emotions that can then be shared with others and reflected upon in appropriate 
psychotherapeutic contexts (unlike the current limited, research context). 
 This observation is of obvious relevance to existential counselling psychology and 
raises the question of whether the video-replay is necessary, or even ethically appropriate in 
such contexts. It can be instead regarded as a very crude and confrontational way to expose a 
patient to her paralysis. Moreover, at first sight it is unclear why the therapeutic relationship 
itself cannot operate as a facilitating mirror for the client, exploring the experiences of the client 
in a non-judgemental or objectifying ways, and at the same time endeavouring to opening up 
the horizons perceived by the individual as described in Chapters 3 and 4. Indeed, Kaplan-
Solms and Solms (2000), reported that when themes of loss are explored during 
psychotherapeutic sessions, transient awareness and depressive episodes can be experienced 
by patients who are otherwise stably anosognosic. Marcel and colleagues (2004) have further 
found that when questions are expressed in an emotional, conspiratorial manner, or from the 
perspective of the examiner, patients with AHP may show increased awareness regarding their 
paralysis. These observations raise the possibility that verbal, third-person perspective 
feedback may have similar effects as visual, ‘mirror-like’ feedback. Although this of course 
remains a possibility, it should also be noted that despite the occasional insights from a third-
person perspective (e.g. in the aforementioned psychotherapeutic and research descriptions) 
and the frequent social reinforcement of the third-person perspective on the body by healthcare 
staff and carers, anosognosic patients are known to remain more generally anosognosic and to 
express a marked dissociation between what they know others to believe and what they 
experience (e.g. “I know my husband thinks I am paralysed, but I know I am not”).  
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Moreover, the use of video-replays may have a unique role in the treatment of 
anosognosia in relation to two particular aspects of this syndrome: (1) as mentioned in the 
introduction, the presence of AHP at the acute stage of recovery following stroke, where there 
is little time for extensive psychotherapy provision, acts to worse patients prognosis and 
functional recovery, even if the AHP eventually recovers and (2) as discussed in this chapter, 
there is the possibility that video-replays facilitate the ‘objectification’ of the body, over and 
above any verbal or psychotherapeutic interventions, because the brain areas specialised for 
such perceptions of the body may be spared by the brain lesion that has nevertheless affected 
other aspects of bodily self-awareness.  These possibilities need to be assessed in future studies, 
including also investigations of the subjective experience of clients when faced with video-
replays of themselves. 
 
5.5.6. Methodological Limitations and Future Directions  
It should be noted that the present study has a number of limitations. Firstly, this study 
was a single case study, with the well-recognised and extensively debated in neuropsychology 
epistemological advantages and disadvantages (see Fotopoulou, 2014 for discussion). From the 
point of view of ‘quantitative research methods’ and the emphasis of ‘evidence-based practice’ 
of policy makers, the present findings will need to be replicated in a sufficiently powered, 
randomised controlled study (RCT), using a standardised protocol. However, preliminary case 
studies of this kind are important since there are no previous RCTs of any intervention in this 
population, and as I have outlined in the introduction (see also discussion), individualized 
clinical approaches may be particularly pertinent in the case of anosognosia. Moreover, the 
focus on ‘practice-based’ research in individual cases is a crucial epistemological value in 
Counselling Psychology (see also Introduction and Discussion). There is also very little prior 
knowledge available in stroke research about the video, or other similar interventions to be 
used. Thus, even from the perspective of quantitative research methods, it is vital to evaluate 
the feasibility of applying such bedside intervention `in the real world', as well as testing the 
acceptability of and adherence with the intervention and estimating important design 
parameters before planning a large-scale, randomised controlled trial.   
 
Indeed, as discussed above, the present study highlighted that while this simple, 
psychophysical intervention seems potent, it may not be sufficient, not even appropriate for 
Unawareness of Paralysis Following Stroke            145
awareness restoration in all patients. At the very least, this intervention needs to be embedded 
in a wider and perhaps individualised intervention protocol (see also Prigatano, 2005), 
involving the provision of psychotherapeutic support for the related emotions and self-
perceptions. In all cases, the current  results suggest that in order to establish a good clinical 
relationship with the patient, it is not advisable to begin the intervention too soon after first 
meeting the patient.  
 
There are also a number of other intervention parameters and facets that this study did 
not assess and should be explored in future case studies. Given their lack of insight some 
patients may be resistant to recruitment. Moreover, patients have varying stroke severity, 
neuropsychological, neurological and medical profiles. In addition, in clinical practice, the 
precise protocol for each individualised rehabilitation program is conditioned by personal and 
institutional variables. For example, it is important to consider that not all patients may be 
appropriate for video intervention and that it is important to individuate the times when it is 
possible to suggest it. Moreover, severe spatial neglect that cannot be by-passed by prompting 
may prevent some patients from seeing left side of the screen when watching the video replay.  
Severe attention and memory problems may also reduce the effectiveness of the video 
observation. Unawareness itself is multifaceted and can differ in specificity and extent. For 
example, some patients may be aware of their upper but not their lower limb paralysis (Marcel 
et al., 2004). Thus, the potential `transfer' across awareness domains of the restorative effect of 
video therapy needs to be assessed and the therapy needs to be modified accordingly. Finally, 
no study has assessed time- or treatment-related brain lesion changes in patients with motor 
unawareness following stroke. Specification of the relationship between cerebral re-
organisation and treatment-related changes could potentially highlight important mediators and 
moderators of the treatment effects.  
 
Accordingly, certain practical aspects of the video intervention itself will need to be 
tested and calibrated including any associated psychoeducation and psychotherapeutic 
components, the duration of treatment sessions, the duration and quantity of edited video clips 
in each session, the optimal time lapse between sessions, the necessity of breaks/ reminders, 
the extent/type of motor errors highlighted, the body parts captured in clips, the use of ratings 
by therapist and patient, procedures capable of by-passing the effects of neglect, procedures 
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for ensuring sufficient attention and concentration during video-viewing, the optimal 
proportion of `successful' versus `unsuccessful' tasks to be used for maintaining engagement 
and the optimal filming and projection angles/distance, the optimal sound levels.  
 
5.5.7. Summary and Conclusion 
This single-case study provides preliminary evidence that when right hemisphere 
damage impairs the ability to update first-person body awareness, judgements relying on off-
line, self-observation from a third-person perspective may be spared and may provide 
facilitating visual feedback towards reinstating motor awareness. Further studies should 
explore the usefulness and generalization of self-observation ‘from the outside’ in unaware 
patients, its optimal timing and relation to emotional factors, neglect and spontaneous recovery. 
In all cases, it should be noted that it was not the intention of the present study to suggest a 
generally applicable and stand-alone intervention for the treatment of AHP. Rather the aim is 
to determine the critical mediators of any dynamic change of awareness in these patients. By 
identifying such dynamic mechanisms, the thesis aims to generate new knowledge regarding 
the nature of motor and body awareness and its relation to wider existential considerations in 
the formation of our self-awareness.  
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6. Discussion 
6.1. Summary of Thesis 
In this dissertation I aimed to explore from an interdisciplinary vantage point the way in 
which the body is experienced in people with AHP following a stroke. Ultimately, I envisioned 
that the discussion of the findings could contribute to existential theory and existential 
counselling psychology. More specifically, taking as a starting point the existential-
phenomenological perspective on embodiment put forward by Merleau-Ponty, I aimed to 
provide an alternative to the one-to-one aetiological relations between neurological deficits and 
unawareness proposed by current neuroscientific models of AHP. The epistemological 
principles I followed in this thesis were informed by the ideas put forward by Merleau-Ponty 
regarding the value of studying psychological phenomena following brain damage, particularly 
as formalised by current ‘neurophenomenological’ approaches (see Chapter 2 for review). 
Specifically, given the paradoxical nature of unawareness of paralysis following right-
hemisphere damage, I made the paradoxical choice of aiming to explore existential-
phenomenological ideas regarding the experience of embodiment and selfhood by using 
quantative research methods from experimental psychology and neuropsychology.  
I recruited 14 patients with right hemisphere damage following a stroke and conducted 
three separate experiments, even though only eight out of the 14 patients could be tested in the 
second experiment and the last experiment was a single case study. These three studies 
addressed the following three hypotheses regarding the nature of AHP, respectively: (1) the 
possibility that at least some patients with AHP have a prereflective awareness of their deficits, 
despite their conscious, explicit unawareness (2) the possibility that at least some patients with 
AHP show explicit unawareness because of their prereflective, bodily awareness and (3) the 
possibility that ‘artificially’ by-passing such tacit awareness with the use of video-replays may 
contribute to the restoration of conscious awareness of paralysis in at least some of these 
patients. Results confirmed all three hypotheses. Specifically, the first experiment found that 
six out of seven patients with explicit unawareness of their paralysis showed behavioural 
indications of ‘pre-reflective’ awareness. The second experiment showed that motor intentions 
and expectations rather than sensory deficits seemed to drive patients’ unawareness of their 
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paralysis, in the sense that they are aware of similar errors when these are not preceded by 
motor expectations. Lastly, a simple video intervention, during which a patient can see herself 
failing to perform an action at the time that she did not have the intention to do so (i.e. off-
line), helped the patient recover her explicit awareness of her paralysis, particularly when this 
was accompanied by psychotherapeutic reflections and shared exploration of the painful but 
empowering insight generated by the video replay. 
These findings were discussed in relation to their respective neurocognitive and 
philosophical background literatures as well as in relation to their implications for existential 
counselling psychology, in each of the preceding chapters. In this chapter, I reflect critically 
on the personal, epistemological and ethical issues that the research results raise and finally, in 
the context of these reflexions, I address the wider implications of the thesis’s results for 
existential counselling psychology. 
 
6.2. Reflexivity: Personal, Epistemological and Ethical Hindsight 
6.2.1. Personal and Epistemological Reflexivity 
In Chapter 2, I presented my own position in relation to this research topic and 
particularly the tension between the mental and the somatic and its relevance to Counselling 
Psychology. I reviewed my training and professional background and outlined my biases, fears 
and goals for this research. In this section, having the first-person experience of meeting the 
patients, conducting the experiments, analysing and writing-up the data, I reflect on the 
implications of my positioning for the results and most importantly, their potential meaning 
and value to the field. 
 The first consideration is the existence and specificity of the hypotheses I set out to 
investigate and their effects on the results. As I outlined in Chapter 2, I was always intrigued 
by clinical indications and previous writings of tacit awareness in anosognosic patients and the 
paradoxes they entail, and hence I was curious to examine whether Merleau-Ponty’s relevant 
intuition about the existence of such forms of implicit awareness and its effects could be 
empirically confirmed. Thus, it should be stressed that the prominence of this topic in the thesis 
is in no way intrinsic to the phenomenon under consideration. As far as this thesis goes, tacit 
awareness is no more central to anosognosic phenomena than any other of its facets, e.g. the 
many other concomitant symptoms that accompany anosognosic behaviours or statements. In 
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other terms, the prominence of these findings and conclusions regarding anosognosia in 
relation to other potential findings portrays nothing else than researcher bias. These topics are 
not what the patients themselves chose to discuss or reveal to me. It is what I attempted to focus 
on and probe. In this sense, one could argue that I have not prioritised the patients’ subjectivity, 
nor entered a non-hierarchical relationship with my ‘co-participants’, as the values of 
Counselling Psychology dictate (Cooper, 2009). Indeed, throughout the thesis I have chosen to 
refer to the participants of the research as ‘participants’ or even ‘patients’. This was a conscious 
choice, I believe consistent with the third-person, quantitative methodologies I have chosen to 
use, as well as with the embodied and medical reality of the participants (see also below). 
 
 As I have outlined in Chapter 2, these choices reflect my belief that when trying to 
tackle complex, unconscious psychological phenomena about embodiment from an 
interdisciplinary perspective, one should try not to ‘cancel out’ the third-person ‘reality’ ‘of the 
body’ that these patients find themselves in, i.e. the reality of their paralysis, of their brain 
damage and the reality of their stroke. Of course, paradoxically, this is the very reality that they 
themselves deny. It is axiomatic to this condition to subjectively deny one’s paralysis. Yet, as 
I tried to explain in Chapter 2, this fundamental paradox requires a very careful balance 
between the mental and the somatic and thus between first and third person methods. As I have 
written in the context of amnesia and confabulation (Fotopoulou, 2008), I do not believe that 
colluding with, or contradicting patients subjective beliefs is the answer to exploring this 
paradox. In the case of anosognosia, minimising the reality of their hospital ‘patient-status’ and 
their change in their habitual embodiment (i.e. their paralysis) would in a way also mean 
colluding with patients’ ‘reflective consciousness’ at the expense of their embodiment. The 
answer I thus feel is a more messy, to be discovered in action, in therapy, and even in ‘action-
based’, practical, probing research. Indeed, I hope this study demonstrates that a potential part 
of the answer perhaps lies in ‘probing’ both their reflective abilities and their embodiment 
directly, experimentally (see Chapters 3-6) and from different perspectives (see Chapter 6). I 
think my position stems from a willingness to tolerate the paradox itself and knowing that all 
choices, even research choices, entail a loss or at least a compromise. In the case of this thesis, 
the major loss lies in the fact that I have not been able to explore patients own subjectivity for 
its own sake, nor established a close, equal, therapeutic relation from which intersubjective 
meaning could be drawn. Everything this thesis therefore claims is from a third-person, 
somewhat disengaged position. Any inference of subjective or intersubjective meaning, and 
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hence value, is therefore one of theoretical, reflective nature on my part, yet in ‘respect’ of my 
own perspective on the patients ‘embodiment’ and particularly their stroke and the 
consequences it may have on one’s subjective sense of the body. I realise that this is an 
approach that may be met with various criticism within Counselling Psychology, some of them 
valid, but at the same time I think it is fair to argue that such criticisms are in part the result of 
a certain neglect of the physical body within the field of Counselling Psychology and 
psychotherapy more generally (see Wahl, 2003 for review). Although there have been 
exceptions in the history of the field (e.g. bioenergetic approaches in psychotherapy), most 
counsellors are not trained in body-focused therapy or research and similarly the epistemology 
of research in the field is mainly focused on studying ‘mental components’ of client’s 
experience, using methods that prioritise reflection, verbal reports and therapeutic dialogue, or 
interview research techniques. As Conger has reflected “the body has been invisible, for years 
unaddressed and ignored, left in the waiting room of the therapist’s office (Conger, 1994, pp. 
211).        
Similarly, one has to wonder what ‘empirical confirmation’, in the form of the 
quantitative research undertaken in this thesis, adds to the previous clinical observations and 
writings on the topic. Is it a mere need on my part to have my interests, readings and first-hand 
observations, ‘confirmed’ by third-person methods and perhaps some kind of scientific 
authority? Although I do admit that I have enjoyed and benefited from the ‘familiarity’ of 
experimental methods for exploring such difficult topics in such a challenging setting (the acute 
stroke ward) and with such challenging conditions (e.g. the medical and cognitive difficulties 
encountered by patients), I believe that my desire to explore these questions with experimental 
methods is actually more than just such an emotional need for confirmation by some 
‘authority’, and the ‘empirical confirmation’ is of added value to the study of anosognosia, as 
well as to the field of counselling psychology. More specifically, I would like to believe that 
the results of the study can serve as a first step towards an interdisciplinary consideration of 
anosognosia for hemiplegia, with direct relevance to Counselling Psychology of both practical 
and theoretical nature.  
Specifically, as I have outlined in the introduction, there is a paucity of 
psychotherapeutically-relevant research on the disorder and an equally rare acceptance of 
anosognosia as a ‘real’ psychological phenomenon. Hence, if research is ever to be relevant for 
policy changes, and particularly policy changes that may affect Counselling Psychology, then 
such research needs to have some impact in the clinical fields that are currently exposed to 
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anosognosic patients at acute stroke wards. These are currently mostly neurologists, 
neuroscientists, psychiatrists and to a lesser degree clinical psychologists (see Introduction), 
and of course physiotherapists, occupational therapists, speech therapists and nurses. 
Quantitative methods and the kind of results they tend to generate are more likely to have 
impact in these fields than qualitative methods. I have frequently heard clinicians in stroke 
wards describe these patients as ‘difficult’ and there are frequently a lot of challenges involved 
in their care, as they come across as suspicious, more aware than they are willing to admit, 
indifferent one minute and upset and aggressive the next. As Chapters 3 and 4 show, this 
occasional tacit knowledge and the sudden emotions that may accompany it (see Chapter 6), 
does not mean that these patients are aware of their deficits, nor that they are indifferent about 
them. As I have tried to show in this thesis (Chapters 3 and 4), it may mean that our reflective 
and our embodied awareness are not one and the same, and these patients find themselves in a 
paradoxical dissociation between them. I think that if these patients are going to be ever offered 
proper psychological support in acute wards, both quantitative and qualitative research is 
needed on the complex relation between our subjective reflection on our body, our habitual 
awareness of our embodiment and all the emotions that their relation entails.  
Moreover, it should be mentioned that despite the general appreciation of quantitative 
methods as not respecting the ‘uniqueness’ of each individual (an important value of 
Counselling Psychology, Cooper, 2009), there is a long tradition of ‘case studies’ in 
neuropsychology and related, specialised methodological innovations. Of course, the studies 
used in this thesis did not focus on how one’s stroke and its resulting disability was perceived 
by every individual patient in the recruited sample (for the reasons outlined above), however 
as Chapters 3 and 5 reveal, some of the results generated in this study, even if they are aimed 
at ‘universal principles’ such as the ‘existence of tacit awareness despite explicit unawareness’ 
they nevertheless are able to generate some results that apply to some individuals and not 
others. Thus, for instance, in Chapter 3, I was able to show that only 6 out of 7 of the patients 
showed tacit awareness into their deficit and explore some of the particular characteristics of 
the single patient that differed from the rest. Chapter 5 is a single case study, which by 
definition means that the research is focused on one particular individual. Moreover, given the 
close relation between neurological and neuropsychological quantitative research, these 
methods allowed me to formulate and then implement the video-based intervention. As I 
described this intervention has a ‘hands-on’, visuomotor element that originated from 
quantitative explorations of the disorder (as presented in the preceding chapters). Nevertheless, 
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‘in practice’ this intervention was implemented in a single case study and focused on the 
immediate reactions, emotions and reflections of the particular patient. In this regard, it is not 
possible to separate the video-component from the reflections and conversations that took place 
between the patient and myself, during which the ‘meaning’ of the video was shared, negotiated 
and intersubjectively created. I believe that in this sense, quantitative research methods can be 
applied ‘in practice’ and hence generate insights that are relevant to both the individual patient 
but also more broadly to counselling psychology.  
Finally, although scientific, and particularly neuroscientific authorities enjoy particular 
prominence in recent years, it should not be forgotten that ‘empirical, third-person methods’ 
are carried out with established methodologies that despite their limitations in scope (i.e. 
quantitative methods are reductionist in many regards) can be rather evaluated by peers with 
some degree of transparency against specific, criteria and irrespective of the ‘status’ of the 
researchers in the field. To a degree this also applies to systematic, qualitative studies. Yet, it 
does not apply to simple, anecdotal clinical observations, nor philosophical writings. These are 
the kind of ‘proof’ the literature contained for tacit awareness in anosognosia before I set out 
to conduct this doctorate. When these are expressed by recognised authorities in philosophy or 
in psychotherapy are equally authoritative. I thus do not feel that I have been predominately 
driven by the need to confirm these intuitions by mainstream, authoritative, methods. Rather, I 
firmly believe that given the deeply intertwined relationship between mind and body, as well 
as between subjectivity and objectivity, the results of first, second and third-person methods 
should be able to converge at some level, despite their differences and tensions. It may well be 
that some of the findings of this thesis may not be found if another examiner assesses the 
patients behaviour, or maybe some of the findings generated by the current results may not be 
experienced at all by some patients, or may be less emphasised and prioritised by some other 
patients. Nevertheless, I believe there is some generalizable psychological and 
psychotherapeutic value to the current observations, constrained as they may be by my own 
biases, my presence, the particular participants, the particular experiments and the particular 
context and culture in which they were generated. At the very least they can serve as the starting 
point for future observation with other methods, and particularly first- and second-person 
methods (Finlay & Evans, 2009).  
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6.2.2. Ethical Reflexivity 
As part of the ‘general Methods’ section of the thesis (Chapter 2), and in each empirical 
Chapter, I have discussed the various ethical issues and risks raised by the research and the 
steps taken in advance to mitigate them. Specifically, I will discuss the factors that lead to 
potent and distinctive sources of ethical dilemmas in psychotherapy in neurorehabilitation 
settings and particularly in people with unawareness into their neurological condition. Of 
course, practice in neurological settings is governed by the values and standards of practice of 
the relevant professionals, as well as by the national health system involved. These standards 
and values are typically transmitted through formal and regulated education and a certain 
degree of ‘automaticity’ is expected in their application. Nevertheless, and despite the usual 
requirement of ‘bracketing-out’ assumptions while in a psychotherapeutic session, certain 
situations may arise during neuropsychological psychotherapy that challenge personal and 
professional assumptions and lead to ethical dilemmas. Dilemmas have been defined as 
complex problem situations that involve tension and paradox, where all potential solutions 
appear to be unfavourable, where potential solutions conflict, and where it is difficult to act 
(Sekereka & Bagozzi, 2007; McGrath, 2007). Existentially- and phenomenological-trained 
psychotherapists would know that dilemmas are to a degree unavoidable in any setting. In the 
case of brain damage however, it has been argued that the unique combination of psychosocial 
and medical factors raises specific ethical issues (Malec 1993; Tarvydas & Shaw, 1996).  
In this discussion, I will focus particularly on dilemmas that arise in relation to two 
factors. First, I reflect on the fact that research, as well as counselling and psychotherapy in 
acute anosognosia clients and other stroke survivors at acute wards can be offered only in the 
context of a multidisciplinary team of rehabilitation professionals. Second, I reflect to the wider 
social context in which AHP and other neurological deficits occur and its implications for 
research and practice. In both cases, I refer first to ethical issues I encountered and considered 
during or after conducting the research and second, I refer to the wider ethical implications 
raised by this research, particularly as regards the practice of Counselling Psychology with this 
population and brain damage patients more generally.    
 
The Role of the Psychotherapist in a Multidisciplinary Stroke Team: Specialised 
Knowledge, Tolerance of Unknowns and Recognition of Separate Professional Perspectives 
and Priorities   
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It well-recognised that specialized treatment and rehabilitation are crucial for improving 
functional outcome and quality of life in brain damage survivors (e.g. British Psychological 
Society Briefing Paper, 2002; Stroke Unit Trialists' Collaboration, 2003). Thus, patients with 
right hemisphere damage and anosognosia, as well as other stroke survivors find themselves in 
busy wards, where key features of care are a dedicated multidisciplinary team and specialised 
rehabilitation, prevention and adequate treatment of complications. The present study was 
indeed conducted in such a ward, in which an unusually large range of professionals and their 
professional values and assumptions may need to be balanced in various situations (Kjellstrom 
et al., 2007). Moreover, as exemplified by the group studied in this thesis, clinicians, clients 
and families may have only partial information in their disposal given the genuinely 
interdisciplinary subject matter of brain-mind relations and the implications they may have on 
domains of being such as one’s ability to appreciate and come to terms with one’s disability.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, assessment by a neuropsychologist and psychological 
therapy and counselling should be available when needed and is recommended in most existing 
surveys and guidelines (e.g. National Sentinel Audit of Stroke, 2008). However, these 
recommendations are not always implemented. Indeed, none of the patients that I encountered 
in this thesis had seen a psychologist, or a psychotherapist as part of their routine post-stroke 
care. In some cases, the stroke team would refer a patient to a ‘liaison’ clinical psychologist or 
psychiatrist but generally there seemed to be an unspoken avoidance for such referrals. Some 
staff (mainly occupational therapists, physiotherapists and junior doctors) admitted to me that 
the team avoided such referrals because they felt that such colleagues were not really engaged 
in the rehabilitation process, offering either psychometric assessments of cognitive function or 
psychoactive medication respectively, rather than more specialised opinions on the mood, 
cognition and motivation of patients, in a way that may be useful to their care. It is of course 
hard to generalise from the experience of one ward and such informal comments. Nevertheless, 
these experience tallies with my previous experience in amnesia research, where I found that 
other professionals preferred to engage with ‘research psychologists’ who were trying to 
understand these patients from interdisciplinary perspectives that include both ‘brain’ and 
‘mind’ considerations (see for instance, Fotopoulou, 2008). Interestingly, some of these 
reflections concern also the well-being and psychology of staff in the stroke ward. I have been 
amazed for example to see that stroke wards have no psychological support provision for their 
staff, despite the fact that they deal daily with an intense, stressful environment, where 
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disability and death are the rule rather than the exception (see also next section). One wonders 
how burnout and related consequences are acknowledged and dealt with in such environments.   
 
Some of the unique challenges encountered in this thesis, that also apply more generally 
in neurorehabilitation settings include the fact that brain damage involves profound novelty 
and great complexity and requires specialised knowledge in psychotherapists, as well as in 
other professionals. Indeed, if the role of a psychotherapist or a counselling psychologist is 
likely to be most effective within a specialised, multidisciplinary team, then they need to have 
specific clinical skills and experience in neurorehabilitation, as well as thorough knowledge 
and skills in neuropsychological and psychological assessment. These skills are not typically 
part of a counselling psychologists formal training and thus a counselling psychologists may 
not be familiar with psychological presentations of neurological conditions such as for example 
the neglect and anosognosia examined here, or other symptoms such as aphasia or amnesia, 
nor the intricacies of therapeutic leverage in the treatment of conditions with unclear 
psychogenic versus neurogenic origins. I do not mean to imply that they need to be as 
knowledgeable as clinical neuropsychologists, which is a specific specialisation in the UK but 
they need to have some familiarity with neuropsychology in order to be able to interact 
efficiently with the clinical team and clients.  
For example, as in the case of anosognosia examined here, frequently neurological 
conditions require psychological therapy and more general neurorehabilitation with a degree 
of uncertainty about the precise brain and mind mechanisms that lead to a dysfunctional 
behaviour. For instance, in some cases a patient may show stroke-like symptoms, including 
motor, cognitive and emotional difficulties, but there is no clear neuroradiological evidence for 
a stroke. This uncertainty is to a degree unavoidable and I addressed the consequences of not 
tolerating such uncertainty in relation to anosognosia in this thesis. In fact, following from the 
insights of Merleau-Ponty, I used third-person methods in neuropsychology to show that the 
categories of ‘psychogenic’ and ‘neurogenic’ are unsuitable to characterize symptoms such as 
anosognosia that at the border between the mental and the somatic. This insight is a valuable 
perspective that the counselling psychologist may bring to multidisciplinary teams, for example 
stressing the mean that symptoms may have for the patient irrespective of their cause. Despite 
this however, tolerating uncertainly is not synonymous to ignorance or avoidance of the subject 
matter of other fields. Specialized training and experience can help psychologists to proceed in 
risk-assessment of various treatment options and then make informed choices in an attempt to 
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optimize rehabilitation, avoid harm and promote care, despite the unknown territories and the 
interdisciplinary dilemmas involved with impairments of the brain and their consequences on 
the mind.  
For example, brain damage may affect some of the identifying markers of what 
professionals recognize as ‘a person’ and thus increase the likelihood of ‘dehumanisation’ and 
‘objectification’ by some professionals. For example, people may become behaviourally 
unpredictable and disinhibited, cognitively impaired, socially inappropriate, needing 
immediate satisfaction of needs and show other characteristics that are counterintuitive and 
may appear as childlike, or even animal-like to others (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Such changes 
may lead to a number of professional dilemmas. In neurological tradition, for instance, doctors, 
nurses and therapists may refer to hospitalised, neurological patients in the third-person in their 
presence (e.g. during a ward round a doctor may say “the patient has lost sensation of his arm, 
does not remember his recent past but motor functions are intact”. This kind of third-person 
presentation may put the patient and the attending psychologist or psychotherapist in a very 
difficult position. Indeed, such occasions were frequent during this research, as for instance 
when one nurse interrupted my session to inform me that “I should not listen to the patient 
because he cannot really move”. I thanked her for her concern and information but I explained, 
in front of the patient and in the second-person when referring to the patient, that as far as my 
research was concerned I was interested in how the patient herself perceived her body and 
therefore it was only the patient who could inform my research correctly regarding her own 
body. I think similar considerations apply more generally to counselling psychology and 
psychotherapy, as from the perspective of these disciplines, neuropsychological symptoms may 
be neurologically mediated but they are occurring in a human person that thus deserves respect 
and sensitivity when such symptoms are addressed (Fotopoulou, 2008), and hence these fields 
could actively influence the more general ‘social ethos’ (Dubnick, 2003) of the 
multidisciplinary team in neurological wards.  
 
Brain Damage does not occur in a social vacuum 
 
In the current thesis, I mainly focused on the behaviour and experience of individuals 
with AHP. However, AHP as well as brain damage more broadly, affects both the individual 
and her social world, frequently changing social roles dramatically, e.g. when one of the two 
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partners can no longer work, or handle their previous responsibilities towards the family and 
themselves (Oddy, 1995; McKevitt et al., 2011). As brain damage may affect one person’s 
autonomy and independence, e.g. as in the case of the people in the current thesis who showed 
various degrees of difficulty in mentally and/or physically taking care of their basic bodily and 
life needs, or moving freely in the environment and getting one with their lives, it also creates 
new conditions of social dependency, in turn affecting the psychological and practical lives of 
others. Similarly, the social world of the patient may experience shock, sadness, anger, fear, 
guilt and many other strong emotions and psychological conditions (anxiety, fear of illness, 
fear of death of the other or the self), without the ‘benefit’ of the ‘objectively’ recognisable 
illness. Thus, it is important for counselling psychology to address any arising issues in the 
social world of its clients, both to their benefit of clients themselves but also to the benefit of 
their social environment. This task is particularly difficult as brain illnesses can rob people of 
features that signify their uniqueness and distinctiveness as individuals (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 
2000) in at least two ways: a. people may lose some of their pre-damage personality 
characteristics, personal memories, personal preferences and habits; b. individuals may 
develop behaviours that make them lose their distinctiveness, such as tics, or ‘slow-paced’ 
dysarthric speech, abnormal, environmentally dependent movements and even specific 
delusions, e.g. my wife is replaced by an impostor, or my arm belongs to my husband (e.g. see 
Chapter 5) that make the particular individual seem more similar to other individuals with the 
same symptoms and less similar to the person their families and wider social environment 
recognise and remember.  
 
The anosognosic symptoms of the participants reported here, for example, did not just 
affect the ‘reality’ of their embodiment, i.e. the paralysis, but they also affected their ‘shared 
reality’ with relatives and friends. What does a husband think when his wife suddenly insists 
that her paralysed arm is his own? (see Chapter 4). Conversely, how does a daughter feel about 
her mother ‘choosing to attribute’ her own arm to her granddaughter? Thus, for relatives and 
carers the stroke or other brain pathology also has a subjective, first person significance, despite 
the fact that their own embodiment is not affected per se. Moreover, such first person 
perspective may contrast or be in conflict with the experience of the patient, as the case of 
anosognosia exemplifies. Importantly, as the last empirical chapter of this thesis demonstrated 
relatives may be an important sources of ‘second-’ and ‘third-’person perspectives on one’s 
condition but ‘balancing’ of such perspectives with all the ‘first-person’ experiences involved 
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and the particular ways and timing of communication of such perspectives to the patient needs 
some careful consideration and may lead to various ethical dilemmas. Counselling 
psychologists may have a particular role here, particularly if the finding of the single case in 
this thesis are extended and validated by additional studies. Specifically, one could imagine 
that relatives of an anosognosic patient may feel that they are asked to bear with a disability, 
that the patient herself is not willing to acknowledge. Thus, counselling psychology or 
psychotherapy may have the specific role of validating the perspectives of both patient and her 
social environment, while at the same time working with them to progressively try to increase 
empathy and understanding for the perspective of the other. 
In summary, research and psychotherapy in acquired brain injury and particularly in 
clients with anosognosia raises several of the standard ethical issues of research and practice 
in counselling and psychotherapeutic psychology but also includes some unique ethical 
dilemmas that require specialised knowledge, conscious and informed deliberation and courage 
by the researcher and the clinician. I suppose they should also be accompanied by the 
knowledge that ethical risk, responsibility and dilemmas are an integral part of one’s decision 
to be a science-practitioner in the field.           
 
6.3. Wider Implications for Existential Counselling Psychology and Psychotherapy 
As mentioned throughout the thesis, the consideration of AHP from this interdisciplinary 
perspective may be of relevance to the practice of existential counselling psychology with 
anosognosic patients, while also raising a number of considerations as regards some the 
phenomenological and existential characteristics and challenges of research and psychotherapy 
in neurological settings. In addition, the findings of the thesis have implications for the practice 
of existential counselling psychology with other clients that lack insight into somatic symptoms 
due to an identifiable neurological disease (e.g. traumatic brain injury or dementia; Kotler-
Cope & Camp, 1995; Ott, Noto & Fogel, 1996) or in different psychopathological contexts 
(e.g. functional disorders, obsessive compulsive disorder, or eating disorders; 
e.g.Vandereycken, 2006a; 2006b). More generally, some of the findings and theoretical 
considerations of the present thesis may be of relevance to psychotherapeutic work with all 
clients, in the sense that there are noted self-awareness paradoxes frequently encountered in 
psychotherapeutic practice and particularly the tension between our conscious wish to change 
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our psychological tendencies or habits and our simultaneous adherence to our habitual ways of 
being-in-the-world. I discuss these implications below, with particular reference to three issues: 
1) Our embodiment has both physical and psychological aspects and hence damage to the brain 
and the body requires consideration by psychotherapists and other mental health professional 
as much as it requires consideration by doctors or, physiotherapists. 2) Our self-awareness is 
not a unitary ability; it seems to involve several different levels and therapists need to stay open 
and receptive to both the conscious experience of their anosognosic clients and their habitual, 
lived experience. 3) These psychotherapeutic insights into this extreme form of motor 
unawareness may have implications for other, less extreme types of unawareness and their role 
in therapy, including body image and self-esteem distortions in clients with eating disorders or 
even no particular neuro- or psycho-pathology.  
Psychotherapy After Stroke: As aforementioned, acute anosognosia following a stroke 
poses a number of clinical challenges and it is viewed as a negative prognostic sign for long-
term functional recovery. Nevertheless, there is currently no specialised provision for its 
psychological treatment or management in most Western countries (Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 
2010). Indeed, the traditional scope of counselling psychology and psychotherapy (and related 
fields) does not involve treating patients with anosognosia at the acute stage following stroke. 
Instead, in acute stroke management, anosognosia is mostly regarded as neuropsychological 
deficit that needs to be diagnosed and ‘trained’. For example, patients may be repeatedly 
reminded of their ‘correct’ circumstances, their disabilities and ‘realistic’ prospects in 
‘instructive’ ways under an approach called ‘reality orientation’ (Holden & Woods, 1995). 
Although this approach has long been criticized for its rigidity and insensitivity towards the 
patients’ emotions (see Spector et al., 2001 for a recent discussion), no alternative, 
psychotherapeutic approaches have been put forward for anosognosia following stroke, 
particularly at the acute stage.  Nevertheless, the few attempts to provide psychotherapy to 
these patients have shown that these symptoms are not only linked with very powerful 
emotions, but also the apparent emotional indifference in these patients is only superficial and 
the establishment of a good therapeutic rapport reveals a wealth of psychological attempts to 
cope with and make sense of the consequences of brain damage (Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 
2000). I would like to believe that the present interdisciplinary inquiry into the embodied 
experience of these patients provides further, albeit indirect, support for the need of 
psychotherapeutic provision in these patients. Particularly, the video replay case study revealed 
that even a simple psychophysical intervention, coupled with a psychotherapeutic attitude 
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could have profound effects on participants. Even more so, the change in awareness I reported 
in this case study was accompanied mainly by emotional changes and not by any cognitive, 
sensorimotor alternations. This suggests that psychotherapy could have a central role in helping 
patients with AHP to come to appreciate their deficits based on their available emotional, 
copying strategies and the exploration of individual meanings.     
The Lived Experience of a Damaged Body in Therapy.  In the above context, the 
existential-phenomenological readings of the empirical findings I presented in the thesis offer 
a specific perspective to the understanding and psychotherapeutic treatment of patients with 
stroke-induced anosognosia for hemiplegia. This condition is regarded as unintentional and as 
unrelated to personal goals and motivations. However, having shown here that these patients 
may simultaneously have implicit knowledge into their deficit, and even more so that this tacit 
knowledge is paradoxically intertwined with their conscious inability to perceive their deficits, 
could potentially offer psychotherapists and counselling psychologists, and more generally all 
clinicians, a different view of patients with AHP. As Merleau-Ponty suggested clinicians could 
strive to listen to their clients in a manner that transcends the strict categories of consciousness, 
such as the ‘presence’ and the ‘absence’ of a deficit. Despite their counterintuitive nature, 
clinicians need to be mindful of such paradoxes in the perception of one’s own body following 
stroke. Stroke patients with anosognosia, particularly when encountered in a psychotherapeutic 
context as clients, call upon us to bracket and horizontalise the very notion of the physical 
reality of the body. As aforementioned, a therapist can attempt to relate to patients’ lived 
experience, including exploring their feelings about the body in the context of their lives, 
without the need to establish a commonly perceived ‘reality’, or ‘world’ in such ‘objective’ 
terms. A therapist informed by existential-phenomenological insights about patient’s implicit 
knowledge as outlined above, may try to engage with the patient’s own subjective experience 
about the meaning of the habitual body, exploring, describing and even validating their feelings 
and thoughts in the subjective and intersubjective context that they occur, while also 
progressively opening them up to further perspectives.   
As I discussed in chapter 3, Merleau-Ponty’s use of Husserl’s concept of the ‘horizon’ 
(1945/1962) may be useful in this respect. Our conscious reflections on the world, in this case 
including the conscious appreciation of our own body and its capabilities, are not but mere 
abstract derivatives of a lived, embodied experience of the world that lacks the determinate, 
specific and fixed in their boundaries, hierarchies and categories of our conscious perception. 
The horizon of our lived, embodied experience includes a rich and dynamic repertoire of 
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meanings that may not fit the categories of our conscious, ‘neatly organised’ reflections. In the 
case of the anosognosic, the perception and description of the physical body as able, familiar 
and present is therefore simultaneously the understanding of the body as disabled, estranged 
and lost. The body the patient speaks of is, and simultaneously is not, the body that lies 
paralysed in front of the therapist. The client, as any client, calls upon the lived body when 
interacting with the therapist, even at the very moments that he tries to describe his 
(anosognosic) appreciation of the physical body. It may seem easy and even comforting for the 
therapist to cling to the observable ‘reality’ of the paralysed limbs and try to engage the client 
in such reflections. However, as this thesis has attempted to highlight, such efforts would 
always leave behind the potentially uncomfortable, prereflective experience of the lived body 
as habitually active and currently paralysed and lost. For instance, anosognosic patients make 
comments that appear as random errors to the cognitive, ‘reality orientation’ therapist, such as 
‘come back and see me when I will be really ill’. They are seen as mere mistakes regarding 
‘reality’. For the existential counselling psychologist however, this apparent disregard of reality 
is equally important as the consideration of the fact that there will be a time when a client will 
be ‘really’ ill and in need of help. Thus, such a therapist, may enquire about what this time 
would be like for the client. They may explore with the patient what such statement may mean 
in the context of their lives, their relations, their self-regard, thus hopefully in time opening up 
the patient to further, potentially already experienced ways of being in the world (albeit in 
different contexts) that entail both ability and disability (e.g. the experience of being a child, a 
novice in something, of getting lost, of being ill, etc.).  
In this regard existential counselling psychology may create a safe space in which reality 
does not need to be negotiated as such, it can be ‘played with’ and explored intersubjectively. 
Consideration of the complex notions of intersubjectivity, social interaction and second-person 
perspectives in phenomenology and neuroscience (e.g. see Gallagher & Hutto, 2008), as well 
as psychotherapy (Finlay & Evans, 2009) far exceed the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that such second-person, relational considerations may be proven to be key in 
anosognosia where as shown in this thesis the first-person experience of the body is directly 
affected by brain damage and third-person perspectives may not be habitually available to the 
patient (e.g. as provided by video-replay in this thesis) and may be rather harsh and emotionally 
upsetting (e.g. as indicated by the sudden influx of depressive feeling sin our patient). Instead, 
one could hypothesize that the role of the psychotherapist and counselling psychologist is to 
facilitate the disrupted transition from a subjective appreciation of one’s body (e.g. I am not 
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ill) to a more ‘objective’ one (I have had a stroke, I am paralysed) by allowing for a safe 
intersubjective perspective where the body of the client can be considered from a shared and 
‘horizontialised’ standpoint that may facilitate the integration of the other two perspectives. 
More generally, one hopes that intersubjective explorations and sharing of several prereflective 
experiences and their associated meanings during psychotherapy may facilitate clients to arrive 
at a new subjective understanding of the body and a consideration of its role in their own, 
dynamic and wider ‘world-horizon’. 
  Unawareness in other Psychopathologies and Everyday Life. I believe the results of 
the present experiment further highlight the challenges faced by the existential counselling 
psychologist, or psychotherapist in their potential attempts to respond to the needs of 
anosognosic patients, as well as to any client who presents with issues regarding the human 
paradox of self-awareness.  Specifically, the present findings highlight how an existential 
therapist needs to be attuned not only to the conscious content, agency and wishes of their 
clients but also to their more general, embodied commitment to the world and their ‘embodied 
intentionality’. For instance, one could speculate that despite their conscious unawareness of 
their thin body, individuals suffering from anorexia nervosa or related eating disorders, or even 
individuals with everyday ‘body dissatisfaction’ concerns may be simultaneously and tacitly 
aware of the threat to their bodies by eating restriction or by excessive exercise and similar 
practices. Moreover, if the conclusions of the present study are found to be of some validity, 
this tacit knowledge of one’s emaciated or, threatened body may be paradoxically intertwined 
with an individual’s conscious inability to appreciate their difficulties. The more available 
foods and temptations call upon the hunger instincts of the anorexic body for instance, the more 
their conscious need to control such hunger may be. Such insights on the treatment of 
anosognosia and other somatic disorders are of course speculative, as they have been generated 
by third-person, philosophical reflection and confirmed by third-person, scientific 
experimentation. Thus, they cannot be taken for granted in every client, and need to be 
considered as a possibility rather than a certainty in each case. Nevertheless, they may be a 
useful reminder of the paradoxical nature of our embodied and reflective self-awareness and 
they could potentially lead to further theoretical and empirical considerations in this respect. In 
brief, I believe that the results and reflections of the present thesis on anosognosia for 
hemiplegia capture and bring to light dramatically the more general paradox underlying certain 
clients’ motivation for therapy. On the one hand they come to therapy consciously hoping to 
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change their habitual ways of being-in-the-world while on the other hand they may hope not to 
change their commitment to the world.  
In conclusion, research and psychotherapy in acquired brain injury and particularly in 
clients with anosognosia raises several epistemological and ethical challenges, particularly as 
regards the paradoxical relation between our lived body and our reflective appreciation of our 
embodiment. Inspired by the existential-phenomenological writings of Merleau-Ponty on 
anosognosia, I have endeavoured to conduct clinically-relevant, interdisciplinary research in a 
way that does justice to both the neural and psychological aspects of anosognosia. I have thus 
discovered in practice that epistemological challenges, risks and dilemmas are an integral part 
of my decision to be a science-practitioner in this field. I do however believe that these risks 
have generated some valuable results and insights, with three particular implications for the 
field of counselling and psychotherapeutic psychology, namely 1) Our embodiment has both 
physical and psychological aspects and hence damage to the brain and the body requires 
consideration by psychotherapists and other mental health professional as much as it requires 
consideration by doctors or physiotherapists. 2) Our self-awareness is not a unitary ability and 
therapists need to stay open and receptive to both the conscious experience of their anosognosic 
clients and their habitual, lived experience. 3) Future research could explore whether these 
insights into this extreme form of motor unawareness may also apply to other, less extreme 
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8. Appendices 
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BERTI ET AL. 1996: OPEN QUESTIONS: Upper limb 
 




















2. If the patient verbally denies left upper limb motor impairment, then ask: 
- Please touch my hand with your left hand (the examiner puts his/her hand in the 




- Have you done it? 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




              (if the patient answers YES, then) Are you sure?  It is strange as I have not seen 
your hand touching my hand. 





                                                       Score--------- 
                                                        
NORMAL (0)        MILD ANOSOGNOSIA (1)         SEVERE ANOSOGNOSIA (2)  
 
0 = the patient answered correctly to the first group of questions. 
1 = The patient acknowledged being in the hospital and/or being affected by a stroke but denied his 
or her upper limp impairment.  However the patient acknowledged that the left arm did not reach the 
examiner’s hand. 




BERTI ET AL. 1996: OPEN QUESTION 
lower limb 
 





2. Can you walk without any problem? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                                           Score -------- 
                                                        
NORMAL (0)       MILD ANOSOGNOSIA (1)         SEVERE ANOSOGNOSIA (2)  
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SCORE 
0 = The patient either spontaneously reported the motor impairment of the lower limb when first 
asked about the reasons for his or her being in the hospital (see above) or acknowledged paralysis 
when specifically questioned about the left (right)leg. 
1 = The patient answered ‘well’ to the first question but acknowledged the impossibility of walking. 
2 = The patient claimed that he was able to walk. 
 
Anosognosia for Hemiplegia Questionnaire 
Feinberg, Roane and Ali (2000) 
 
Do you have weakness anywhere? 
 
 
Is your arm causing you any problems? 
 
 
Does it feel normal? 
 
 
Can you use it as well as you used to? 
 
 
Are you fearful about losing your ability to use 
your arm? 
 
Is the sensation in your arm normal? 
 
 
The doctors tell me that there is some 
paralysis of your arm.  Do you agree? 
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(Left arm is lifted and dropped in left 
hemispace.) It seems there is some weakness.  
Do you agree? 
 
(Left arm is lifted and dropped in right 
hemispace.) It seems there is some weakness.  
Do you agree? 
 
Take your right arm, and use it to lift your left 






Score 0 if the patient showed awareness of deficit; 0.5 for partial awareness; and 1.0 for complete 
unawareness or denial. 
 
 
Feinberg Assessment of Verbal Asomatognosia 
Feinberg, Haber, and Leeds (1990) 
 
(Lift the normal right arm) What is this? 
Required to answer correctly to be included in the 
study 
 
(Lift the left arm by the elbow and move the 
patient’s hand and forearm into the right 
hemispace) What is this?  
Judged to have verbal asomatognosia if the limb is 
misidentified. 
 
Care should be taken to keep the examiner’s hand and arm out of the patient’s right hemispace. 
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8.2. Appendices II and III: Information Sheet and Consent Form 
Patient Information Sheet  
Version 3: 12.02.07 
 
TITLE OF PROJECT: Awareness of Illness Following Brain Damage 
 
    • You are invited to participate in a psychological study conducted at St. Thomas’s Hospital. Before you decide 
it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to 
read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is 
not clear or if you would like more information.  Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. If you 
are currently unsure, you can think it over and let us know if you decide to take part any time in the following 
three weeks. 
Consumers for Ethics of research publish a leaflet entitled ‘Medical Research and You’. This gives more 
information about medical research and looks at some questions that you may want to ask. Please ask for a 
copy or it may be obtained from CERES, PO Box 1365, London N16 0BW  
Thank you for reading this. 
 
1. What is the purpose of the study? 
The overall purpose of this 2-year long study investigation is to explore and evaluate the subjective 
experience of illness following brain damage. Being aware of what has happened to you and how it may 
affect your future life is sometimes seen as a simple mental task. In reality, it is very complex cognitive 
process (a mental ability) and one that has not been sufficiently explored by scientists. Crucially, some 
patients may partly or wholly lose such ability, if certain areas of their brain are affected. This study aims to 
investigate the neurological and psychological basis of such processes. More specifically, the purpose of the 
study is to understand how emotions and thoughts about oneself may affect one’s perception of motor and 
visual difficulties and their everyday consequences.  
2. Why have I been chosen? 
In total, around 30 individuals will participate in this study. You, as well as the other participants, were 
chosen based on the type of brain damage you had and particularly the site of the problem.  
3. Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to take part you will be given this 
information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free to 
withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to 
take part, will not affect the standard of care you receive. 
According to your notes you have not participated in any other research, but please note that if you have 
been involved in any other research project, you should not take part in this study. 
4. What will happen to me if I take part? 
You are asked to take part in this study by participating in different psychological studies and tasks. These 
will take place in four to six different sessions, which will last a maximum of an hour each and will be 
scheduled, at your convenience, on non-consecutive days. During the first session you will be encouraged to 
describe the experience of your neurological illness and give its history. A number of standard cognitive tests 
of memory, attention and problem-solving will also be administered in the first and second sessions. For 
example, you will be asked to complete a number of tests concerning knowledge (e.g. defining words), 
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thinking (e.g. interpreting proverbs) and attention (e.g. identifying common patterns in figures). During these 
tasks we will also measure certain physiological functions, such as your heart-rate. In the third session, you 
will be asked to answer a number of questions regarding your present emotions and the view you have of 
yourself following your illness. In the next two sessions, you will be asked to perform certain cognitive tasks 
such as completing sentences, and memorising words or phrases. You need to be concentrated in order to 
complete these tasks. At the last session, we will explain the details of certain of the administered tests in 
ways that we will not be able to reveal until you have completed the tasks. If you wish you may also ask for 
feedback on your answers, although the full results of the study will not be available at that stage. Your 
answers may be audio- and video- recorded and we may look at these recordings together if you wish. If 
out-patient appointments are arranged (subject to your agreement and convenience) we will reimburse your 
travel expenses to and from the hospital. 
Please note that these sessions are independent of your clinical care and treatment, and they should not 
interfere with the latter at any stage and for any reason. Please also note that they are not needed for your 
care.   
5. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no anticipated risks involved in this research, but if you should experience mental and/or physical 
fatigue, or any form of psychological distress please be aware that you could inform the investigator 
immediately and discontinue the session or even the study, if you wish and without consequences.  
6. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There is no direct benefit to yourself from taking part in the study. The information we get from this study 
may help us to understand and treat future patients with similar brain damage better.  
7. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential.  
Any information about you which leaves the hospital will have your name and address removed so that you 
cannot be recognised from it.  All audio- and video- recordings made will be suitably anonymised, securely 
stored and made accessible only to the investigators. Anonymous data will be extracted from these 
recordings and the tapes will be destroyed 3 years after the completion of the study. Anonymous data will be 
retained for 5 years following their potential publication.  
8. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the research will form the basis of future scientific papers. These will be submitted for 
publication approximately one year following the completion of the study. Your identity and the confidentiality 
of your answers will be protected.  
9. What if something goes wrong? 
If you are harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special compensation arrangements.  
If you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for a legal action but you may 
have to pay for it.  Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns about any aspect of the 
way you have been approached or treated during the course of this study, the normal National Health 
Service complaints mechanisms should be available to you. 
10. Who is organising and funding the research? 
This study is a research project, forming part of a two-year research fellowship at King’s College, University 
of London and a doctorate degree at Middlesex University. The study is being funded by a joint grant of the 
Medical Research Council, and the Economic and Social Research Council.  
11. Who has reviewed the study? 










TITLE OF PROJECT: Awareness of Illness Following Brain Damage 
 
 Please tick as necessary 
 
Have you read the Subject Information Sheet?                                         YES  
 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study?      YES  
 
Who have you spoken to?   Dr/Prof. ...................................................... 
 
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study: 
 
 * at any time 
 * without having to give a reason for withdrawing 
 * and without affecting your future care and treatment?                          YES  
 
Do you understand that some of your answers  in the study will be audio- and video-taped ? 
Do you consent to the unattributed and  confidential use of these recordings for  
scientific purposes?                                                                                               YES 
 
Do you understand that sections of any of your medical notes may be looked at by the main 
researchers where it is relevant to your taking part in research? Do you give permission for 
these individuals to have access to your records?                                                 YES 
 
Participant                                                                                                                     
Signed .............................................………................     Date ........................................... 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) ......................................................………........................ 
 
Researcher 
Signed .............................................………................     Date ........................................... 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) ......................................................………........................ 
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8.3. Appendix IV: Hayling Test Sentences 
Sentences are presented here in thematic order (rather than randomised), in order to highlight their 
linguistic and syntantic similarities across the three (colour coded here) semantic categories, i.e. 
disability, neutral and negative. Their syntax and grammar and word and letter count is matched as 
closely as possible: 
1. Being unable to move your limbs when you want to, can make you feel very __________ 
2. Being unable to park your car where you want to, can make you feel very___________ 
3. Being unable to defend yourself when physically attacked, can make you feel 
very___________ 
4. Being depended on others is something that you may have to get use to following your brain 
_________ 
5. Wearing a seat-belt is something that you may have to get used to when driving your 
new________ 
6. Being in danger is something that you may have to get used to when walking in 
dodgy_________ 
7. Because you can no longer move on your own you might feel less able than ________ 
8. Because you cannot drive an automatic car you might feel less modern than ________ 
9. Because you can rarely go out alone at night in safety you might feel more constrained 
than___________ 
10. Following severe brain damage your movement may be ________ 
11. Following a severe motor accident your car may be ____________ 
12. Following a severe sexual assault your confidence may be ___________  
13. When you are paralysed, you cannot even get dressed on your own  and you have to ask 
for_________ 
14. When you are a new driver you cannot even get into the garage on your own and you have 
to park___________ 
15. When you are physically assaulted you sometimes cannot even get over it on your own and 
you have to ask for________  
16. A hoist is often used to lift paralysed patients off the_________ 
17. A tow truck is often used to pull broken-down cars off the________  
18. An ambulance is often used to take assaulted people to the ________ 
19. Wheelchairs are used for people who cannot ___________ 
20. Glasses are used for drivers who cannot ______________ 
21. Tranquilisers are often used for violence victims who cannot__________ 
22. Often people who had a stroke need physiotherapy in order to re-learn how to move their 
______ 
23. Often drivers who previously lived abroad need driving lessons in order to learn to drive on 
the opposite  __________ 
24. Often people who have been physically assaulted need psychotherapy in order to feel more 
__________      
25. Some people recover completely following brain damage but others might be left with some 
permanent motor __________ 
26. Some cars can be repaired following motor accidents but others might be left with some 
permanent mechanical___________ 
27. Some people recover completely following physical attacks but others might be left with 
some permanent emotional___________ 
28. Trying to drive your car when its engine is damaged can be very __________ 
29. Trying to move your body when your brain is damaged can be very _________ 
30. Trying to escape when you are physically attacked can be very_____________ 
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8.4. Appendix V. Experimental Design and Set-Up in Chapters 4 and 5  
Chapter 4. Design 
Instruction to 
Patients 
Rubber Hand Held by Experimenter 
Movement No Movement 
Self-Intention Control for Vision, Attention and 
Comprehension 
Condition Similar to Clinical 
Presentation 
Other-Intention Control for Vision, Attention and 
Comprehension 
Critical Control Condition for the Motor 
Intention Hypothesis 
No Intention Control for Vision, Attention and 
Comprehension 
Critical Control Condition for the Motor 
Intention Hypothesis 
 
Chapter 4. Set-up 
 
Chapter 5. Design 
Pre-Assement Video Viewing Post-Assessment 
Neurolological, Neuropsychological  
and Awareness Battery 
90 seconds Neurolological, Neuropsychological  
and Awareness Battery 
Chapter 5. Set-Up.  
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8.5. Appendix VI. Glossary 
 Body Agency.  A fundamental facet of the bodily self referring to the sense, feeling or 
metacognitive judgement that I am the cause or author of a movement and its consequences in 
the world) (Gallagher, 2003; Legrand, 2006).  
Body Ownership. A fundamental facet of the bodily self referring to the sense, feeling or 
metacognitive judgement that I am the subject of a voluntary or involuntary movement, or that 
I am experiencing a certain sensation like touch. 
Core or Minimal Self. The common denominator of all other facets of self-consciousness, or 
awareness, experienced by the subject as an immediate subject of experience, unextended in 
time (Gallagher, 2000). Importantly, this minimal self is not to be conceived as a kind of 
internal representation of some substance called the “self”. Instead, minimal selfhood is 
conceived as an ongoing, dynamic and emergent processes of tracking and controlling bodily 
properties as a whole and hence the notion of the self needs to be grounded in its bodily 
foundations (Bermúdez et al. 1995; Gallagher 2005; Legrand 2006). The idea that our everyday 
experiences are characterized by a minimal or ‘pre-reflective’ (see term) sense of self has been 
highlighted by a longstanding phenomenological tradition and more recently referred to as the 
“minimal self” by contemporary philosophers such as Zahavi (2005, 2014), Gallagher (2008) 
and Legrand (2006) with direct reference to the phenomenological tradition. According to such 
views, the development of the mind, and particularly cognition, can be viewed as the 
consequence of embodiment within a wider physical and social environment.  
Embodiment refers to the fact that the experiences I am living through are given to me through 
my body, an organism situated in a particular space-time context.  
First- and third-person perspective. The first-person perspective can be considered as a basic 
constituent of a ‘‘minimal self’’ (Gallagher, 2000). It enables us to experience the subjective 
multimodal experiential space centered on our own body (Vogeley et al., 2004). At a 
phenomenal level, the first-person means the centralization of the subjective multidimensional 
and multimodal experiential space around one’s own body. At a representational level, it 
coincides with the egocentric reference frame, constituted by subject-to-object relations which 
can be distinguished from the allocentric reference frame constituted by object-to-object 
relations. At the phenomenal level, it can be opposed to the third-person perspective, in which 
mental states are ascribed to someone else. In visuospatial perspective taking, one can take a 
visuospatial third-person perspective but remain egocentric, i.e. translocate the first-person 
perspective into another space.  
Motor awareness. A fundamental facet of the bodily self, referring to the sense, feeling or 
metacognitive judgement that I am moving, or have just executed a movement. 
Narrative, or extended self. A more or less coherent self (a self-story or self-image) that is 
constituted with a past and a future in the various stories that we and others tell about ourselves 
(Gallagher, 2000). 
Non-conceptual, or non-representational first-person content. The content of a primitive 
self-consciousness that is not informed by conceptual thought, or reflection. For example, the 
ecological content of perception that specifies one’s own embodied position in the environment 
(Gallagher, 2000). 
Perception is used to describe a ‘cognitive process’ of appreciating certain properties of stimuli 
in the environment or changes in one’s own body.  
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Reductionism. Methodological reductionism refers to the splitting of a larger question or 
phenomenon to smaller parts or processes with the aim of reducing its complexity and 
increasing the possibility of studying such components with greater precision and scientific 
control. Epistemological reductionism refers to the theory that a larger, or complex 
phenomenon can be explained by certain more fundamental processes at a lower level of 
analysis. Ontological reductionism as applied to mental phenomena refers to the theory that 
all mental phenomena can be reduced to physical causes.  
Tacit or implicit awareness is defined as “knowledge that is expressed in task performance 
unintentionally and with little or no phenomenal awareness” (Schacter, 1990, p. 157). 
Unawareness of deficit. The apparent loss of one’s ability to sense, feel or judge a physical, 
emotional or cognitive disability, or its consequences.   
 
 
 
